This chapter completes the physical groundwork of the thesis by examining quantum mechanics, the second of the two theories that the following chapters interpret philosophically. Rather than offering an exhaustive mathematical treatment, it selects the concepts required to follow the two transversal principles identified in Chapter 3: causality and the principle of stationary action. It presents the emergence of the quantum of action, the formal structure of the theory (states, observables, Born’s rule, Schrödinger dynamics, superposition and entanglement), the double-slit experiment, the uncertainty principle, the measurement problem, and the sequence formed by the EPR argument, Bell’s theorem and its experimental tests. Using the three senses of causality distinguished in Chapter 3, the chapter shows that Heisenberg’s 1927 attempt to refute the law of causality did not succeed: unitary evolution preserves dynamical determination at the level of the quantum state, while the no-signalling condition and relativistic microcausality preserve causal precedence and causal propagation, even though Bell-local models fail. It then shows that action, present at the very birth of the theory as Planck’s quantum of action, governs quantum dynamics through Feynman’s path integral and Schwinger’s quantum action principle, and that the classical principle of stationary action re-emerges in the classical limit. The principal result, restricted to physics, is that causality and stationary action are transversal to classical, relativistic and quantum physics, although their mathematical formulation changes. Ontological conclusions are reserved for the following chapters.
This chapter completes the physical groundwork of the thesis by examining quantum mechanics, the second of the two theories that the following chapters interpret philosophically. Rather than offering an exhaustive mathematical treatment, it selects the concepts required to follow the two transversal principles identified in Chapter 3: causality and the principle of stationary action. It presents the emergence of the quantum of action, the formal structure of the theory (states, observables, Born’s rule, Schrödinger dynamics, superposition and entanglement), the double-slit experiment, the uncertainty principle, the measurement problem, and the sequence formed by the EPR argument, Bell’s theorem and its experimental tests. Using the three senses of causality distinguished in Chapter 3, the chapter shows that Heisenberg’s 1927 attempt to refute the law of causality did not succeed: unitary evolution preserves dynamical determination at the level of the quantum state, while the no-signalling condition and relativistic microcausality preserve causal precedence and causal propagation, even though Bell-local models fail. It then shows that action, present at the very birth of the theory as Planck’s quantum of action, governs quantum dynamics through Feynman’s path integral and Schwinger’s quantum action principle, and that the classical principle of stationary action re-emerges in the classical limit. The principal result, restricted to physics, is that causality and stationary action are transversal to classical, relativistic and quantum physics, although their mathematical formulation changes. Ontological conclusions are reserved for the following chapters.
This chapter repeats for quantum mechanics the comparison carried out for relativity in Chapter 5. Its thesis is that the same three interpretative families, neo-Kantian, empiricist and scientific realist, reappear in the philosophical reception of quantum mechanics, but in a more radical form, because the dispute now reaches the meaning of the quantum state, of probability and of measurement. The chapter first identifies what the formalism established in Chapter 4 leaves open and treats the Copenhagen framework as a point of departure rather than a unified doctrine. It then reconstructs the neo-Kantian interpretation (the Kantian affinities of Bohr’s complementarity, Cassirer, Grete Hermann and contemporary transcendental perspectives), the empiricist interpretation (Heisenberg’s observability principle, instrumentalism, Schlick, Frank, Reichenbach and van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism) and, on equal terms, the realist interpretation: Einstein and the EPR argument, Popper’s propensities, the de Broglie–Bohm theory, Bell’s beables and local causality, realist modal interpretations, and the Everett and collapse programmes. The realist family is the most developed of the three in quantum mechanics, but it is also internally plural: it affirms that the theory refers to a mind-independent reality while disagreeing about whether that reality consists of particles, fields, propensities, branching worlds or definite and possible properties. On this basis the chapter compares the three interpretations of causality and of stationary action. Causality appears as a relativized condition of objective description, as a statistical relation without surplus content, or as an objective but non-local structure; stationary action appears as a coordination axiom of quantum dynamics, as an empirically equivalent formulation, or as a real dynamical structure that in Bohm’s theory directly guides motion. The result confirms the pattern of Chapter 5 and identifies the precise point, the relation between quantum possibility and actuality, from which the BBMT bridge of Chapter 7 will start.
