I argue that properties and relations are in the same boat with respect to quantum mechanics. That just as properties cannot be considered as “hidden variables” so also neither can the relation of being correlated with. Nevertheless properties and relations can both be understood as incomplete expressions: they are both contextual, properly understood. The argument on this leverages a neglected proof by Adán Cabello. We show that this latter argument extends and strengthens an argument given by van Fraassen in his (2006). The argument given also considerably strengthens the arguments given previously by Cao (2003) and Psillos (2006). I end by sketching a way of understanding that this contextuality is similar across relativity theory and quantum theory
I argue that properties and relations are in the same boat with respect to quantum mechanics. That just as properties cannot be considered as “hidden variables” so also neither can the relation of being correlated with. Nevertheless properties and relations can both be understood as incomplete expressions: they are both contextual, properly understood. The argument on this leverages a neglected proof by Adán Cabello. We show that this latter argument extends and strengthens an argument given by van Fraassen in his (2006). The argument given also considerably strengthens the arguments given previously by Cao (2003) and Psillos (2006). I end by sketching a way of understanding that this contextuality is similar across relativity theory and quantum theory
What if Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen were right that quantum mechanics is incomplete, and there do exist ‘‘elements-of-reality’’ corresponding to all observables whether or not they are compatible? The implications are surprising. Not only must the values of these elements-of-reality depend upon what measurements are actually performed on the system, but also upon measurements performed at spacelike separation from it! The former dependence has been dubbed ‘‘contextualism,’’ and the latter ‘‘nonlocality.’’ It is important for students to understand the necessity of these two features, if only to reinforce the point that a straightforward classical recasting of quantum theory in terms of pre-existing measurement independent elements-of-reality is not feasible. Unfortunately the argument for contextualism, in particular, is daunting due to its reliance on an elaborate geometrical argument. I aim here to minimize the geometry needed to argue for contextualism by using some ideas inspired by the original arguments of Bell and of Kochen and Specker. Using similar methods, I simplify the closely related geometrical argument for nonlocality due to Heywood and Redhead and to Stairs.
Quantum mechanics is often regarded as paradoxical or incomplete due to the imposition of a classical ontology that is not suited to its domain. This paper proposes a reinterpretation based on the notion of contextual coherence, in which the quantum state is not an intrinsic property but a relational configuration dependent on interaction conditions. Measurement is thus understood as a regime transition characterized by phase fixation and the dispersion of coherence into the environment. Within this framework, the Résonon is introduced as a minimal conceptual unit articulating energy, information, and temporal phase. It does not constitute a new physical entity but serves as a theoretical tool to express the internal logic of coherence transitions. This approach allows for a reformulation of superposition, contextuality, and decoherence without invoking additional assumptions such as many worlds or hidden variables. Finally, the paper opens an epistemological dialogue with operative knowledge systems such as Ifá, highlighting a convergence around the notion of preparing reality. Quantum mechanics thus emerges as a theory of coherence regimes in transition, where reality stabilizes through contextual configurations rather than as a set of pre-existing objects.
The circumstances of measurement have more direct significance in quantum than in classical physics, where they can be neglected for well-performed measurements. In quantum mechanics, the dispositions of the measuring apparatus-plus-environment of the system measured for a property are a non-trivial part of its formalization as the quantum observable. A straightforward formalization of context, via equivalence classes of measurements corresponding to sets of sharp target observables, was recently given for sharp quantum observables. Here, we show that quantum contextuality, the dependence of measurement outcomes on circumstances external to the measured quantum system, can be manifested not only as the strict exclusivity of different measurements of sharp observables or valuations but via quantitative differences in the property statistics across simultaneous measurements of generalized quantum observables, by formalizing quantum context via coexistent generalized observables rather than only its subset of compatible sharp observables. Here, the question of whether such quantum contextuality follows from basic quantum principles is then addressed, and it is shown that the Principle of Indeterminacy is sufficient for at least one form of non-trivial contextuality. Contextuality is thus seen to be a natural feature of quantum mechanics rather than something arising only from the consideration of impossible measurements, abstract philosophical issues, hidden-variables theories, or other alternative, classical models of quantum behavior.
We propose a non-contextual hidden variable model, consistent with all predictions of quantum mechanics (QM). A careful scrutiny of consistency requirements of any hidden variable model with quantum mechanics and the corresponding no-go theorems, leads us to the conclusion that the notion of contextuality is not a necessary feature of QM. The alternative view that emerges, hinges on identifying a new classical property which we call multiplicativity. It turns out that by relaxing this condition of multiplicativity on hidden variable models, they can be made consistent with QM. The connection of non-multiplicativity to Bohm's model and to apparent contextuality is also discussed.
As far as classical physics is concerned, it is possible to trace causal relations between physical objects (i.e. particles in this case) back to intrinsic properties of these objects (such as their mass and charge). On this view, causal relations turn out to be internal instead of external relations, supervening on intrinsic properties of the relata (as proposed by Heil and Lowe). However, one can raise doubts about this view already in Newtonian mechanics. The decisive blow to this view comes from quantum physics, with Bell’s theorem proving that no dynamics based on local, intrinsic properties of quantum objects can yield the empirical predictions of quantum mechanics. Nonetheless, quantum entanglement by no means implies that we have to abandon an ontology of objects (i.e. substances such as particles) in favour of an ontology of structures (as claimed by French and Ladyman). Any of the known proposals for a quantum ontology of matter in space-time is committed to objects. However, on any of these proposals, what determines the dynamics of these objects are not local, intrinsic properties, but a global or holistic property instantiated by all the objects together – that is, a structure that takes all the objects in the universe as its relata. The view set out in this paper thus amounts to combining ontic structural realism with an ontology of objects that can be conceived as substances. This suggestion is illustrated by drawing on the ontology of quantum physics worked out by Bohm and Bell. 1.
The aim of this article is to offer a rejoinder to an argument against scientific realism put forward by van Fraassen, based on theoretical considerations regarding microphysics. At a certain stage of his general attack to scientific realism, van Fraassen argues, in contrast to what realists typically hold, that empirical regularities should sometimes be regarded as “brute facts”, which do not ask for explanation in terms of deeper, unobservable mechanisms. The argument from microphysics formulated by van Fraassen is based on the claim that in microphysics the demand for explanation leads to a demand for the so-called hidden-variable theories, which “runs contrary to at least one major school of thought in twentieth-century physics”. It is shown here that this argument does not represent an insurmountable obstacle to scientific realism, not even when a series of important theoretical and experimental results against hidden-variable theories — and not merely a conflict with a certain school of thought—is taken into account.