The operation of smart grids relies on the bidirectional flow of unicast and multicast (broadcast) information, and their security is typically ensured by authentication key agreement mechanisms based on classical cryptography. However, quantum algorithms threaten this security foundation. Existing semi-quantum authentication schemes fail to address the dual requirements of multicast and unicast keys for regionalized flexible management, nor do they balance the quantum burden on resource-constrained endpoints with authentication security in physical environments. To this end, this paper proposes a semi-quantum authentication and dual-key agreement scheme (SQADKA). It employs parallel distribution of a d -dimensional n -particle entangled system to generate a shared multicast key, while embedding random states within a single communication for two-factor authentication and unicast key generation. The multicast key can be used for broadcasting regional commands, while the unicast key protects private data exchange between smart meters and the neighborhood area network. Smart meters configured as classical users with two-factor authentication achieve quantum-enhanced security without complex quantum operations. Considering the dynamic membership of SGs, SQADKA allows SMs to join or leave a group while ensuring multicast key security. Additionally, the security of SQADKA has been analyzed through formal and informal security analyses. This scheme’s logic is verified and the comparison demonstrates advantages over similar schemes in terms of security, qubit efficiency, and communication complexity.
The operation of smart grids relies on the bidirectional flow of unicast and multicast (broadcast) information, and their security is typically ensured by authentication key agreement mechanisms based on classical cryptography. However, quantum algorithms threaten this security foundation. Existing semi-quantum authentication schemes fail to address the dual requirements of multicast and unicast keys for regionalized flexible management, nor do they balance the quantum burden on resource-constrained endpoints with authentication security in physical environments. To this end, this paper proposes a semi-quantum authentication and dual-key agreement scheme (SQADKA). It employs parallel distribution of a d -dimensional n -particle entangled system to generate a shared multicast key, while embedding random states within a single communication for two-factor authentication and unicast key generation. The multicast key can be used for broadcasting regional commands, while the unicast key protects private data exchange between smart meters and the neighborhood area network. Smart meters configured as classical users with two-factor authentication achieve quantum-enhanced security without complex quantum operations. Considering the dynamic membership of SGs, SQADKA allows SMs to join or leave a group while ensuring multicast key security. Additionally, the security of SQADKA has been analyzed through formal and informal security analyses. This scheme’s logic is verified and the comparison demonstrates advantages over similar schemes in terms of security, qubit efficiency, and communication complexity.
Smart grids leverage smart terminal devices to collect information from the user side, achieving accurate load forecasting and optimized dispatching of power systems, effectively improving power supply efficiency and reliability while reducing energy consumption. However, the development of quantum technology poses severe challenges to the communication security of smart grids that rely on traditional cryptography. To address this security risk in the quantum era, this paper draws on the core idea of quantum private comparison and proposes a quantum-secure identity authentication and key agreement scheme suitable for smart grids. This scheme uses Bell states as quantum resources, combines hash functions and XOR operations, and can adapt to resource-constrained terminal devices. Through a security proof, it verifies the scheme's ability to resist various attacks; the experimental results further show that the scheme still has good robustness in different noise environments, providing a feasible technical path for the secure communication of smart grids in the quantum environment and having clear practical engineering value.
The extensive value and importance of smart grids are evident in their transformative impact on sustainable urban development. However, the swift progression of quantum computing has made the security and privacy of smart grid communications a pressing and vital issue. Although considerable studies have been carried out on authentication and key agreement within smart grids, the predominant body of solutions either come with substantial computation, communication, and storage overheads, or are primarily single-layer schemes. More importantly, they are not designed to withstand advanced quantum attacks. In this paper, we propose a novel quantum-safe and cross-layer authentication and key agreement protocol, named QCLaka, for smart grid communications that overcomes the shortcomings of existing approaches and offers advanced security and functionality features. The proposed QCLakaprotocol integrates lattice-based cryptography with probability physical unclonable function (Prob-PUF) to enable the local gateway and the smart meter to mutually authenticate each other and establish a secure session key. The security of the proposed QCLakaprotocol is assessed through formal security verification to highlight its safety in adversarial environments and its ability to withstand both well-known and advanced cyberattacks. Additionally, the experimental evaluation shows that the proposed QCLakaprotocol outperforms the benchmark schemes regarding the performance in security and efficiency.
