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IEEE Transactions on Cloud Computing

Efficient Actively Secure Multi-Party Computation for RAM Programs

Kun Xiong, Wenfang Zhang, Muhammad Khurram Khan

Published Jan 1, 2026• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Cloud platforms offer innovative solutions for data processing, and privacy concerns arising from this can be addressed through secure multi-party computation (MPC). MPC in the random access machine (RAM) model leverages Oblivious RAM (ORAM) to conceal memory access patterns, rendering it more suitable for data storage and aggregation in cloud environments, where cloud servers can infer user privacy based on observed access patterns. However, most existing RAM-based MPC protocols only ensure semi-honest security; the few actively secure alternatives have limitations in efficiency or input leakage. To address this gap, this paper proposes an efficient active-secure RAM-based MPC protocol without input leakage. Specifically, we first present a new actively secure, reactive MPC protocol with communication of 2(n−1) bits per gate. As the building blocks, we design the (i) multi-party distributed BitGC garbling scheme and (ii) multi-party somewhat homomorphic encryption (SWHE) scheme with distributed decryption. In particular, we then build a RAM-based MPC protocol on top of the above new building blocks with Circuit ORAM and present the check mechanism to achieve secure memory accesses. The implementation shows that our protocol outperforms the prior actively secure RAM-based MPC without leakage by one to two orders of magnitude in both LAN and WAN networks. Compared with the state-of-the-art actively secure RAM-based 2PC with one bit leakage, ours is slightly less efficient in most cases (not all), but supports the multi-party setting and offers a superior alternative for highly confidential environments.

