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IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT)

Key-Efficient Decentralized Secure Aggregation with General Security and Collusion Models

Zhou Li, Xiang Zhang, Giuseppe Caire

Published Jun 1, 2026• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Decentralized secure aggregation (DSA) considers a fully-connected network of K users, each holding a private input. The goal is for every user to compute the sum of all inputs without revealing additional information, even if up to T users collude. Traditional DSA often requires large key sizes to protect all information except the input sum. To reduce key overhead, we study DSA with arbitrary collusion and heterogeneous security constraints, where the inputs of predefined user subsets, called the security set $\mathcal{S}$, must be protected from predefined collusion sets $\mathcal{T}$. For any $\mathcal{S} \in \mathcal{S}$ and $\mathcal{T} \in \mathcal{T}$, we characterize the optimal communication and source key rates. In particular, we determine the minimum number of key bits per input bit required for secure aggregation, which in general reduces to solving a linear program.

DOI
10.1109/isit62367.2026.11653845

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Decentralized secure aggregation (DSA) considers a fully-connected network of K users, each holding a private input. The goal is for every user to compute the sum of all inputs without revealing additional information, even if up to T users collude. Traditional DSA often requires large key sizes to protect all information except the input sum. To reduce key overhead, we study DSA with arbitrary collusion and heterogeneous security constraints, where the inputs of predefined user subsets, called the security set S\mathcal{S}S, must be protected from predefined collusion sets T\mathcal{T}T. For any S∈S\mathcal{S} \in \mathcal{S}S∈S and T∈T\mathcal{T} \in \mathcal{T}T∈T, we characterize the optimal communication and source key rates. In particular, we determine the minimum number of key bits per input bit required for secure aggregation, which in general reduces to solving a linear program.
Decentralized secure aggregation (DSA) considers a fully-connected network of KKK users, where each pair of users can communicate bidirectionally over an error-free channel. Each user holds a private input, and the goal is for each user to compute the sum of all inputs without revealing any additional information, even in the presence of collusion among up to TTT users. Traditional DSA typically requires large key sizes to protect all information except for the input sum and the information of colluding users. To mitigate the source keys overhead, we study decentralized secure aggregation with arbitrary collusion and heterogeneous security constraints. In this setting, the inputs of a predefined collection of user subsets, called the \emph{security set} S\bm{\mathcal{S}}S, must be protected from another predefined collection, the \emph{collusion set} T\bm{\mathcal{T}}T. For an arbitrary security set S∈S\mathcal{S}\in \bm{\mathcal{S}}S∈S and an arbitrary collusion set T∈T\mathcal{T}\in \bm{\mathcal{T}}T∈T, we characterize the optimal communication and source key rates. A key contribution of this work is the characterization of the optimal source key rate, i.e., the minimum number of key bits per input bit that must be shared among users for decentralized secure aggregation with arbitrary collusion and heterogeneous security constraints to be feasible. In general, this characterization reduces to solving a linear program.
We study the fundamental limits of multi-server secure aggregation over a two-hop network where multiple servers, each connected to a disjoint subset of users, jointly compute the sum of all users' inputs. The goal is to ensure that no server can infer any information about prescribed subsets of inputs beyond the desired aggregate, even when colluding with an arbitrary subset of users. Existing works largely focus on homogeneous security requirements, where all inputs are protected against colluding sets up to a given size. Such formulations are insufficient to capture more general scenarios in which different subsets of inputs may require protection against different collusion patterns. In this paper, we consider a general model with heterogeneous security requirements and arbitrary user collusion. We characterize the communication rates for all parameter regimes, and determine the minimum key rate required for secure aggregation in most regimes. In particular, we establish tight information-theoretic lower bounds and matching achievable schemes in a broad class of regimes. For the remaining regime, we derive a general lower bound together with an achievable scheme that attains it within a bounded gap. Our results reveal how the interplay between network topology and heterogeneous security constraints fundamentally determines the communication and key generation requirements, and generalize existing results on secure aggregation.
In secure summation,Kusers, each holds an input, wish to compute the sum of the inputs at a server without revealing any information aboutall the inputseven if the server may collude withan arbitrary subset of users. In this work, we relax the security and colluding constraints, where the set of inputs whose information is prohibited from leakage is from a predetermined collection of sets (e.g., any set of up toSinputs) and the set of colluding users is from another predetermined collection of sets (e.g., any set of up toTusers). For arbitrary collection of security input sets and colluding user sets, we characterize the optimal randomness assumption, i.e., the minimum number of key bits that need to be held by the users, per input bit, for weakly secure summation to be feasible, which generally involves solving a linear program.
We study the multi-server secure aggregation problem in a two-hop network, where users communicate with their designated server, and servers exchange messages to compute a global sum under the information-theoretic threat of up to T colluding users. We characterize the complete optimal rate region involving user-server and server-server communication rates, individual key rate, and common randomness (source key) rate.Our results show that the minimum communication and individual key rates are all one symbol per input symbol. The optimal source key rate is min{U + V + T − 2,UV − 1}, where U and V are the numbers of servers and users per server, respectively. Achievability is proven via a novel linear key scheme, and the converse follows from tight entropy bounds derived from correctness and security constraints.
Secure summation is one of the most applicable functions of secure multiparty computation (MPC) in which a group of users securely computes the summation value of their private inputs. The current solutions to this problem are basically on adding a random number to private inputs or splitting the inputs among users which need secure channel among members. Moreover, to be resistant against collusion of n − 2 players, they impose high communication cost. In this paper, we propose three cryptography-based protocols for secure sum that do not need secure channel and are secure against collusion of n − 2 players. Also, the communication cost of the proposed protocols is of complexity O(n). Based on the privacy requirements, the proposed protocols can provide the final result privacy as well as the private input privacy.
Secure multiparty computation refers to the problem where a number of users wish to securely compute a function on their inputs without revealing any unnecessary information. This dissertation focuses on the fundamental limits of secure summation under different constraints. We first focus on the minimal model of secure computation, in which two users each hold an input and wish to securely compute a function of their inputs at the server. We propose a novel scheme base on the algebraic structure of finite field and modulo ring of integers. Then we extend the minimal model of secure computation, in which K users wish to securely compute the sum of their inputs at the server. We prove a folklore result on the limits of communication cost and randomness cost. Then we characterized the optimal communication cost with user dropouts constraint, when some users may lose connection to the server and the server wishes to compute the sum of remaining inputs. Next, we characterize the optimal communication and randomness cost for symmetric groupwise keys and find the feasibility condition for arbitrary groupwise keys. Last, we study the secure summation with user selection, such that the server may select any subset of users to compute the sum of their inputs. This leads us to the MDS variable generation problem. We characterize the optimal individual key rate and the result is interestingly the harmonic number.