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Conference on Lasers and Electro-Optics Europe & European Quantum Electronics Conference (CLEO/Europe-EQEC)

Resilience of Quantum Key Distribution Source Against Laser-Damage Attack by a Variety of Lasers

D. D. Ruzhitskaya, Irina V. Zhluktova, Anastasiya Ponosova, Daniil Trefilov, Poompong Chaiwongkhot, Anqi Huang, Vladimir A. Kamynin, Vadim Makarov

Published Jun 26, 2023• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Quantum key distribution (QKD) systems provide quantum-safe key exchange. Therefore, complete security analysis of implementations of QKD protocols is in the focus of interest of a worldwide information-security community. For today, a number of QKD loopholes are closed by countermeasures, which are also considered in emerging QKD security evaluation and certification [1]–[3]. However, new threats to practical QKD implementations are still found, such as the laser-damage attack, which is a powerful hacking strategy. In investigations, CW laser radiation is most often used, but in contrast to it, the interaction of pulsed laser radiation with optical materials may lead to a wide range of effects, like nonlinear effects, dielectric breakdown, etc.

DOI
10.1109/cleo/europe-eqec57999.2023.10231603

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Quantum key distribution (QKD) systems provide quantum-safe key exchange. Therefore, complete security analysis of implementations of QKD protocols is in the focus of interest of a worldwide information-security community. For today, a number of QKD loopholes are closed by countermeasures, which are also considered in emerging QKD security evaluation and certification [1]–[3]. However, new threats to practical QKD implementations are still found, such as the laser-damage attack, which is a powerful hacking strategy. In investigations, CW laser radiation is most often used, but in contrast to it, the interaction of pulsed laser radiation with optical materials may lead to a wide range of effects, like nonlinear effects, dielectric breakdown, etc.
With the emergence of an information society, the idea of protecting sensitive data is steadily gaining importance. Conventional encryption methods may not be sufficient to guarantee data protection in the future. Quantum key distribution (QKD) is an emerging technology that exploits fundamental physical properties to guarantee perfect security in theory. However, it is not easy to ensure in practice that the implementations of QKD systems are exactly in line with the theoretical specifications. Such theory–practice deviations can open loopholes and compromise security. Several such loopholes have been discovered and investigated in the last decade. These activities have motivated the proposal and implementation of appropriate countermeasures, thereby preventing future attacks and enhancing the practical security of QKD. This article introduces the so-called field of quantum hacking by summarising a variety of attacks and their prevention mechanisms.
With the emergence of an information society, the idea of protecting sensitive data is steadily gaining importance. Conventional encryption methods may not be sufficient to guarantee data protection in the future. Quantum key distribution (QKD) is an emerging technology that exploits fundamental physical properties to guarantee perfect security in theory. However, it is not easy to ensure in practice that the implementations of QKD systems are exactly in line with the theoretical specifications. Such theory-practice deviations can open loopholes and compromise security. Several such loopholes have been discovered and investigated in the last decade. These activities have motivated the proposal and implementation of appropriate countermeasures, thereby preventing future attacks and enhancing the practical security of QKD. This article introduces the so-called field of quantum hacking by summarising a variety of attacks and their prevention mechanisms.
We report a new type of vulnerability based on a physical principle that has not been previously exploited in quantum hacking—optical pumping of a laser in practical implementations of quantum key distribution (QKD) systems. We show that it is possible to increase the pulse energy of a source laser diode not only by injection-locking it with external light near its emission wavelength of 1550 nm, but also by optically pumping it at a much shorter wavelength. We experimentally demonstrate a 10% increase in pulse energy when exposing the laser diode to continuous-wave (cw) laser light at 1310 nm with a power of 1.6 mW via its fiber pigtail. This effect may allow an eavesdropper to steal the secret key. A possible countermeasure is to install broadband optical filters and isolators at the source output and to characterize them during security certification.
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) enables secure key exchange, based on fundamental laws of quantum mechanics [1] . There exist various protocols which are mathematically proven to be secure, however, for an actual implementation vulnerabilities, due to non-ideal components, must be considered. For example, the usage of faint lasers instead of single-photon sources undermines the security, as even for mean photon numbers per pulse µ ≪ 1 there is a non-vanishing probability of emitting multiple photons. The decoy protocol [2] , [3] offers a countermeasure. When randomly switching between two or more different pulse intensity levels, by exploiting their non-orthogonality, the so-called photon number splitting (PNS) attack can be revealed.
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