The security threats posed by quantum computing to existing cryptographic systems have accelerated the transition toward post-quantum solutions in Internet-oriented applications. However, for industrial cyber-physical systems (ICPSs), which operate in more complex environments and impose stricter safety requirements, research on quantum security remains significantly lagging behind. This paper focuses on a typical ICPS — DC microgrid (DCmG) — and proposes a quantum-resistant secondary control framework. Specifically, we reveal that the introduction of stronger post-quantum security mechanisms incurs additional communication overhead, which may conflict with the control stability requirement. To mitigate this issue, a session-reserve mechanism is proposed to decouple secure session establishment from the real-time control loop. Based on this method, a distributed configuration strategy using max-consensus is designed to enable fully decentralized deployment. Finally, theoretical analyses and hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) experiments with realistic communication conditions are conducted to comprehensively evaluate the proposed framework in terms of overhead, scalability, and closed-loop control performance. The results indicate that integrating post-quantum security enhancement mechanisms into ICPSs requires cyber-physical co-design, in which physical safety requirements are incorporated into the design and configuration of cyber security mechanisms to jointly ensure post-quantum security and operational safety.
The security threats posed by quantum computing to existing cryptographic systems have accelerated the transition toward post-quantum solutions in Internet-oriented applications. However, for industrial cyber-physical systems (ICPSs), which operate in more complex environments and impose stricter safety requirements, research on quantum security remains significantly lagging behind. This paper focuses on a typical ICPS — DC microgrid (DCmG) — and proposes a quantum-resistant secondary control framework. Specifically, we reveal that the introduction of stronger post-quantum security mechanisms incurs additional communication overhead, which may conflict with the control stability requirement. To mitigate this issue, a session-reserve mechanism is proposed to decouple secure session establishment from the real-time control loop. Based on this method, a distributed configuration strategy using max-consensus is designed to enable fully decentralized deployment. Finally, theoretical analyses and hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) experiments with realistic communication conditions are conducted to comprehensively evaluate the proposed framework in terms of overhead, scalability, and closed-loop control performance. The results indicate that integrating post-quantum security enhancement mechanisms into ICPSs requires cyber-physical co-design, in which physical safety requirements are incorporated into the design and configuration of cyber security mechanisms to jointly ensure post-quantum security and operational safety.
The security threat posed by quantum computing to existing cryptographic systems has driven a rapid shift toward post-quantum transformation in Internet-oriented applications. However, research on quantum security for industrial control systems, which operate in more complex environments and involve stronger safety requirements, remains significantly lagging. This paper focuses on the secondary control in DC microgrids (DCmGs) and conducts in-depth analysis of its severe quantum security threats. Targeting the widely used Modbus protocol in industrial control systems, we propose post-quantum security enhancement methods and construct a quantum-secure secondary control framework for DCmGs. Through analysis and hardware-in-the-loop experiments, we validate the effectiveness of the proposed approach and reveal the unique challenge faced by industrial control systems in the process of post-quantum transformation, requiring to align with the safety requirement (e.g., control performance) of physical entity.
The advent of quantum computing poses a significant threat to the cryptographic foundations that secure critical infrastructure information systems, including energy grids, transportation networks, healthcare systems, and financial services. Conventional public-key cryptographic schemes such as RSA and elliptic curve cryptography are vulnerable to quantum attacks, necessitating a paradigm shift toward post-quantum secure design principles. This review paper examines emerging post-quantum cryptographic frameworks and their role in strengthening detection and mitigation mechanisms within critical infrastructure environments. It systematically analyzes post-quantum algorithms, hybrid cryptographic models, and quantum-resilient authentication schemes, emphasizing their integration into intrusion detection systems, anomaly detection frameworks, and secure communication protocols. Additionally, the paper explores quantum-aware threat models, resilience-oriented system architectures, and adaptive mitigation strategies that enhance system survivability against both classical and quantum-enabled cyber threats. Key challenges including computational overhead, legacy system compatibility, scalability, and regulatory compliance are critically discussed, alongside ongoing standardization efforts and implementation case studies. By synthesizing current research and industry practices, this review provides a comprehensive roadmap for designing, deploying, and managing post-quantum secure detection and mitigation frameworks that ensure the long-term resilience, reliability, and trustworthiness of critical infrastructure information systems in the quantum era.
