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Journal of Discrete Mathematical Sciences and Cryptography

Secure pairing-based cryptographic protocols

Suresh Rajpurohit, Aabha Patil, Nilesh Vispute, Uma Goradiya, Prachi Wagde, Swapna Ambekar

Published Oct 31, 2026• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

The secure pairing cryptographic protocols have become a strong paradigm to offer possessing security facilities of high level including identity-based encryptions, short signature and an effective key exchange in a distributed set up.The paper below gives a sketch of how to achieve secure two-way communication protocols based on the theory of bilinear maps and hardness assumptions such as Bilinear Diffie Hellman (BDH), Computational Diffie Hellman (CDH) and Decisional Diffie Hellman (DDH).The proposed architecture possesses a strong key generation, secure distribution as well as effective encryption-decryption at the small scale (resource constrained) and large scale.Analytical analysis shows that security resiliency is better with adaptive adversaries and ensuring computational efficiency.Compared ideas provide less complexity of significant administration and greater scalability in contrast to customary public key infrastructures.This model can be applied to cloud security, IoT networks and decentralized systems and this provides a solid guideline on how to develop the next-generation cryptographic protocols.

DOI
10.47974/jdmsc-3044

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The secure pairing cryptographic protocols have become a strong paradigm to offer possessing security facilities of high level including identity-based encryptions, short signature and an effective key exchange in a distributed set up.The paper below gives a sketch of how to achieve secure two-way communication protocols based on the theory of bilinear maps and hardness assumptions such as Bilinear Diffie Hellman (BDH), Computational Diffie Hellman (CDH) and Decisional Diffie Hellman (DDH).The proposed architecture possesses a strong key generation, secure distribution as well as effective encryption-decryption at the small scale (resource constrained) and large scale.Analytical analysis shows that security resiliency is better with adaptive adversaries and ensuring computational efficiency.Compared ideas provide less complexity of significant administration and greater scalability in contrast to customary public key infrastructures.This model can be applied to cloud security, IoT networks and decentralized systems and this provides a solid guideline on how to develop the next-generation cryptographic protocols.
Designing efficient key agreement protocols is a fundamental cryptographic problem. In this paper, we first define a security model for key agreement in certificateless cryptography that is an extension of earlier models. We note that the existing pairing free protocols are not secure in our model. We design an efficient pairing-free, single round protocol that is secure in our model based on the hardness assumption of the Computational Diffie Hellman (CDH) problem. We also observe that previously existing pairing-free protocols were secure based on much stronger assumptions such as the hardness of the Gap Diffie Hellman problem. We use a restriction of our scheme to design an efficient pairing-free single round identity based key agreement protocol that is secure in the id-CK+ model based on the hardness assumption of the CDH problem. Additionally, both our schemes satisfy several other security properties such as forward secrecy, resistance to reflection attacks etc.
Combined public key (CPK) cryptography does not need certificates to guarantee the authenticity of public keys and avoids the inherent key escrow problem of identity-based cryptography. Based on the efficient CPK scheme, we present an efficient three-round two-party authenticated key exchange protocol with strong security, which is provably secure in the standard model under the decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption. The protocol can keep the session key secret from the adversary except that one party’s ephemeral private key and static private key are all revealed to the adversary. Compared to the existing protocols, this protocol not only assures strong security but also is more efficient.
Key exchange protocols, first introduced by Diffie and Hellman in 1976, are one of the most widely-deployed cryptographic protocols. They allow two parties, that have never interacted before, to establish shared secrets. These shared cryptographic keys may subsequently be used to establish a secure communication channel. Use cases include the classic client-server setting that is for example at play when browsing the internet, but also chats via end-to-end-encrypted instant messaging applications. Security-wise, we generally demand of key exchange protocols to achieve key secrecy and authentication. While, informally, authentication ensures that the communicating parties have confidence in the identity of their peers, key secrecy ensures that any shared cryptographic key that is established via the key exchange protocol is only known to the participants in the protocol and can be used securely in cryptographic protocols, i.e., is sufficiently random. In 1993, Bellare and Rogaway gave a first formalization of key exchange protocol security that captures these properties with respect to powerful adversaries with full control over the network. Their model constitutes the basis of the many subsequent treatments of authenticated key exchange security, including the models presented in this thesis. The common methodological approach underlying all of these formalizations is the provable security paradigm, which has become a standard tool in assessing the security of cryptographic protocols and primitives. So-called security models specify the expected security guarantees of the scheme in question with regards to a well-defined class of adversaries. Proofs that validate these security claims do so by reducing the security of the overall scheme to the security of the underlying cryptographic primitives and hardness assumptions. However, advances in computational power and more sophisticated cryptanalytic capabilities often render exactly these