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IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications

A Linear Secret Sharing Framework for Hybrid Quantum and Post-Quantum Cryptography

Pei Zeng, Debayan Bandyopadhyay, J. A. Méndez, Nolan Bitner, Alexander Kolar, Michael T. Solomon, Han Zheng, Ziyu Ye, Filip Rozpędek, Tian Zhong, F. Joseph Heremans, D. D. Awschalom, Liang Jiang, Junyu Liu

Published Jan 1, 2026• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Quantum resistance is vital for emerging cryptographic systems as quantum technologies continue to advance towards large-scale, fault-tolerant quantum computers. Resistance may be offered by quantum key distribution (QKD), which ideally provides information-theoretic security (ITS) using quantum states of photons, but is limited in practice due to device-dependent loopholes and the reliance on classical channel authentication. An alternative approach uses classical means and is conjectured to be resistant to quantum attacks—so-called post-quantum cryptography (PQC)—but its security relies on the unproven assumption of the hardness of mathematical problems. To address the security and performance challenges present in each, here we introduce a key merging framework to combine QKD and PQC key material based on linear-code secret sharing schemes. In particular, we design joint QKD-PQC key distribution schemes based on Reed-Solomon codes, which achieve high performance while ensuring a high security level. Compared to naive XOR-type schemes, our schemes can achieve a security enhancement of$\Theta (n)$where$n$is the number of parallel key distribution links when the key distribution performance is similar. Furthermore, we develop schemes where the attacker needs to break both QKD and PQC links to learn the key bit information. Our hybrid approach paves the way for joint quantum-classical communication networks, which leverage the advantages of both QKD and PQC and can be tailored to the requirements of various practical networks.

