Beyond Post-Quantum Cryptography: Architecture, Memory, and Governance in the Quantum Era

Syed Muntasir Mamun

Published Oct 2, 2026• 0 citations

Abstract

These interview talking points open on the locks-versus-the-archive fallacy: treating post-quantum cryptography as a software migration does not protect historically stolen data. They state that harvest-now-decrypt-later is already underway, with encrypted enterprise archives being hoarded pending a later break of current encryption, and that security has to move from perimeter defence to data-level resilience so the archive can survive independently of who holds the transient keys. They then describe data-centre speciation into three forms: silicon compute (hot, GPU-dense infrastructure for real-time AI), molecular halls (DNA or synthetic-polymer archives for permanent, zero-power retention), and sovereign caches (geopolitically bound, physically air-gapped, jurisdictionally hardened local vaults). Interview talking points by Dr. Syed Muntasir Mamun, ORCID 0000-0001-6845-2853.

DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.23107892

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