Epistemology & Philosophy of Science

D. Bohm’s Realism and Holism

Petr Abramov

Published Jan 1, 2026• 0 citations

Abstract

Bohmian mechanics is the leading non-local realistic interpretation of quantum mechanics. Its development and defense against objections (by V. Allori, B. Hiley, and others) constitute a distinct field at the intersection of physics and the philosophy of science. The aim of this work is to examine, in the context of current debates on quantum realism, the scientific and philosophical ideas of D. Bohm in their interconnection. The novelty of the article includes: a characterization of D. Bohm’s epistemology, his system of metaphors, as well as a comparative analysis of his metaphysics with the philosophical concepts of N. Bohr and W. Heisenberg. In his epistemology, Bohm combines realism with the view that our knowledge is limited. In the case of a single particle, its trajectory can be visualized; for a hundred particles, this is practically impossible. Similarly, in metaphysics, the world is real, but at the deep level of the implicate order it is only partially knowable for us. It is emphasized that Bohm possesses a genuine system of mutually complementary metaphors that elucidate his metaphysics: besides the holographic one, these are “the fish in the aquarium”, “the drop of ink”, and “the radio signal to the ship”. The metaphor of the radio signal to the ship in mechanics demonstrates an informational, rather than a force-based, influence on the particle. In metaphysics, it acquires a broader meaning: information guides the development of macro-objects. In the philosophy of physics, D. Bohm’s dynamic holism is contrasted with N. Bohr’s epistemological line and Heisenberg’s Pythagorean line (A. Plotnitsky). Bohr also recognizes holism, but it is the holism of particle, apparatus, and observer. In Bohm, holism has an ontological, universal character, rather than being fragmented according to the observer’s standpoint. For Heisenberg, symmetries expressed in equations lie at the foundation of reality; for Bohm, however, the meaning and significance of equations are merely an isolated aspect of a unified whole, a manifestation of active information from it. These three lines represent three answers to the question of the foundation of physical reality.

DOI: 10.5840/eps202663345

Related papers

David Bohm’s philosophy of science in his causal interpretation of quantum mechanics

Marja‐Liisa Kakkuri‐Knuuttila

Abstract The paper investigates David Bohm’s philosophy of science as a form of fallibilist realism that underpins his causal interpretation of quantum mechanics Bohm (Bohm 1952a, 1952b, 1984, 1985, 1988, 1989, 1990; Bohm and Hiley 1975, 1984, 1993). Bohm’s central aim is to establish the superiority of his interpretation over the standard Copenhagen framework, particularly in contrast to that of Niels Bohr. Whereas Bohr asserts that knowledge of quantum phenomena is restricted to the statistical outcomes of measurement, Bohm’s approach is distinctly realist in orientation. Responding to the challenges posed by Einstein and other physicists, Bohm relies on extra-empirical criteria such as determinism, objectivity and intelligibility. The paper develops what will be termed the methodology of intuitive intelligibility (II), consisting of four stages: (1) reformulation of the standard quantum equations, (2) physical interpretation of the mathematical symbols, (3) drawing analogies with classical laws, and (4) drawing analogies with common experience. It is argued that Bohm applies the (II) methodology consistently, with the notable exception of the ontological status of the wave function and quantum potential. In attempting to explain causal relations from a 3N-dimensional configuration space (where N is the number of particles) to familiar three-dimensional space through an appeal to ‘information’, Bohm arguably commits a category mistake. A proposed resolution—drawing on Bohm’s own holistic analogies—is supported by the recent multi-field interpretation (Romano Multi-field and Bohm’s theory. Synthese, 198(30), 10587–10609, 2021). The term fallibilist realism aptly characterizes Bohm’s stance in the philosophy of science: he repeatedly emphasizes that the causal interpretation is not intended as a final theory. Nevertheless, holism constitutes a substantive ontological commitment that he is unwilling to abandon.

SyntheseOct 22, 20251 citation

THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL APPROACH TO QUANTUM MECHANICS: A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY OF QUANTUM MECHANICS BY REVISITING BOHR AND HUSSERL

Tina Bilban

Niels Bohr, considered one of the fathers of quantum mechanics, formulated a complex interpretation \nof quantum mechanics that guided his understanding of quantum experiments. The contemporary dispute \nbetween realism and anti-realism, the two main approaches to the interpretation of quantum mechanics, \nis often based on different attitudes towards or even readings of Bohr. We propose that a better \nunderstanding of Bohr’s philosophical thought can contribute to the contemporary reconciliation of \nthese opposing philosophical views and thus to a better understanding of the quantum world. Unfortunately, \nin many contemporary interpretations, Bohr’s philosophical approach to quantum mechanics \nhas been misunderstood, re-interpreted or labelled as ambiguous. This is mostly due to the dispersion \nof Bohr’s complex and unique interpretation through different texts, never united in a single systematically \nconceptualized work. To comprehensively explain Bohr’s philosophical approach and his main \nphilosophical concepts, we consider the many similarities between Bohr’s and Husserl’s philosophical \napproach to science. Husserl developed his philosophical standpoint in a cultural context similar to \nBohr’s and shared Bohr’s objects of philosophical consideration as well as his approach to these objects. \nParallel reading of Bohr’s and Husserl’s texts reveals the closeness between Bohr’s ontological realism— \nepistemological anti-realism standpoint and Husserl’s phenomenological standpoint. This explains \ntheir similar views on the relationship between mathematical language, scientific method and Nature. \nWhile Bohr’s use of the term phenomenon is not equal to Husserl’s, Husserl’s rigorous philosophical \nexplanation of the term helps us to better understand Bohr’s use. Furthermore, the parallel reading \nfacilitates better understanding of one of Bohr’s main philosophical theses, often labelled as ambiguous \nand interpreted in different ways, that it is necessary to use classical concepts to describe quantum phenomena. \nWe claim that the thesis is connected with the advance of epistemological reconsideration of \nscience at the time of Bohr’s writing. Thus, Bohr considers some parts of argumentation as self-evident, \nwhile they are not evident to the contemporary reader. Husserl’s analysis of the relationship between science and the life-world offers a much-needed background for a comprehensive understanding of \nBohr’s thesis. The insight into the similarities between Bohr’s and Husserl’s philosophical approach \nto science and scientific phenomena enables a philosophically rigorous reading of Bohr’s texts; it can \neliminate some of the disagreements between realists and anti-realists and provide a firmer philosophical \nground for a dialog between them.