DOI
10.1109/jsac.2026.3731124

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Quantum resistance is vital for emerging cryptographic systems as quantum technologies continue to advance towards large-scale, fault-tolerant quantum computers. Resistance may be offered by quantum key distribution (QKD), which ideally provides information-theoretic security (ITS) using quantum states of photons, but is limited in practice due to device-dependent loopholes and the reliance on classical channel authentication. An alternative approach uses classical means and is conjectured to be resistant to quantum attacks—so-called post-quantum cryptography (PQC)—but its security relies on the unproven assumption of the hardness of mathematical problems. To address the security and performance challenges present in each, here we introduce a key merging framework to combine QKD and PQC key material based on linear-code secret sharing schemes. In particular, we design joint QKD-PQC key distribution schemes based on Reed-Solomon codes, which achieve high performance while ensuring a high security level. Compared to naive XOR-type schemes, our schemes can achieve a security enhancement ofΘ(n)\Theta (n)Θ(n)wherennnis the number of parallel key distribution links when the key distribution performance is similar. Furthermore, we develop schemes where the attacker needs to break both QKD and PQC links to learn the key bit information. Our hybrid approach paves the way for joint quantum-classical communication networks, which leverage the advantages of both QKD and PQC and can be tailored to the requirements of various practical networks.
Quantum resistance is vital for emerging cryptographic systems as quantum technologies continue to advance towards large-scale, fault-tolerant quantum computers. Resistance may be offered by quantum key distribution (QKD), which provides information-theoretic security using quantum states of photons, but may be limited by transmission loss at long distances. An alternative approach uses classical means and is conjectured to be resistant to quantum attacks, so-called post-quantum cryptography (PQC), but it is yet to be rigorously proven, and its current implementations are computationally expensive. To overcome the security and performance challenges present in each, here we develop hybrid protocols by which QKD and PQC inter-operate within a joint quantum-classical network. In particular, we consider different hybrid designs that may offer enhanced speed and/or security over the individual performance of either approach. Furthermore, we present a method for analyzing the security of hybrid protocols in key distribution networks. Our hybrid approach paves the way for joint quantum-classical communication networks, which leverage the advantages of both QKD and PQC and can be tailored to the requirements of various practical networks.
Large quantum computers will be able to break the cryptographic algorithms on which current secure communications rely on. Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) and Quantum key distribution (QKD) are two security technologies that show protection capabilities against the latent quantum threat. While PQC relies on different hard mathematical problems to develop a wide variety of cryptographic operations, QKD is based on quantum physics laws to generate and distribute symmetric cryptographic keys through different QKD protocols. These keys can be used by different applications to perform security transformations. QKD still requires authentication to prevent man-in-the-middle attacks. The hybridization of PQC and QKD is an important step for future secure infrastructures, being able to provide long-term security. In this work we propose authenticated QKD approaches that rely on pre-shared keys and hybrid PQC/QKD alternatives and which are able to securely exchange secret QKD keys through authenticated channels. We identify the different configuration alternatives and their parameters, as well as we develop a wide performance evaluation. Results show that pre-shared keys and PQC-based authentication through Dilithium algorithm are the fastest alternatives. Also, we show the potential of the T12 QKD protocol.
The emergence of highly developed quantum computing is threatening the current established public key cryptography systems like Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) and RSA, and it enables attackers to perpetrate harvest now, decrypt later attacks on the current encrypted communications. Quantum resistant security has provided shedding light on quantum threats by introducing Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) project and Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC). QKD offers a no-d efficiency protection with respect to quantum mechanics, though PQC provides protection against quantum attacks of comparable scalability via classical methods of cryptography that are standardized by the NIST. Nevertheless, these two approaches have practical constraints in the field of application in isolation, especially distance, cost, scaling, and infrastructure overhead. This paper suggests a hybrid secure communication system integrating QKD based key generation following the BB84 protocol through the quantum channel and PQC based authentication and integrity schemes following the classical channel and a bulk data transmission scheme utilizing the symmetric encryption. System level performance measures are as well evaluated by simulation to analyse classical cryptography, PQC alone, QKD alone and hybridQKD−PQC\text{QKD}-\text{PQC}QKD−PQCschemes, comparing the systems throughput and performance impact amid various network conditions. According to the outcomes of the experiment, the proposed hybrid approach injects a throughput overhead of less than 0.1 percent compared to the traditional cryptographic systems, and thus, strong quantum-resilient security is computable with insignificantly low performance costs. This justifies the practicability of hybrid QKD-PQC topologies to prospective quantum safe communication networks encompassing next generation and large-scale distributed communication systems.
The emergence of large-scale quantum computers poses a significant threat to current cryptographic protocols, particularly Transport Layer Security (TLS), which relies on RSA and elliptic curve cryptography vulnerable to Shor's algorithm. This paper presents a hybrid framework for quantum-resistant TLS handshakes that integrates post-quantum cryptography (PQC), quantum key distribution (QKD) and classical cryptography to provide comprehensive protection against both classical and quantum attacks. The approach employs three QKD protocols; BB84, E91, and Measurement-Device-Independent QKD (MDI-QKD) alongside NIST-standardized PQC algorithms as well as alternative candidates such as HQC and BIKE. A key innovation is the QKD key management module, which addresses performance bottlenecks through periodic key generation and secure reuse within predefined retention periods, significantly reducing QKD overhead in TLS handshakes. The experimental implementation using the quantum network simulator evaluated 144 distinct cryptographic protocol combinations. Results demonstrate that ML-KEM combined with ML-DSA provides optimal PQC performance, while QKD protocol selection is distance-dependent: BB84 for short-range and MDI-QKD for long-distance communication. The framework includes various attack mitigation mechanisms and ensure security as long as at least one cryptographic method remains uncompromised. Consistent with current global quantum network usage, the proposed TLS approach is designed primarily for MAN and WAN environments rather than the Internet, providing a balanced solution that combines theoretical security guarantees with computational efficiency.
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) provides information-theoretic security based on quantum mechanics, but its practical deployment is limited by its reliance on classical infrastructure and inability to operate as a standalone solution.Recent research emphasizes hybrid approaches that combine QKD with post-quantum cryptography (PQC) to achieve practical and robust security.This paper presents a hybrid key distribution model integrating QKD with the postquantum key encapsulation mechanism.The two independently generated keys are combined to derive a unified shared secret, enhancing resilience against both classical and quantum adversaries.The system is implemented using a simulated quantum environment, enabling the emulation of quantum communication over classical networks.The proposed approach is validated through a secure image transmission use case, demonstrating the correctness of the hybrid key exchange.The results highlight the feasibility of hybrid classical-quantum cryptographic systems as a practical step toward secure communication in emerging quantum network infrastructures.
Recent advances in quantum-secure communication have highlighted the value of hybrid schemes that combine Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) with Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC). Yet most existing hybrid designs omit realistic finite-key effects on QKD key rates and do not specify how to maintain security when both QKD and PQC primitives leak information through side-channels. These gaps limit the applicability of hybrid systems in practical, deployed networks. In this work, we advance a recently proposed hybrid QKD-PQC system by integrating tight finite-key security to the QKD primitive and improving the design for better scalability. This hybrid system employs an information-theoretically secure instruction sequence that determines the configurations of different primitives and thus ensures message confidentiality even when both the QKD and the PQC primitives are compromised. The novelty in our work lies in the implementation of the tightest finite-key security to date for the BBM92 protocol and the design improvements in the primitives of the hybrid system that ensure the processing time scales linearly with the size of secret instructions.