Quantum Mechanics and the Dispute over Its Interpretation

Manuel Bernardo Muñoz Bastias

Published Oct 28, 2026• 0 citations

Abstract

This chapter repeats for quantum mechanics the comparison carried out for relativity in Chapter 5. Its thesis is that the same three interpretative families, neo-Kantian, empiricist and scientific realist, reappear in the philosophical reception of quantum mechanics, but in a more radical form, because the dispute now reaches the meaning of the quantum state, of probability and of measurement. The chapter first identifies what the formalism established in Chapter 4 leaves open and treats the Copenhagen framework as a point of departure rather than a unified doctrine. It then reconstructs the neo-Kantian interpretation (the Kantian affinities of Bohr’s complementarity, Cassirer, Grete Hermann and contemporary transcendental perspectives), the empiricist interpretation (Heisenberg’s observability principle, instrumentalism, Schlick, Frank, Reichenbach and van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism) and, on equal terms, the realist interpretation: Einstein and the EPR argument, Popper’s propensities, the de Broglie–Bohm theory, Bell’s beables and local causality, realist modal interpretations, and the Everett and collapse programmes. The realist family is the most developed of the three in quantum mechanics, but it is also internally plural: it affirms that the theory refers to a mind-independent reality while disagreeing about whether that reality consists of particles, fields, propensities, branching worlds or definite and possible properties. On this basis the chapter compares the three interpretations of causality and of stationary action. Causality appears as a relativized condition of objective description, as a statistical relation without surplus content, or as an objective but non-local structure; stationary action appears as a coordination axiom of quantum dynamics, as an empirically equivalent formulation, or as a real dynamical structure that in Bohm’s theory directly guides motion. The result confirms the pattern of Chapter 5 and identifies the precise point, the relation between quantum possibility and actuality, from which the BBMT bridge of Chapter 7 will start.

DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.23731298

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