HORIZON / Fenomenologicheskie issledovanija/ STUDIEN ZUR PHÄNOMENOLOGIE / STUDIES IN PHENOMENOLOGY / ÉTUDES PHÉNOMÉNOLOGIQUESJan 1, 202015 citations

Bohr, Einstein and Realism

Wojciech Daniel

The Bohr-Einstein debate on the interpretation of quantum mechanics may be viewed as a discussion on the epistemological status of knowledge gained by physics. It is shown that in fact the advent of quantum theory has led, in a new context, to an old philosophical controversy between epistemological realism (held by Einstein) and phenomenalism (held by Bohr). An inquiry into this controversy, taking into account the contemporary understanding of quantum mechanics based on the axiomatic study of its foundations, leads to the conclusion that contrary to widespread opinion, it is perfectly possible to formulate quantum mechanics in an entirely realistic manner according to the postulate of Einstein. We demonstrate that Bohr's episteme-logy, in which the role of experimental arrangements in the physical description is taken as a starting point, does not necessarily imply phenomenlism, but may be justifiably considered as a complementary standpoint to the realistic epistemology of Einstein, which is based on the notion of a mental construction which pictures reality.

dialecticaJan 1, 19897 citations

Heisenberg’s Representation of Quantum Reality

Gregg S. Jaeger

The innovations to physics introduced by Werner Heisenberg and Niels Bohr via quantum mechanics presented them with epistemological and metaphysical challenges with which they were perpetually engaged. Among Heisenberg’s innovations are the complex-valued quantum state-transition probability amplitudes, and among Bohr’s the non- trivial role of the measuring environment in the procurement of data. In his article, Arkady Plotnitsky examines the responses of these two natural philosophers to these challenges through the lens of Pythagoreanism in terms of the rational and the irrational. He argues that Bohr’s philosophical stance is of the Reality-without-Realism sort in that Bohr holds quantum reality to be unrepresentable, and that Heisenberg’s is of the Pythagorean-realist sort in that Heisenberg comes to hold reality to be representable, but only by mathematics. Here, I argue that Heisenberg’s later representation of reality can be characterized as neo- Aristotelian because, among other relevant things, he intentionally develops quantum potentiality, which is essential to his late interpretation of the quantum formalism, as a quantification of Aristotle’s potentia.

Epistemology & Philosophy of ScienceJan 1, 20251 citation

Real Consciousness in a Real World: Interactionist Monism

Paavo Pylkkänen

Perhaps more so than any other twentieth-century physicist, David Bohm was trying to develop an ontological interpretation for quantum theory, i.e. an interpretation which tells us what quantum theory says about the nature of reality. He is best known for presenting in 1952 an improved version of de Broglie’s ‘pilot-wave’ theory, which says that an electron is a particle always accompanied by a new type of quantum field or pilot wave which guides it. In later research Bohm realized that the pilot wave is not pushing and pulling the particle mechanically but rather contains information which guides the particle, analogously to the way radar waves guide a ship on autopilot. The postulation of such objective and active information to the quantum level is a radical metaphysical move which also opens a new way to understand how the material and mental sides of reality are related to each other. It might even make it easier to understand what phenomenal properties are and how they could play a causal role in the physical world. This paper provides an overview of not only the pilot-wave theory, but also Bohm’s other related frameworks, namely the implicate order and soma-significance. It is suggested that these views point to a new theory of the relation of consciousness and matter which we can call interactionist dual-aspect monism. This theory suggests, against illusionism, that phenomenal properties exist and, against idealism, that the world has a material aspect which exists independently of the human mind ‐ thus ‘real consciousness in a real world’.

Journal of Consciousness StudiesJun 1, 20252 citations

Bohr's philosophy of physics

Dugald R. Murdoch

Now that Bohr's philosophy of quantum physics has been surveyed in detail, it is time to provide a general description of his philosophy that illuminates the details. The question which I wish to address, then is: what is the general philosophy, or philosophical point of view, that underlies Bohr's philosophy of physics? Can his philosophy be neatly categorised in terms of any well known philosophical position? Apropos his philosophy of physics in particular, the question of primary interest is: to what extent, if any, is Bohr's philosophy of physics realist? No simple answer to this question can be given: indeed, certain realist and non-realist components are subtly interwoven in his philosophy, and to unravel them we shall need a fairly refined conception of what constitutes a realist interpretation of physics. Realism in the interpretation of physics The basis of realism is the view that statements of a certain class predicate properties of real objects, the truth-values of these statements being determined by reality as it is independently of how it appears to us to be. This notion is captured in the following characterisation of what constitutes the adoption of a realist interpretation of a physical theory.

Cambridge University Press eBooksNov 5, 198717 citations