In two 1952 papers David Bohm proposed a hidden-variables interpretation of quantum theory, completing an approach de Broglie had suggested in 1927. An electron is a particle accompanied by a field, described by the wave function, which gives rise to a quantum potential influencing the particle alongside the classical potential. Bohm later became critical of his own theory: the mathematical form of the quantum potential is arbitrary; for a many-body system it assumes a physical field in 3N-dimensional configuration space; and in measurement it leaves empty wave packets floating around. He responded by radically reinterpreting the quantum field as a field of information rather than a physical field, claiming thereby to solve all three problems. This proposal has been largely ignored in recent philosophy of physics. I situate it in relation to the nomological interpretation of the wave function and its dispositionalist and Humean variants, arguing that active information agrees with the nomological view about what the wave function is not while differing about what it is, and that it belongs among property rather than law interpretations. I conclude that it is a serious live option, which moreover suggests a new approach to the mind–matter relation.
In two 1952 papers David Bohm proposed a hidden-variables interpretation of quantum theory, completing an approach de Broglie had suggested in 1927. An electron is a particle accompanied by a field, described by the wave function, which gives rise to a quantum potential influencing the particle alongside the classical potential. Bohm later became critical of his own theory: the mathematical form of the quantum potential is arbitrary; for a many-body system it assumes a physical field in 3N-dimensional configuration space; and in measurement it leaves empty wave packets floating around. He responded by radically reinterpreting the quantum field as a field of information rather than a physical field, claiming thereby to solve all three problems. This proposal has been largely ignored in recent philosophy of physics. I situate it in relation to the nomological interpretation of the wave function and its dispositionalist and Humean variants, arguing that active information agrees with the nomological view about what the wave function is not while differing about what it is, and that it belongs among property rather than law interpretations. I conclude that it is a serious live option, which moreover suggests a new approach to the mind–matter relation.
Abstract The paper proposes that quantum theory implies a radically new notion of matter which has not been properly understood before David Bohm’s groundbreaking work. Bohm proposed that the fundamental particles of physics (such as electrons) are not merely pushed around mechanically by classical forces but are also able to respond to information. Information is thus assumed to be an objective commodity which can exist independently of the human mind and which actively guides or instructs physical processes. This notion of active information also applies in computational, biological and psychological phenomena, thus helping us to understand how the mental and the physical sides of reality are related. It may even help us to understand the nature of conscious experience. The latter part of the paper considers the deeper mathematical and physical background of quantum theory and suggests that we need to revise our basic assumptions about quantum objects, such as the role of the wave function.
In this paper I give a new information-theoretic analysis of the formalisms and interpretations of quantum mechanics (QM) in general, and of two mainstream interpretations of quantum mechanics in particular: The Copenhagen interpretation and David Bohm’s interpretation of quantum mechanics. Adopting Juan G. Roederer’s reading of the notion of pragmatic information, I argue that pragmatic information is not applicable to the Copenhagen interpretation since the interpretation is primarily concerned with epistemology rather than ontology. However it perfectly fits Bohm’s ontological interpretation of quantum mechanics in the realms of biotic and artificial systems. Viewing Bohm’s interpretation of QM in the context of pragmatic information imposes serious limitations to the qualitative aspect of such an interpretation, making his extension of the notion active information to every level of reality illegitimate. Such limitations lead to the idea that, contrary to Bohm’s claim, mind is not a more subtle aspect of reality via the quantum potential as active information, but the quantum potential as it affects particles in the double-slit experiment represents the non-algorithmic aspect of the mind as a genuine information processing system. This will provide an information-based ground, firstly, for refreshing our views on quantum interpretations and secondly, for a novel qualitative theory of the relationship of mind and matter in which mind-like properties are exclusive attributes of living systems. To this end, I will also take an information-theoretic approach to the notion of intentionality as interpreted by John Searle.
