The innovations to physics introduced by Werner Heisenberg and Niels Bohr via quantum mechanics presented them with epistemological and metaphysical challenges with which they were perpetually engaged. Among Heisenberg’s innovations are the complex-valued quantum state-transition probability amplitudes, and among Bohr’s the non- trivial role of the measuring environment in the procurement of data. In his article, Arkady Plotnitsky examines the responses of these two natural philosophers to these challenges through the lens of Pythagoreanism in terms of the rational and the irrational. He argues that Bohr’s philosophical stance is of the Reality-without-Realism sort in that Bohr holds quantum reality to be unrepresentable, and that Heisenberg’s is of the Pythagorean-realist sort in that Heisenberg comes to hold reality to be representable, but only by mathematics. Here, I argue that Heisenberg’s later representation of reality can be characterized as neo- Aristotelian because, among other relevant things, he intentionally develops quantum potentiality, which is essential to his late interpretation of the quantum formalism, as a quantification of Aristotle’s potentia.
The innovations to physics introduced by Werner Heisenberg and Niels Bohr via quantum mechanics presented them with epistemological and metaphysical challenges with which they were perpetually engaged. Among Heisenberg’s innovations are the complex-valued quantum state-transition probability amplitudes, and among Bohr’s the non- trivial role of the measuring environment in the procurement of data. In his article, Arkady Plotnitsky examines the responses of these two natural philosophers to these challenges through the lens of Pythagoreanism in terms of the rational and the irrational. He argues that Bohr’s philosophical stance is of the Reality-without-Realism sort in that Bohr holds quantum reality to be unrepresentable, and that Heisenberg’s is of the Pythagorean-realist sort in that Heisenberg comes to hold reality to be representable, but only by mathematics. Here, I argue that Heisenberg’s later representation of reality can be characterized as neo- Aristotelian because, among other relevant things, he intentionally develops quantum potentiality, which is essential to his late interpretation of the quantum formalism, as a quantification of Aristotle’s potentia.
For many years, Arkady Plotnitsky has written extensively about the interpretation of quantum mechanics, and his source of inspiration has undoubtedly been Niels Bohr’s philosophy to which he has returned time and again in order to make clear what Bohr said and meant. More than many other philosophers, Plotnitsky’s work shows a deep understanding of quantum mechanics and of Bohr’s thinking especially. In the present paper, he attempts to give a rational reconstruction of what he sees as Heisenberg’s Pythagorean revolution. This he explains as Heisenberg’s aim in his search for a theory. Heisenberg was looking for “a strictly predictive theory of quantum phenomena (only probabilistically predictive on the experimental grounds), without requiring this theory to represent the ultimate reality responsible for quantum phenomena. This is the form of Pythagorean view that this article advocates under the heading of the ‘reality-without-realism’ (RWR) Pythagorean view, also possible in mathematics”. Unfortunately, I think that Plotnitsky’s rational reconstruction misses some important historical facts just as I think the expression “ultimate reality” is unfortunate. Rejecting that our physical theories represent a world beyond the phenomena does not imply that there is something left to be represented in the future.
This article considers a revolutionary transformation – physical, mathematical, and philosophical – of modern physics brought about by Heisenberg’s invention of quantum mechanics (QM). While physical and mathematical aspects of Heisenberg’s invention have been extensively commented on, and while they are essential for this article, considering the transformative philosophical aspects of Heisenberg’s thinking is rare. This article fills this lacuna through the concept of reality without realism (RWR) and the corresponding interpretations of QM, and philosophical implications of this concept.
In PHYSICS AND PHILOSOPHY: The Revolution Modern Science, (1) Werner Heisenberg aims, in not too technical language, to clarify change concept of reality manifesting itself quantum theory. He means to contribute to an articulation of the (not only epistemology) that underlies quantum theory's modified logical patterns. (2) To highly unusual degree, Heisenberg is gripped by sense of responsibility of modern quantum physicist to convey, language immediately intelligible to thinking public, his most serious and far-reaching reflections on metaphysical implications of his scientific work. One may go so far as to say that there is substantial evidence, partly within Physics and Philosophy, that Heisenberg regards such reflections and their public communication as his most important task. Heisenberg is especially apt for this intensely self-conscious contribution to humanity's historical-cultural development because his stature as principal originating architect of quantum at its most fundamental level is complemented by his deployment of an unusually broad and deep erudition and lifelong preoccupation with philosophic and artistic ontology from Anaximander through Kant and Goethe to Heidegger. No thinker has yet appeared who possesses such an authoritative combination of decisively necessary learning quantum physics and historical development of philosophic ontology. Despite flurry of renewed scholarly interest development of Heisenberg's scientific work, (3) and his complex relation to dramatic unfolding of German cultural his time, (4) there has yet to be executed sustained and philosophically critical interpretative commentary on this book that is his crucial philosophical-ontological legacy. Given profound ontological puzzles that continue to attend quantum physics and its implications for humanity's past as well as present and future conception of reality, such critical exegesis of this text is overdue. In what follows I try to extricate central nerve of Heisenberg's sinuously unfolding, dialectical exposition, and process to elucidate its strengths but also its deep ambiguities and perplexities--which express, I believe, fundamental dilemmas that pervade contemporary ontology. I Heisenberg makes inviolability of principle of noncontradiction cornerstone of his discussion. Unlike Aristotle (5) Heisenberg does not wrestle with challenge posed by