This chapter introduces quantum mechanics through the experimental discoveries that revealed the limits of classical physics. Beginning with the historical debate over whether light is a wave or a particle, it examines Young’s double-slit experiment and its modern single-particle versions, which demonstrate that quantum objects can exist in superpositions of mutually exclusive states. The chapter explains how interference arises when alternative possibilities are not measured and how interaction with the environment suppresses these effects through decoherence, giving rise to classical behavior at macroscopic scales. A sequence of thought experiments involving interferometers and Stern–Gerlach devices highlights the counterintuitive structure of quantum measurement and the incompatibility of certain physical properties, as captured by the uncertainty principle. The chapter emphasizes that quantum mechanics does not describe particles taking multiple paths simultaneously in a classical sense but rather requires a new framework for probability based on amplitudes and interference. Finally, the discussion connects these foundational ideas to emerging technologies such as quantum computing, showing how superposition and entanglement can be harnessed to perform computations that have no classical analogue.
The classical world, governed by classical physics, might have felt more intuitive and certain. However, the 20th century’s revolutionary birth of quantum mechanics opened a way to the “quantum world”. This chapter investigates the evolving concept of “world”, especially exploring the special and general theories of relativity, with Wittgenstein’s philosophical view that the world is composed of facts, or the existence of states of things. Quantum mechanics has two essential principles: The Heisenberg uncertainty principle and the new Heisenberg uncertainty principle, where the former indicates the inherent uncertainty within the quantum world and the latter uncovers the certainty under some circumstances such as quantum entanglement. Quantum mechanics, while having multiple interpretations, is considered a relatively complete framework; however, its “counterfactuals”—scientific facts that defy classical expectations—can be challenging for the classical understanding. Additionally, the potential for “backward causality” under time symmetry conditions adds another level of complexity. These counterfactuals and the possibility of backward causality don’t contradict existing facts, but rather signal the expansion of our scientific scope and, potentially, a new scientific paradigm.
This article surveys a selection of key conceptual and interpretational developments in quantum mechanics, tracing the theory from its foundational postulates to contemporary discussions of measurement, nonlocality, and the emergence of classicality. Beginning with the structure of Hilbert space and the postulates governing state evolution and measurement, the epistemic stance of the Copenhagen interpretation and its modern reformulations are examined. The Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen argument, Bell's theorem, and Hardy's paradox are then discussed as probes of locality and realism, alongside the deterministic but explicitly nonlocal de Broglie-Bohm theory. The measurement problem and the implications of contextuality are analyzed in relation to objective collapse models, which introduce new physical dynamics to account for definite outcomes. Finally, the role of decoherence in the suppression of interference and the emergence of classical behavior is explored, together with the interpretational frameworks of many-worlds and consistent histories. This material aims to provide a coherent introductory overview of how several of the most prominent interpretations address the central concern of what quantum mechanics tells us about the nature of physical reality.
The laws of quantum mechanics were formulated in the year 1925 through the work of Werner Heisenberg, followed by Max Born, Pascual Jordan, Paul Dirac, and Wolfgang Pauli. A separate but equivalent approach was independently developed by Erwin Schrödinger in early 1926. The laws governing quantum mechanics were highly mathematical and their aim was to explain many unresolved problems within the framework of a formal theory. The conceptual foundation emerged in the subsequent 2–3 years that indicated how radically different the new laws were from classical physics. In this chapter some of these salient features of quantum mechanics are discussed. The topics include the quantization of energy, wave–particle duality, the probabilistic nature of quantum mechanics, Heisenberg uncertainty relations, Bohr’s principle of complementarity, and quantum superposition and entanglement. This discussion should indicate how different and counterintuitive its fundamentals are from those of classical physics.
This article surveys a selection of key conceptual and interpretational developments in quantum mechanics, tracing the theory from its foundational postulates to contemporary discussions of measurement, nonlocality, and the emergence of classicality. Beginning with the structure of Hilbert space and the postulates governing state evolution and measurement, the epistemic stance of the Copenhagen interpretation and its modern reformulations are examined. The Einstein–Podolsky–Rosen argument, Bell’s theorem, and Hardy’s paradox are then discussed as probes of locality and realism, alongside the deterministic but explicitly nonlocal de Broglie–Bohm theory. The measurement problem and the implications of contextuality are analyzed in relation to objective collapse models, which introduce new physical dynamics to account for definite outcomes. Finally, the role of decoherence in the suppression of interference and the emergence of classical behavior is explored, together with the interpretational frameworks of many-worlds and consistent histories. This material aims to provide a coherent introductory overview of how several of the most prominent interpretations address the central concern of what quantum mechanics tells us about the nature of physical reality.