Abstract The paper investigates David Bohm’s philosophy of science as a form of fallibilist realism that underpins his causal interpretation of quantum mechanics Bohm (Bohm 1952a, 1952b, 1984, 1985, 1988, 1989, 1990; Bohm and Hiley 1975, 1984, 1993). Bohm’s central aim is to establish the superiority of his interpretation over the standard Copenhagen framework, particularly in contrast to that of Niels Bohr. Whereas Bohr asserts that knowledge of quantum phenomena is restricted to the statistical outcomes of measurement, Bohm’s approach is distinctly realist in orientation. Responding to the challenges posed by Einstein and other physicists, Bohm relies on extra-empirical criteria such as determinism, objectivity and intelligibility. The paper develops what will be termed the methodology of intuitive intelligibility (II), consisting of four stages: (1) reformulation of the standard quantum equations, (2) physical interpretation of the mathematical symbols, (3) drawing analogies with classical laws, and (4) drawing analogies with common experience. It is argued that Bohm applies the (II) methodology consistently, with the notable exception of the ontological status of the wave function and quantum potential. In attempting to explain causal relations from a 3N-dimensional configuration space (where N is the number of particles) to familiar three-dimensional space through an appeal to ‘information’, Bohm arguably commits a category mistake. A proposed resolution—drawing on Bohm’s own holistic analogies—is supported by the recent multi-field interpretation (Romano Multi-field and Bohm’s theory. Synthese, 198(30), 10587–10609, 2021). The term fallibilist realism aptly characterizes Bohm’s stance in the philosophy of science: he repeatedly emphasizes that the causal interpretation is not intended as a final theory. Nevertheless, holism constitutes a substantive ontological commitment that he is unwilling to abandon.
I combine the idea of a primitive ontology with the metaphysics of laws of nature. In so doing, I examine the theoretical entities that are postulated in Newtonian mechanics, classical electrodynamics, and the de Broglie–Bohm quantum theory. I argue that the existence of mass, forces, fields, and the wave-function depends on the status of laws. The three major theories on laws of nature I treat are Humeanism, dispositionalism, and primitivism about laws. I point out that properties are notoriously ignored in debates on primitive ontologies. In fact, I show that properties, both intrinsic and relational, aren’t needed in physics; therefore, I replace the primitive ontology with a primitive stuff ontology, whose elements have no properties. Recently, a debate has started on the ontological status of forces in classical mechanics; I criticize the major positions and present my own idea that focuses on the status of laws of nature. Another hot topic is the status of the wave-function. Here, I develop a new interpretation in the framework of Humeanism that crucially differs from that advocated by David Albert and Barry Loewer, in that our world is not an illusion of a reality in configuration space. In addition, I propose a hitherto unconsidered way in which the wave–function can be construed as a holistic disposition.
This paper introduces and analyses David Bohm's causal interpretation of quantum potential and his viewpoint of nonlocality. As the key of Bohm's causal interpretation of quantum theory, the interpretation of quantum potential has been paid serious attention to by Bohm since 1980's. Bohm reviews quantum potential from the perspective of information and puts forward some new views. Especially, Bohm probes into nonlocality on the basis of the view of quantum potential and active information. This is of great significance in both physics and philosophy.
There are three possible interpretations of the wave function in the de Broglie-Bohm theory: taking the wave function as corresponding to a physical entity or a property of the Bohmian particles or a law. In this paper, we argue that the first interpretation is favored by an analysis of protective measurements. The de Broglie-Bohm theory is an alternative to standard quantum mechan-ics initially proposed by de Broglie (1928) and later developed by Bohm (1952). According to the theory, a complete description of a quantum system is provided by the configuration defined by the positions of its particles together with its wave function. The wave function follows the linear Schrödinger equation and never collapses. The motion of the particles, which are usually called Bohmian particles, follows the so-called guiding equation. Although the de Broglie-Bohm theory is mathematically equivalent to quantum mechanics, there is no clear consensus with regard to its physical interpretation. In particular, the interpre-