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International Conference on Communications

A Quantum-Agile Framework for Secure 5G Core Communication Using Post-Quantum TLS

Vasileios Fountas, Grigorios Kakaletsis, Harry Skianis, Emmanouil Kafetzakis, Ioannis Giannoulakis, Dimitrios Kastrinakis

Published May 24, 2026• 0 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1109/icc59461.2026.11588003

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