The advent of quantum computing poses a significant threat to the cryptographic foundations that secure critical infrastructure information systems, including energy grids, transportation networks, healthcare systems, and financial services. Conventional public-key cryptographic schemes such as RSA and elliptic curve cryptography are vulnerable to quantum attacks, necessitating a paradigm shift toward post-quantum secure design principles. This review paper examines emerging post-quantum cryptographic frameworks and their role in strengthening detection and mitigation mechanisms within critical infrastructure environments. It systematically analyzes post-quantum algorithms, hybrid cryptographic models, and quantum-resilient authentication schemes, emphasizing their integration into intrusion detection systems, anomaly detection frameworks, and secure communication protocols. Additionally, the paper explores quantum-aware threat models, resilience-oriented system architectures, and adaptive mitigation strategies that enhance system survivability against both classical and quantum-enabled cyber threats. Key challenges including computational overhead, legacy system compatibility, scalability, and regulatory compliance are critically discussed, alongside ongoing standardization efforts and implementation case studies. By synthesizing current research and industry practices, this review provides a comprehensive roadmap for designing, deploying, and managing post-quantum secure detection and mitigation frameworks that ensure the long-term resilience, reliability, and trustworthiness of critical infrastructure information systems in the quantum era.
Cyber-physical systems (CPS) are critical components in industrial control, automation, and real-time decision, making, where they must frequently rely on cooperative relaying to be able to communicate reliably and with low latency.Nevertheless, advancements in quantum computing capabilities pose a threat to the cryptographic measures traditionally used in these networks.This paper explores the possibility of combining post-quantum secure protocols with the cooperative relaying architectures of CPS environments.We have run simulations to measure the effectiveness of these security measures by monitoring various parameters such as the ability to resist eavesdropping, the efficiency of secure key distribution, throughput, latency, energy consumption, and channel capacity.Our findings indicate that post-quantum technology can be instrumental in fortifying communication security without compromising the efficacy of key management and spectral utilization.The suggested approach also shows excellent flexibility when subjected to realistic traffic scenarios, thereby allowing data transmission with minimal delay required by time, critical control applications.Although post-quantum schemes introduce moderate additional energy overhead, the improvement in long-term security resilience outweighs the cost.The findings confirm that quantum-resilient cooperative relaying provides robust protection for Industrial IoT, smart grid infrastructures, and autonomous control networks against future quantum-enabled attacks, making it a viable foundation for next-generation secure CPS communication.
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems represent the cyber-physical infrastructure core of critical infrastructure, where any security violation can cause severe operational and physical repercussions. The integration of operational technology with Information Technology networks has introduced new vulnerabilities to cyber attacks, while the emergence of quantum computing poses a basic threat to classical cryptographic approaches currently in use within industrial control systems. This paper presents a novel Zero-Trust Post-Quantum Cryptographic (ZT-PQC) solution specifically tailored for resource-constrained SCADA systems. The solution combines lightweight symmetric encryption for field devices, hybrid and pure post-quantum cryptography for higher layers, and continuous Zero-Trust policy enforcement throughout the communication process. A layer-aware cryptographic offloading approach is utilized to strike a balance between quantum resilience and real-time operational requirements. The feasibility of the proposed solution is assessed using a validated synthetic SCADA dataset simulating practical communication patterns, attack models, and system constraints. Experimental results show that the solution provides quantum-resistant security with acceptable latency, minimal communication overhead, and compatibility with existing SCADA systems, thus being amenable to incremental deployment in critical infrastructure systems.
The microgrid faces increasingly severe communication security challenges due to its open and highly interactive characteristics. However, the traditional trust architecture cannot cope with the dynamically changing identity authentication requirements, and data transmission based on classical encryption is vulnerable to attacks from quantum computers. Existing quantum-secure microgrid research typically requires both parties to possess full quantum capabilities, which limits its practicality in real-world deployments. To address these challenges, this paper proposes a semi-quantum secure commu nication framework for microgrids. Firstly, a semi-quantum authentication model based on zero-trust architecture is introduced to support dynamic and secure identity verification between the microgrid central controller (MGCC) and distributed energy resources (DERs). Secondly, a semi-quantum key distribution (SQKD) scheme is integrated, requiring only the MGCC to be fully quantum-capable, thereby reducing system complexity. Additionally, a dynamic key provisioning strategy is designed based on DERs' energy characteristics to improve resource efficiency and system security. Experimental results and analysis provide valuable insights for the design and deployment of semi quantum-enabled microgrid communication.