The key management faces significant challenges in terms of efficiency, scalability, and quantum resistance in smart grid environments. This paper addresses these challenges by proposing a novel mutual authentication and key agreement (AKA) protocol for the Noisy Intermediate-Scale Quantum (NISQ) era. The protocol integrates quantum and classical information streams, enabling secure key agreement without third-party reliance. For the first time, quantum-based mutual identity authentication is applied to smart grid security, with a comprehensive analysis of resilience against various attacks, including man-in-the-middle, quantum computation, relay, impersonation, and DoS. Experimental results show that the scheme achieves a communication cost of 0.9 KB for 2 rounds, outperforming quantum-resistant schemes (2.5 KB) and performing similarly to classical schemes (1.2 KB). The scheme requires 2 quantum preparations and 1 measurement, offering higher efficiency compared to quantum-resistant methods. Compared to QKD and computational hardness-based models, our approach provides superior key management efficiency, practical implementation in non-fault-tolerant quantum systems, and enhanced security protection. Rigorous analysis and validation using IBM’s quantum-enabled environments demonstrate the robustness of the protocol in addressing modern smart grid security challenges.
The development and evolution of the smart grid into complex, cyber-physical energy systems make it essential to secure?communication among the distributed components. The rise of quantum computing has made it even more pressing to develop protocols that?are secure outside the limitations of classical cryptosystems. In this paper, it proposes a quantum-assisting secure communication scheme (QASCP) to?boost the security and energy for smart grid communication systems. The proposed protocol combines quantum key distribution with lightweight entropy-based mutual authentication and dynamic session management. It is designed to defend grid assets such as control centers, smart meters, and distribute energy?resources from sophisticated adversarial models, including quantum-capable threats. The approach consists of system level simulation utilizing a?co-simulation framework customized for quantum smart grid communication. The performance of this scheme was compared?against classical and PQ lattice-based schemes in terms of the authentication latency, energy consumption, entropy preservation, and scalability to handle the load and delay effects, under the assumptions of different loading and delay scenarios. Simulation results show that QASCP is able to reduce the energy consumption and authenticity latency, simultaneously it keeps the high throughput and leaves strong entropy?under attack scenarios. The protocol is also shown to?remain robust with varying quantum bit error rates as well as having a smaller memory footprint on popular network topologies. The results provide evidence for the practical integration of?quantum-secure communication in smart grid architectures. By addressing security and performance simultaneously, the protocol?provides a path to future-proof energy networks which can support dependable operations in a quantum-enhanced environment. This could be future enhance for energy efficiency.
This paper presents an enhanced Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) protocol to strengthen the security of smart grid systems through secure communication and signature verification. As smart grids increasingly depend on digital communication, safeguarding them against cyber threats is paramount. Our approach incorporates Hadamard, SWAP, and rotation gates to fortify the BB84 protocol, ensuring secure key exchange while verifying the integrity and authenticity of transmitted data between smart meters and grid operators. Experimental results demonstrate that the protocol provides efficient key generation, encryption, and decryption while improving eavesdropping detection. With 10 qubits, the protocol achieved a key generation rate of 957 bits and successfully encrypted messages. These findings suggest that QKD offers a robust security framework for smart grid environments, providing superior resistance to both quantum and classical attacks.
Abstract Entity authentication and key exchange are fundamental prerequisites for ensuring the security of various emerging smart networks. However, most existing classical schemes are vulnerable to attacks from quantum computers. Recently, Prateek et al proposed a privacy-preserving mutual authentication scheme for smart metering infrastructure in smart grids. The authors claimed that their scheme is unconditionally secure and could resist various known security attacks, including impersonation attacks, eavesdropping attacks, and replay attacks. However, in this article, we demonstrate that there are serious security flaws in the proposed scheme. First, the scheme fails to ensure that two legitimate parties can reliably share a common session key, leading to a potential authentication failure. Second, an eavesdropper can exploit entangle-measure attacks to obtain partial information about the shared session key. Additionally, due to the inherent randomness of quantum measurements, the session key shared between two entities in each session is unpredictable. Consequently, the session keys distributed across different sessions may not be identical, further contributing to authentication failure. Finally, we provide an improvement to address these security flaws while preserving the original scheme’s advantageous features.