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Communications in computer and information science

From Classical PKI to Hybrid PQC: A Crypto-Agile Migration Framework for Edge Systems

Abdelrahman Ahmed, Mohamed Hegazy, Mahmoud Saad

Published Aug 31, 2026• 0 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/978-3-032-36813-3_18

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Hybrid enterprise environments combining public cloud, private infrastructure, and edge devices—rely fundamentally on classical public-key cryptography (PKC) for secure key exchange, authentication, and digital signatures. The emergence of cryptographically relevant quantum computers (CRQCs) threatens to dismantle these foundations via algorithms such as Shor's, rendering current data confidentiality and long-term security guarantees obsolete.1 This systematic review transitions the focus from pure cloud security to the complex architectural challenge of integrating Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) across distributed enterprise landscapes. The analysis examines the foundational PQC candidates (NIST selection), assesses architectural dependencies (PKI, KMS, ZTA), reviews implementation hurdles (side-channels, performance overhead in IoT), and details the strategic necessity of crypto-agility. Furthermore, this report critically examines the global regulatory framework, including US CNSA 2.0 and FIPS 140-3, highlighting critical gaps in migration planning, governance, and compliance readiness required to mitigate the systemic risk of the "Harvest Now, Decrypt Later" threat model.
The emergence of cryptographically relevant quantum computing presents a fundamental challenge to contemporary public-key cryptography because Shor's algorithm can solve the integer-factorization and discrete-logarithm problems on which widely deployed RSA and elliptic-curve cryptographic systems rely. Although standardized post-quantum cryptographic (PQC) algorithms are now available, migration from classical cryptography to quantum-resistant systems is not a simple algorithm-selection problem. Different applications impose different requirements with respect to security strength, computational cost, communication overhead, interoperability, algorithmic diversity, and crypto-agility. This paper proposes RACAF-PQC, a Risk-Aware Crypto-Agility Framework for post-quantum migration decision-making. The framework introduces a Post-Quantum Migration Readiness Index (PMRI) that integrates six normalized criteria: security adequacy, computational performance, communication efficiency, algorithmic diversity, interoperability, and crypto-agility. Six cryptographic configurations are evaluated across five application scenarios: low-risk web communication, enterprise systems, high-confidentiality systems, constrained Internet-of-Things (IoT) environments, and critical infrastructure. The proposed framework is experimentally validated using a reproducible multi-criteria computational experiment and a 10,000-trial sensitivity analysis. Results show that the framework selects ML-KEM-512 for resource-sensitive environments and an ECDHE+ML-KEM-768 hybrid configuration for enterprise, high-confidentiality, and critical-infrastructure scenarios. Relative to a fixed ML-KEM-768 strategy, RACAF-PQC produces scenario-dependent decision improvements ranging from 0.7% to 8.8%, with a mean improvement of approximately 5.0%. Relative to classical-only migration, the corresponding mean improvement is approximately 42.0%. Sensitivity analysis demonstrates that the principal selections remain stable under perturbation of the decision weights, with selection stability reaching 100% for enterprise systems and 99.42% for critical infrastructure. The results demonstrate that post-quantum migration can be improved by treating cryptographic agility and application-specific risk as explicit decision variables rather than adopting a single universal algorithm. The study provides a mathematically transparent and reproducible framework for PQC migration planning while avoiding unsupported claims of hardware-level performance.
Public Key Infrastructures (PKIs) are foundational to time- and security-critical systems such as air traffic management and cooperative intelligent transport systems (C-ITS). These PKIs rely almost exclusively on classical public-key cryptography, which will become vulnerable once cryptographically relevant quantum computers emerge. Migrating such systems to post-quantum cryptography (PQC) is therefore necessary but non-trivial, as these environments impose strict constraints on latency, bandwidth, interoperability, long system lifetimes, and regulatory compliance. This paper presents a comparative, constraint-driven analysis of PQC migration for time- and security-critical PKIs. Focusing on System-Wide Information Management (SWIM) and C-ITS, we examine how PQC signature and key sizes, verification costs, and certificate structures affect real-time communication, certificate validation, and session establishment. In particular, we analyze the impact of certificate size growth and verification latency on time-critical messaging using published benchmarks and protocol specifications. Rather than proposing new cryptographic primitives or implementations, this work synthesizes existing benchmarks, standardization documents, and protocol specifications to identify feasibility limits, migration risks, and design trade-offs. The analysis shows that certificate chain length and signature overhead can dominate session establishment time in short communication windows, particularly in C-ITS environments, even when individual cryptographic operations remain computationally efficient. We further discuss the operational risks introduced by hybrid cryptographic deployments, including increased system complexity, negotiation failures, and insecure fallback behavior. In addition, we highlight how long system lifetimes and slow standardization cycles in safety-critical sectors complicate timely cryptographic transitions. The results indicate that migration feasibility is often determined by system-level constraints, such as certificate handling, protocol overhead, interoperability requirements, and regulatory alignment, rather than by the performance of individual PQC algorithms alone. Based on this analysis, we present a benchmarking-based migration framework tailored to critical PKIs, highlighting where hybrid cryptographic approaches are unavoidable, where they introduce new risks, and which classes of PQC algorithms are conditionally viable under strict timing and bandwidth constraints. The paper concludes with concrete recommendations for system designers and policymakers to support crypto-agile PQC migration without compromising operational safety.