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International Conference Laser Optics (ICLO)

Laser Damage Attacks on Fusion-Spliced Attenuators: Modeling Attack Scenarios in Quantum Key Distribution Systems

Kirill E. Bugai, Д. А. Гавриловец, Zyzykin A.P., Daniil S. Bulavkin, Ivan S. Sushchev, Dmitri Melkonian, Бондарь К.Д., Anna S. Sidelnikova, Veronika M. Vakhrusheva, D.A. Dvoretskiy

Published Jun 1, 2026• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

This work investigates laser damage attack targeting fusion-spliced attenuators within Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) systems, demonstrating that these passive components are vulnerable to thermal modification induced by high-power optical injection. Through modelling and experimental verification, we show that controlled heating produces permanent attenuation changes that remain undetected by standard QKD monitoring procedures. The results reveal a realistic hardware-based security loophole that threatens the practical implementation of quantum-secure communication networks.

DOI
10.1109/iclo69056.2026.11624441

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This work investigates laser damage attack targeting fusion-spliced attenuators within Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) systems, demonstrating that these passive components are vulnerable to thermal modification induced by high-power optical injection. Through modelling and experimental verification, we show that controlled heating produces permanent attenuation changes that remain undetected by standard QKD monitoring procedures. The results reveal a realistic hardware-based security loophole that threatens the practical implementation of quantum-secure communication networks.
A well-protected and characterized source in a quantum key distribution system is needed for its security.Unfortunately, the source is vulnerable to light-injection attacks, such as Trojan-horse, laser-seeding, and laser-damage attacks, in which an eavesdropper actively injects bright light to hack the source unit.The hacking laser could be a high-power one that can modify properties of components via the laserdamage attack and also further help the Trojan-horse and other light-injection attacks.Here we propose a countermeasure against the light-injection attacks, consisting of an additional sacrificial component placed at the exit of the source.This component should either withstand high-power incoming light while attenuating it to a safe level that cannot modify the rest of the source, or get destroyed into a permanent high-attenuation state that breaks up the line.We demonstrate experimentally that off-the-shelf fiberoptic isolators and circulators have these desired properties, at least under attack by a continuous-wave high-power laser.
Many quantum key distribution systems employ a laser followed by an optical attenuator to prepare weak coherent states in the source. Their mean photon number must be precalibrated to guarantee the security of key distribution. Here we experimentally show that this calibration can be broken with a high-power laser attack. We test four fiber-optic attenuator types used in quantum key distribution systems, and find that two of them exhibit a permanent decrease in attenuation after laser damage. This results in higher mean photon numbers in the prepared states and may allow an eavesdropper to compromise the key.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) systems provide quantum-safe key exchange. Therefore, complete security analysis of implementations of QKD protocols is in the focus of interest of a worldwide information-security community. For today, a number of QKD loopholes are closed by countermeasures, which are also considered in emerging QKD security evaluation and certification [1]–[3]. However, new threats to practical QKD implementations are still found, such as the laser-damage attack, which is a powerful hacking strategy. In investigations, CW laser radiation is most often used, but in contrast to it, the interaction of pulsed laser radiation with optical materials may lead to a wide range of effects, like nonlinear effects, dielectric breakdown, etc.
Quantum key distribution systems are accessible to an eavesdropper; i.e., the eavesdropper can attack not only quantum states but also the equipment. In the former case, vulnerabilities are removed by fundamental constraints (e.g., no-cloning theorem) or theoretical foundations for their removal exist. In the latter case, vulnerability is determined by the practical implementation of equipment. An attack with laser damage of optical components called laser damage attack can allow the eavesdropper to reduce the attenuation of optical elements and compromise distributed keys. In this work, a method based on neutral optical filters has been described for protection from laser damage attack against optical components. A scheme imitating actions of the eavesdropper in the process of laser damage attack has been presented. An approach has been proposed to calculate the parameters of optical elements after the attack. Processes occurring in samples exposed to intense laser radiation have been analyzed. The analysis of experimental data has indicated the stability and constraints of neutral optical filters used in quantum key distribution systems for protection from laser damage attack.
The security of quantum key distribution (QKD) systems relies on the physical integrity of their components. While laser-damage attacks (LDAs) using high-power continuous-wave (cw) lasers have been well studied, the threat posed by pulsed lasers at alternative wavelengths remains underestimated. Here, we experimentally investigated the stability of four types of fiber-optic attenuators under exposure to sub-picosecond pulses at 1061 nm with average power reaching 1 W. Mechanical variable attenuators with blocking elements and fixed air-gap attenuators show resistance to this attack. MEMS-based variable attenuators exhibit increased attenuation or irreversible damage that causes a permanent reduction in attenuation of approximately 3.8 dB. For fixed attenuators with an absorption element, we demonstrate that initial pulsed irradiation significantly lowers the optical damage threshold of the components compared to direct cw attacks. The attenuation reduction achieved is up to 7 dB at a 1 W cw laser at 1550 nm. These results highlight the possibility of establishing a hidden side-channel for eavesdropping attacks and underscore the insufficiency of existing countermeasures against sophisticated LDA scenarios.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) enables private communications with information-theoretic security. To guarantee the practical security of QKD, it is essential that QKD systems are implemented in accordance with theoretical requirements and are robust with regard to side-channel attacks. Here we study a prominent attack on QKD transmitters known as the laser-seeding attack (LSA). It consists in injecting photons into the laser of the transmitter in an attempt to modify the outgoing light in some way that is beneficial to the eavesdropper. In this work we measure the response of a QKD transmitter to the LSA as a function of the optical power injected, allowing us to quantify the level of optical attenuation required to mitigate the attack. Further, we use a laser-rate-equation model to numerically simulate the effects of the LSA on a gain-switched laser. With this model we are able to reproduce previous experimental results, as well as generate new insight into the LSA by examining the effects of the LSA when the QKD transmitter is operated with different laser current driving parameters.