components insecure. Especially the advent of quantum computers will have a devastating effect on much of today's public key cryptography. This is especially true for key exchange protocols since they rely crucially on public-key algorithms. In this thesis, our focus in future-proofing key exchange protocols is two-fold. First, we focus on extending security models for key exchange protocols to capture the (un)expected break of cryptographic primitives and hardness assumptions. The aim is to gain assurances with respect to future adversaries and to investigate the effects of primitive failures on key exchange protocols. More specifically, we explore how key exchange protocols can be safely transitioned to new, post-quantum secure algorithms with hybrid techniques. Hybrids combine classical and post-quantum algorithms such that the overall key agreement scheme remains secure as long as one of the two base schemes remains secure. For this, we introduce security notions for key encapsulation mechanisms that account for adversaries with varying levels of quantum capabilities and present three new constructions for hybrid key encapsulation mechanisms. Our hybrid designs are practice-inspired and for example capture draft proposals for hybrid modes in the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol, which is one of the most widely-deployed cryptographic protocols that enables key agreement. Furthermore, our notion of breakdown resilience for key exchange protocols allows to gauge the security of past session keys in the event of a failure of a cryptographic component in the key exchange. We exercise our model on variants of the post-quantum secure key exchange protocol NewHope by Alkim et al. Thereby, we confirm the intuition that, in order to guard against adversaries that only have access to quantum computing power in the (more distant) future, it is sufficient to use classically-secure authentication mechanisms alongside post-quantum key agreement to achieve authenticated key exchange. As with any mathematical statement, theorems in the provable security paradigm are only as valid as the underlying assumptions. A careful consideration of any newly made assumption is thus essential to ensure the meaningfulness of the statement itself and make the assumption a viable tool for future analyses. Thus, secondly, we systematically classify the PRF-ODH assumption, a complexity-theoretic hardness assumption that has been used in key exchange security analyses of such prominent protocols as TLS, Signal, and Wireguard. In particular, we give a unified, parametrized definition of the assumption encompassing different variants that are present in the literature. We relate the resulting parametrized notions in terms of their strength and show where these assumptions fit in the collection of well-understood related hardness assumptions. We finally sketch our result on the impossibility of instantiating this assumption in the standard model, thereby disposing of the uncertainty in the community whether PRF-ODH is in fact a standard model assumption, i.e., removes the usage of some idealized assumptions in key exchange protocol proofs.
One-round group authenticated key exchange (GAKE) protocols typically provide implicit authentication and appealing bandwidth efficiency. As a special case of GAKE – the pairing-based one-round tripartite authenticated key exchange (3AKE), recently gains much attention of research community due to its strong security. Several pairing-based one-round 3AKE protocols have recently been proposed to achieve provable security in the g-eCK model. In contrast to earlier GAKE models, the g-eCK model particularly formulates the security properties regarding resilience to the leakage of various combinations of long-term key and ephemeral session state, and provision of weak perfect forward secrecy in a single model. However, the g-eCK security proofs of previous protocols are only given under the random oracle model. In this work, we give a new construction for pairing-based one-round 3AKE protocol which is provably secure in the g-eCK model without random oracles. Security of proposed protocol is reduced to the hardness of Cube Bilinear Decisional Diffie-Hellman (CBDDH) problem for symmetric pairing. We also extend the proposed 3AKE scheme to a GAKE scheme with more than three group members, based on multilinear maps. We prove g-eCK security of our GAKE scheme in the standard model under the natural multilinear generalization of the CBDDH assumption.
An authenticated key agreement (AKA) protocol is extremely essential to secure communications over insecure public networks. It enables the communication parties to securely set up a shared session key in present of the malicious attackers. Certificate-based cryptography (CBC) is a novel public-key cryptographic primitive that has many attractive merits. It solves the certificate revocation problem in conventional public-key cryptography and the key-escrow problem in identity-based cryptography. Till now, four AKA protocols have been proposed in the setting of CBC. However, all of them adopt the costly bilinear pairings and are not suitable for the devices which have limited computing resources and battery power. So, it is interesting and worthwhile to design a certificate-based AKA protocol without using the bilinear pairings. In this paper, we develop a pairing-free certificate-based AKA protocol. The proposed protocol is proven secure under the classic computational Diffie-Hellman assumption in the random oracle model. Compared with the previous pairing-based certificate-based AKA protocols, the proposed protocol enjoys obvious advantage in the computation efficiency.DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5755/j01.itc.46.3.14968
Key agreement is one of the fundamental cryptographic primitives in public key cryptography. It plays an important role for securing systems in practice. In this paper, we present the first certificateless one-way authenticated two-party key agreement protocol. The security of the proposed protocol is analyzed based on the intractability of the standard discrete logarithm (DL) and bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) problems. For efficiency, our protocol enjoys low complexity in both communication and computation.