possible denial of principle. He understands nonmathematical articulation of quantum to escape what would otherwise be devastating contradictions--most obviously contradiction wave/particle character of basic entities described by theory--through Bohr's famous principle of complementarity (which Heisenberg closely associates with von Weizsacker's notion of coexistent states), combined with Heisenberg's own principle of potentia, potentiality, potentialities. (6) II After brief introduction, Heisenberg his second chapter sketches history of quantum theory and process begins to explain what he means by potentia. In 1924 Bohr and his colleagues tried to solve apparent contradiction between picture and particle picture by concept of wave. The electromagnetic were treated not as 'real' waves but as mathematical descriptions of probabilities, every point relevant space, for the absorption (or induced emission) of light quantum by an atom at this point. Later this idea of was applied more effectively to much more abstract mathematical in many-dimensional configuration space that was discovered through researches of Schrodinger. Heisenberg reinterprets this mathematical probability wave ontological tenus, as signaling tendency [Tendenz] for a definite happening [einem bestimmten Geschehen], thus introducing remarkable kind of physical reality, standing middle between possibility and actuality: a quantitative version of old concept of 'dunamis' or 'potentia' philosophy of Aristotle. …
The article is devoted to the analysis of the concept of “reality” in the philosophical and scientific works of the theoretical physicist Werner Heisenberg. It analyzes the Heisenberg’s works on the philosophy of natural science, a significant part of which is devoted to quantum theory and its basic concepts. The author shows that Heisenberg’s thought was formed in parallel with the development of relevant problems among neo-Kantian philosophers (N. Hartmann, B. Nicolescu, etc.) throughout the 20th century. According to the author, many European researchers focus their attention on the scientific side of Heisenberg’s work, that is, on the analysis of his physical argumentation. The philosophical aspects of Heisenberg’s works are mostly studied by Russian philosophers of science. The intellectual vector of Heisenberg’s work was the idea of the need for a new philosophical thinking that goes beyond the scope of rational activity and requires a reconception of the gnoseological categories used as an instrument for the cognition of the reality. It relies on the phenomenological tradition, as well as on the arguments of J.W. von Goethe that theory cannot “capture” reality; it requires a synthesis of “trust in experience” and “intelligent observation” (discretion) to understand it. It is also demonstrated in the article the Heisenberg's attitude to the formation of the language of science and to the comparative studies of the philosophical systems of such thinkers as Plato, Democritus, Aristotle.
Bohmian mechanics is the leading non-local realistic interpretation of quantum mechanics. Its development and defense against objections (by V. Allori, B. Hiley, and others) constitute a distinct field at the intersection of physics and the philosophy of science. The aim of this work is to examine, in the context of current debates on quantum realism, the scientific and philosophical ideas of D. Bohm in their interconnection. The novelty of the article includes: a characterization of D. Bohm’s epistemology, his system of metaphors, as well as a comparative analysis of his metaphysics with the philosophical concepts of N. Bohr and W. Heisenberg. In his epistemology, Bohm combines realism with the view that our knowledge is limited. In the case of a single particle, its trajectory can be visualized; for a hundred particles, this is practically impossible. Similarly, in metaphysics, the world is real, but at the deep level of the implicate order it is only partially knowable for us. It is emphasized that Bohm possesses a genuine system of mutually complementary metaphors that elucidate his metaphysics: besides the holographic one, these are “the fish in the aquarium”, “the drop of ink”, and “the radio signal to the ship”. The metaphor of the radio signal to the ship in mechanics demonstrates an informational, rather than a force-based, influence on the particle. In metaphysics, it acquires a broader meaning: information guides the development of macro-objects. In the philosophy of physics, D. Bohm’s dynamic holism is contrasted with N. Bohr’s epistemological line and Heisenberg’s Pythagorean line (A. Plotnitsky). Bohr also recognizes holism, but it is the holism of particle, apparatus, and observer. In Bohm, holism has an ontological, universal character, rather than being fragmented according to the observer’s standpoint. For Heisenberg, symmetries expressed in equations lie at the foundation of reality; for Bohm, however, the meaning and significance of equations are merely an isolated aspect of a unified whole, a manifestation of active information from it. These three lines represent three answers to the question of the foundation of physical reality.
Abstract Heisenberg was a very dedicated Kantian, and viewed the discoveries of early twentieth century physics as disqualifying of the Kantian metaphysical worldview. He made an effort – not an especially successful one – to reconfigure the Kantian critique by replacing noumena with the quantum-level reality, and proposed a new entity as mediative between the quantum realm and the subject. The new entity, potentia (borrowed from Aristotle, and altered to serve Heisenberg’s purpose) fulfills that role by means of its hybrid nature: it’s partly mental, partly a reification of probabilities. This dual nature allows epistemic access to the probabilistic nature of quantum-level interactions, out of which our phenomenal world is realized when a measurement is made. How well this notion serves the purpose of rehabilitating the Kantian critique is questionable, as Heisenberg’s conception is problematic and, perhaps, internally inconsistent. My dissertation follows Heisenberg’s development of potentia, examines how well it addresses the failure of the Kantian problem, and asks whether his proposal is an obscurum per obscurius. Thereafter I introduce a number of other, similar proposals to potentia, consider them on their own merits, compare them to Heisenberg’s conception, and use this conjunction of potentia proposals to made a judgment regarding whether the use of potentia is a philosophically defensible way of addressing the recondite problems of quantum mechanics.