DOI
10.1109/tcc.2026.3721079

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Cloud platforms offer innovative solutions for data processing, and privacy concerns arising from this can be addressed through secure multi-party computation (MPC). MPC in the random access machine (RAM) model leverages Oblivious RAM (ORAM) to conceal memory access patterns, rendering it more suitable for data storage and aggregation in cloud environments, where cloud servers can infer user privacy based on observed access patterns. However, most existing RAM-based MPC protocols only ensure semi-honest security; the few actively secure alternatives have limitations in efficiency or input leakage. To address this gap, this paper proposes an efficient active-secure RAM-based MPC protocol without input leakage. Specifically, we first present a new actively secure, reactive MPC protocol with communication of 2(n−1) bits per gate. As the building blocks, we design the (i) multi-party distributed BitGC garbling scheme and (ii) multi-party somewhat homomorphic encryption (SWHE) scheme with distributed decryption. In particular, we then build a RAM-based MPC protocol on top of the above new building blocks with Circuit ORAM and present the check mechanism to achieve secure memory accesses. The implementation shows that our protocol outperforms the prior actively secure RAM-based MPC without leakage by one to two orders of magnitude in both LAN and WAN networks. Compared with the state-of-the-art actively secure RAM-based 2PC with one bit leakage, ours is slightly less efficient in most cases (not all), but supports the multi-party setting and offers a superior alternative for highly confidential environments.
Secure two-party computation (2PC) in the RAM model has attracted huge attention in recent years. Most existing results only support semi-honest security, with the exception of Keller and Yanai (Eurocrypt 2018) with very high cost. In this paper, we propose an efficient RAM-based 2PC protocol with active security and one-bit leakage.1)We propose an actively secure protocol for distributed point function (DPF), with one-bit leakage, that is essentially as efficient as the state-of-the-art semi-honest protocol. Compared with previous work, our protocol takes about 50× less communication for a domain with 220entries, and no longer requires actively secure generic 2PC.2)We extend the dual-execution protocol to allow reactive computation, and then build a RAM-based 2PC protocol with active security on top of our new building blocks. The protocol follows the paradigm of Doerner and shelat (CCS 2017). We are able to prove that the protocol has end-to-end one-bit leakage.3)Our implementation shows that our protocol is almost as efficient as the state-of-the-art semi-honest RAM-based 2PC protocol, and is at least two orders of magnitude faster than prior actively secure RAM-based 2PC without leakage, providing a realistic trade-off in practice.
General-purpose secure multiparty computation (MPC) remains bottlenecked in large part by a lack of efficient techniques for handling memory access. We demonstrate a remarkably simple and efficient 2PC instantiation of random access memory (RAM), based on distributed point functions (DPFs, Gilboa and Ishai, Eurocrypt'14). Our semi-honest 2PC protocol can be achieved from oblivious transfer (OT) and a black-box pseudorandom generator (PRG). For a memory storing large enough data words, our 2PC RAM incurs constant communication overhead per access. Like prior works using DPFs to achieve memory access, our work incurs linear computation per access, but per-access communication is lean. Our 2PC RAM is built on top of an obliviousness-friendly model of computation called the single access machine model (SAM, Appan et al., CCS'24). In the SAM model, each memory slot can be read at most once. We present a simple 2PC SAM protocol, where each single-access memory operation incurs at most O(w + λ lg n) bits of communication, where w is the word size, n is the number of memory words, and ?ambda is a security parameter. Of this cost, only 2w + 2lg n bits are incurred in the online phase. There are now many oblivious algorithms that compile directly to SAM more efficiently than via a compilation to RAM, and our 2PC SAM can instantiate these algorithms. As one example, we can use our 2PC SAM to implement privacy-preserving graph traversal (DFS or BFS) over a secret-shared size- n graph while revealing nothing beyond the runtime of the SAM program. Our construction achieves online communication O(n lg n) bits, asymptotically matching the number of bits touched in a corresponding cleartext graph traversal.
Secure multi-party computation (MPC) provides provable security guarantees for many privacy critical applications. The semi-honest MPC protocols are secure against semi-honest adversaries who can only observe the protocol execution, while the maliciously secure MPC protocols are secure against malicious adversaries who can deviate from the protocol description arbitrarily. Many security sensitive applications tend to use semi-honest MPC protocols because malicious security comes with huge communication and/or computation costs. In this work, we show how to efficiently transform generic semi-honest two-party protocols into maliciously secure multi-party protocol in the server-aided setting. We further propose an optimized constant-round server-aided MPC protocol. The proposed protocols are secure when all but one parties are maliciously corrupted, while the remaining party and the server are corrupted by semi-honest and non-colluding adversaries. We implement and evaluate our constant-round protocol. For the 2-party case, our protocol is only 1.11× slower than thesemi-honestYao's Garbled Circuits protocol, and it is 9.16× faster than the maliciously secure authenticated garbling protocol and 4.96× faster than the state-of-the-art maliciously secure server-aided protocol of Wuet al.For the 8-party case, our protocol is 103.29× faster than the authenticated garbling protocol and 17.03× faster than the protocol of Wuet al.
Secure multi-party computation (MPC) is one of the most important primitives in cryptography. Several directions to construct and improve MPC protocols have been studied over the past decades. The majority of existing MPC protocols rely on assumptions such as every party communicates with every other party or every party needs to know every other party and the computation algorithm well in advance. Such assumptions can be difficult to achieve in modern large scale networks. This thesis explores two distinct lines of work leading to new practical models in response to these scenarios.First, we examine communication locality, the total number of other parties that each party communicates with in the protocol, as a new measure for an MPC protocol. Although progress has been made, the question of achieving low communication locality and round complexity at the same time for adaptive adversaries corrupting t < n/2 parties remains open. We show that by assuming a public-key infrastructure (PKI) and a symmetric-key infrastructure (SKI) the above question can be answered affirmatively, under standard assumptions. In particular, we describe a protocol with polylogarithmic communication locality and round complexity which tolerates up to t < n/2 adaptive corruptions. Our results are based on a new model of hidden random graphs obtained from the SKI, and using them to emulate a complete network in polylogarithmic rounds and polylogarithmic locality.We then examine multi-key fully homomorphic encryption (MFHE) schemes, which allow computation on data encrypted under different public keys chosen independently of each other. One of the main problems left in MFHE has been on how to deal with malicious users without trusted setup assumptions. We show how this can be done through circuit privacy, which guarantees that even if both ciphertexts and public keys are not well-formed, no information is revealed regarding the computation, other than what follows from the output on some well-formed inputs. Generalizing the result for circuit-private FHE, we provide a framework for adding circuit privacy to existing MFHE schemes.Finally, we incorporate the circuit privacy in a variant of server-assisted MPC, called on-the-fly MPC, where a server or a “cloud” performs an arbitrary dynamically chosen computation on a subset of data uploaded by multiple clients and encrypted under different keys on-the-fly. Circuit privacy allows the server to keep the algorithm used in the computation private even from a malicious adversary corrupting any number of clients. In particular, we construct a three-round on-the-fly MPC protocol with circuit privacy against malicious clients without the trusted setup.
Secure multi-party computation (MPC) allows a set of parties to compute a function jointly while keeping their inputs private. Compared with the MPC based on garbled circuits, some recent research results show that MPC based on secret sharing (SS) works at a very high speed. Moreover, SS-based MPC can be easily vectorized and achieve higher throughput. In SS-based MPC, however, we need many communication rounds for computing concrete protocols like equality check, less-than comparison, etc. This property is not suited for large-latency environments like the Internet (or WAN). In this paper, we construct semi-honest secure communication-efficient two-party protocols. The core technique is Beaver triple extension, which is a new tool for treating multi-fan-in gates, and we also show how to use it efficiently. We mainly focus on reducing the number of communication rounds, and our protocols also succeed in reducing the number of communication bits (in most cases). As an example, we propose a less-than comparison protocol (under practical parameters) with three communication rounds. This is less than a half compared with the previous work. Moreover, the number of communication bits is also 38.4%38.4\%38.4% fewer. As a result, total online execution time is 56.1%56.1\%56.1% shorter than the previous work adopting the same settings. Although the computation costs of our protocols are more expensive than those of previous work, we confirm via experiments that such a disadvantage has small effects on the whole online performance in the typical WAN environments.
Secure Multi-Party Computation (MPC) protocols allow a group of mutually distrusting users to compute a function jointly on their inputs without revealing any information beyond the output. For many years, implementations of MPC protocols have targeted security against semi-honest adversaries, i.e., attackers are assumed to execute the protocol honestly but try to learn private information after the fact. Protocols secure against stronger and more realistic malicious adversaries, who could behave arbitrarily during the protocol execution, were known to exist but were much less efficient. This thesis introduces a new paradigm to construct extremely efficient MPC protocols with malicious security. In particular, this thesis consists of three major contributions. 1. We introduce the authenticated garbling framework, and present an efficient concrete instantiation of the protocol. The resulting protocol partially closes the gap between semi-honest and malicious MPC protocols asymptotically; the implementation of the protocol represents the state-of-the-art system for malicious two-party computation. 2. We discuss how to apply authenticated garbling to the multi-party setting, where all-but-one parties can be corrupted by the adversary. The resulting protocol improves upon the best previous constant-round protocol by orders of magnitude. We also present a system that, for the first time, enables MPC executions among hundreds of parties, distributed globally. 3. We present a series of optimizations to two-party authenticated garbling by interpreting authenticated garbling in a new way. The improved malicious protocol has essentially the same concrete efficiency as the best semi-honest protocol in the preprocessing model. 4. We develop these protocols in EMP-toolkit, a practical and efficient MPC tool that can be used to build new protocols and to develop applications using our existing protocols.