Federal policy now requires a transition to the NIST post-quantum standards ML-KEM (FIPS 203) and ML-DSA (FIPS 204). This report measures their computation time and message sizes at all standardized parameter sets on Google Colab cloud VM, against classical X25519, ECDSA P-256, and Ed25519. On Google Colab cloud VM, an ML-KEM-768 encapsulation took 28 microseconds and an ML-DSA-65 signature took 172 microseconds. Message size is the larger burden: one ML-KEM-768 exchange sends 2,272 bytes versus 64 for X25519, and an ML-DSA-65 public key plus signature is 5,261 bytes versus 96 for Ed25519. Timing was measured on a general-purpose platform as a reproducible baseline. Key, ciphertext, and signature sizes are identical on every platform, so the size results and their consequences for low-power wireless links apply directly to constrained devices; timing on constrained hardware is the next stage of this work. Code and raw data are available at https://github.com/iqrabatool/pqc-constrained-bench.
Federal policy now requires a transition to the NIST post-quantum standards ML-KEM (FIPS 203) and ML-DSA (FIPS 204). This report measures their computation time and message sizes at all standardized parameter sets on Google Colab cloud VM, against classical X25519, ECDSA P-256, and Ed25519. On Google Colab cloud VM, an ML-KEM-768 encapsulation took 28 microseconds and an ML-DSA-65 signature took 172 microseconds. Message size is the larger burden: one ML-KEM-768 exchange sends 2,272 bytes versus 64 for X25519, and an ML-DSA-65 public key plus signature is 5,261 bytes versus 96 for Ed25519. Timing was measured on a general-purpose platform as a reproducible baseline. Key, ciphertext, and signature sizes are identical on every platform, so the size results and their consequences for low-power wireless links apply directly to constrained devices; timing on constrained hardware is the next stage of this work. Code and raw data are available at https://github.com/iqrabatool/pqc-constrained-bench.
The recent introduction of Google’s Willow quantum chip has demonstrated remarkable computational capabilities, solving problems in microseconds that would take classical computers millions of years. As quantum computers advance toward cryptographic relevance, existing encryption algorithms become vulnerable to attacks that could break them within seconds or minutes, rendering current cryptographic protections ineffective. This necessitates the establishment of post-quantum cryptography (PQC) standards to secure systems in the quantum era. This study evaluates the performance of NIST-standardized PQC algorithms ML-KEM (512, 768, 1024) and ML-DSA (2, 3, 5) on a Raspberry Pi 4 Model B, representing baseline IoT device capabilities. Using the Liboqs library, each algorithm was executed across 1000 iterations in a real-world wireless network environment connected to a router, accounting for practical network conditions such as packet loss, latency, and jitter to assess computational feasibility under resource-constrained conditions. Experimental results demonstrate the practical viability of PQC algorithms in IoT environments. ML-KEM-512 achieves encapsulation in 55.76 μs and decapsulation in 56.15 μs, with key generation in 123.78 μs (median), while ML-DSA-44 completes signature generation in 379.83 μs and verification in 159.38 μs. These findings confirm that both ML-KEM and ML-DSA algorithms offer efficient and rapid performance, making them suitable candidates for securing IoT devices against quantum threats.
Abstract—The advent of fault-tolerant Cryptanalytically Relevant Quantum Computers (CRQCs) presents an existential threat to modern information security. Shor's polynomial-time quantum algorithm renders widely deployed public-key cryptographic primitives—including RSA, Diffie-Hellman (DH), and Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECDH/ECDSA)—completely vulnerable to private key derivation. Furthermore, 'Harvest Now, Decrypt Later' (HNDL) adversarial campaigns actively intercept and store encrypted enterprise telemetry today, anticipating future quantum decryption capabilities. In response, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) finalized its primary Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) standards in FIPS 203 (ML-KEM), FIPS 204 (ML-DSA), and FIPS 205 (SLH-DSA). However, transitioning complex enterprise IT ecosystems to quantum-resistant primitives introduces severe architectural and computational disruptions: public key and signature sizes increase by several orders of magnitude, cryptographic handshake latencies escalate, network packets experience Maximum Transmission Unit (MTU) fragmentation, and legacy Hardware Security Modules (HSMs) lack microarchitectural support for lattice-based polynomial arithmetic. This paper provides an exhaustive, mathematically grounded technical survey and architectural roadmap for enterprise PQC migration. We formalize the Module Learning with Errors (M-LWE) and Module Short Integer Solution (M-SIS) hardness foundations, evaluate hybrid classical/post-quantum cryptographic transition models across standard transport protocols (TLS 1.3, IKEv2/IPsec, SSH), and formulate an enterprise Crypto-Agility Maturity Model. Furthermore, we construct an empirical enterprise testbed measuring throughput, connection establishment latency, memory footprints, and packet fragmentation across legacy and quantum-resistant suites. Our results show that while ML-KEM-768 achieves microsecond-level encapsulation, its 1,088-byte ciphertext expands TLS ClientHello payloads into multiple TCP segments under constrained networks. Finally, we establish open research directions in post-quantum identity federations, stateful hash signature tracking, and hardware-accelerated polynomial arithmetic. Index Terms—Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC), FIPS 203 (ML-KEM), FIPS 204 (ML-DSA), Crypto-Agility, TLS 1.3, Lattice-Based Cryptography, Harvest Now Decrypt Later, Hardware Security Modules (HSM), Enterprise Migration.
Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) has emerged as a means to protect encryption from Quantum Computing (QC). Quantum Computing poses a threat towards classical cryptography because of its enhanced capability to solve complex mathematical problems quickly. To combat this, NIST has developed three standards for PQC: FIPS 203, FIPS 204, and FIPS 205. This study compares how the algorithms defined in FIPS 204 and FIPS 205, ML-DSA and SLH-DSA, compare to a baseline classical algorithm, Ed25519. Findings show that both ML-DSA and SLH-DSA offer slower signing times and verifying times compared to Ed25519. The algorithms also consume different amounts memory which can have an impact on future implementations. Future directions include the addition of future algorithms to improve the generability, a closer look at the ecological impacts as well as examining the component bottleneck in order to get a better understanding of how a switch towards these algorithms may impact the future.
Abstract Quantum computing threatens the security foundations of consumer electronics (CE). Preparing CE systems for the post-quantum transition requires quantitative evidence on the performance of standardized and selected post-quantum cryptography (PQC). This paper presents a cross-platform performance analysis of PQC key encapsulation mechanisms (KEMs) and digital signature schemes against classical RSA/ECC baselines. We evaluate execution time and communication and storage overhead on two desktop-class reference platforms (macOS/M4 and Ubuntu/x86-64) and on a Raspberry Pi 4 platform used as a proxy for Linux-based gateway-class CE hubs and gateways. To establish a portable software baseline, the benchmark excludes vendor-specific hardware acceleration such as NEON and AVX. The results show that lattice-based schemes, especially ML-KEM and ML-DSA, provide a favorable measured combination of execution time and object size for gateway-class deployment. By contrast, Classic McEliece imposes large public-key sizes, while SPHINCS+ incurs large signatures despite its conservative hash-based design. Based on these measurements, we provide recommendations for gateway-class CE devices and identify open issues for deeper embedded platforms.
The prospect of cryptographically relevant quantum computers threatens public-key primitives underpinning modern digital infrastructure, including RSA, Diffie-Hellman, and elliptic-curve cryptography. Post-quantum cryptography (PQC) responds with algorithms believed to be hard for both classical and quantum adversaries. In August 2024, the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) finalised the first three PQC standards: FIPS 203 (ML-KEM, based on Kyber), FIPS 204 (ML-DSA, based on Dilithium), and FIPS 205 (SLH-DSA, based on SPHINCS+). This paper surveys the algorithmic families behind these standards, the harvest-now-decrypt-later threat model, hybrid migration strategies, performance trade-offs, and the engineering challenges of transitioning the global cryptographic stack. We examine deployment progress in TLS, SSH, X.509, and constrained devices, and outline open research questions on side-channel security, falcon-style signatures, and the long-term replacement schedule for classical asymmetric cryptography.
A sufficiently capable quantum computer would break the public-key cryptography that secures the modern internet, and data captured today can be stored until that machine arrives. This harvest-now-decrypt-later threat has pushed standards bodies to act well ahead of the hardware. In 2024 NIST published the first finished post-quantum standards: ML-KEM, derived from CRYSTALS-Kyber, for key establishment, and ML-DSA, derived from CRYSTALS-Dilithium, for digital signatures. This paper examines how these algorithms move into the two protocols that carry most secured traffic, TLS 1.3 and IPsec. We describe the hybrid handshake that runs a classical and a post-quantum key-encapsulation mechanism side by side, we measure the cost of the larger keys and signatures these schemes carry, and we discuss the practical friction points such as oversized certificate chains and fragmented handshake records. Benchmarks reported in the literature show that a hybrid X25519 plus Kyber-768 handshake adds only a small latency penalty on a healthy network, while Dilithium signatures inflate the certificate path enough to matter on constrained links. We close with a staged migration plan built around crypto-agility.