The threat of quantum computers becoming strong enough to break classical cryptographic primitives grows only more realistic with time. With increasing urgency, organizations are beginning to migrate their systems to quantum-resistant solutions. One of the areas encompassed by the post-quantum migration is secure network protocols. To protect traffic from quantum adversaries, classical cryptographic primitives inside network protocols must be replaced with quantum-resistant ones. While this transition is relatively straightforward for protocols that use key encapsulation mechanisms (KEMs) in their classical variants, that is not the case for protocols that rely on the Diffie-Hellman key exchange (DH). This simple cryptographic primitive plays a key role in many secure network protocols. It is the component that ensures asynchronicity of instant messaging protocols such as Signal – a property that key encapsulation mechanisms cannot achieve. Because of this, replacing the Diffie-Hellman key exchange with a post-quantum solution – many of which are based on KEMs – is non-trivial and may require changes to these protocols. We examine the obstacles and challenges of post-quantum migration in DH-based protocols and provide a comprehensive comparison of potential solutions proposed in the existing literature.
The threat of quantum computers becoming strong enough to break classical cryptographic primitives grows only more realistic with time. With increasing urgency, organizations are beginning to migrate their systems to quantum-resistant solutions. One of the areas encompassed by the post-quantum migration is secure network protocols. To protect traffic from quantum adversaries, classical cryptographic primitives inside network protocols must be replaced with quantum-resistant ones. While this transition is relatively straightforward for protocols that use key encapsulation mechanisms (KEMs) in their classical variants, that is not the case for protocols that rely on the Diffie-Hellman key exchange (DH). This simple cryptographic primitive plays a key role in many secure network protocols. It is the component that ensures asynchronicity of instant messaging protocols such as Signal – a property that key encapsulation mechanisms cannot achieve. Because of this, replacing the Diffie-Hellman key exchange with a post-quantum solution – many of which are based on KEMs – is non-trivial and may require changes to these protocols. We examine the obstacles and challenges of post-quantum migration in DH-based protocols and provide a comprehensive comparison of potential solutions proposed in the existing literature.
Classical cryptographic primitives such as RSA or Diffie-Hellman key exchange are based on computationally difficult mathematical problems for the solution of which no efficient algorithms are known. However, with the advent of practical quantum computers, quantum algorithms can be used to easily solve these problems and break the security of these algorithms. For this reason, post-quantum algorithms are being rapidly developed, evaluated, and optimized to resist quantum attacks in the hope that they will be used in secure instant messaging protocols such as the Signal protocol, in addition to other secure network protocols. This literature review provides an overview of efforts to develop quantum-resistant primitives for secure instant messaging protocols, with a particular focus on the Signal protocol.
Classical public-key cryptographic algorithms like the RSA algorithm and Diffie-Hellman are used to secure internet communications. However, the emergence of quantum computers poses a significant threat to these established algorithms, potentially leading to security breaches and malicious attacks. If quantum computers can break these algorithms, the entire security infrastructure of the internet could be compromised. Post- quantum cryptography (PQC) is a cryptographic area dedicated to developing new encryption and key exchange mechanisms that can resist quantum attacks. Its goal is to create quantum-resistant cryptographic algorithms, with NIST playing a central role in standardization and collaboration to ensure information security in the era of quantum computing. This study conducts a survey of Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM) algorithms within the field of Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC), along with their alternative counterparts. It provides a comprehensive analysis of performance metrics, including key sizes, execution times, and runtime performance, specifically focusing on Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM) algorithms.
Widely used communication and messaging protocols, e.g., TLS 1.3 and Signal, are insecure against an adversary with a quantum computer. We expect that post-quantum security will become mandatory for a new generation of cryptographic protocols in the nearest 10-15 years. The analysis of existing post-quantum secure cryptographic tools for key exchange, encryption and message authentication based on hard problems in codes, lattices, ring learning with errors and elliptic curve isogenies revealed their advantages and drawbacks. In particular, we conclude, that the main threat to communication and messaging protocols is only pre-quantum security of currently used Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocols. We summarize efficiency and safety results for each class of post-quantum cryptographic schemes and present an experimental implementation of isogeny-based Diffie-Hellman-like key exchange protocol as an illustration of their applicability.
Transitioning from classically to quantum secure key agreement protocols may require to exchange fundamental components, for example, exchanging Diffie-Hellman-like key exchange with a key encapsulation mechanism (KEM). Accordingly, the corresponding security proof can no longer rely on the Diffie-Hellman assumption, thus invalidating the security guarantees. As a consequence, the security properties have to be re-proven under a KEM-based security notion. We initiate the study of the LDACS key agreement protocol (Edition 01.01.00 from 25.04.2023), which is soon-to-be-standardized by the International Civil Aviation Organization. The protocol's cipher suite features Diffie-Hellman as well as a KEM-based key agreement protocol to provide post-quantum security. While the former results in an instantiation of an ISO key agreement inheriting all security properties, the security achieved by the latter is ambiguous. We formalize the computational security using the systematic notions of de Saint Guilhem, Fischlin and Warinshi (CSF '20), and prove the exact security that the KEM-based variant achieves in this model; primarily entity authentication, key secrecy and key authentication. To further strengthen our “pen-and-paper” findings, we model the protocol and its security guarantees using Tamarin, providing an automated proof of the security against a Dolev-Yao attacker.
The advent of quantum computing poses significant threats to classical public-key cryptographic primitives such as RSA and elliptic-curve cryptography. As many critical network and security protocols depend on these primitives for key exchange and authentication, there is an urgent need to understand their quantum vulnerability and assess the progress made towards integrating post-quantum cryptography (PQC). This survey provides a detailed examination of nine widely deployed protocols - TLS, IPsec, BGP, DNSSEC, SSH, QUIC, OpenID Connect, OpenVPN, and Signal Protocol - analysing their cryptographic foundations, quantum risks, and the current state of PQC migration. We find that TLS and Signal lead the transition with hybrid post-quantum key exchange already deployed at scale, while IPsec and SSH have standardised mechanisms but lack widespread production adoption. DNSSEC and BGP face the most significant structural barriers, as post-quantum signature sizes conflict with fundamental protocol constraints. Across all protocols, key exchange proves consistently easier to migrate than authentication, and protocol-level limitations such as message size and fragmentation often dominate over raw algorithm performance. We also discuss experimental deployments and emerging standards that are shaping the path towards a quantum-resistant communication infrastructure.
The advent of quantum computing poses a significant threat to the foundational cryptographic algorithms that secure modern digital communications. [27]. Protocols such as HTTPS, digital certificates, and public key infrastructures (PKIs) heavily rely on cryptographic primitives like RSA, ECC, and Diffie-Hellman, which are vulnerable to quantum attacks—most notably Shor’s algorithm. [18]. This paper presents a comprehensive comparative analysis between classical cryptographic algorithms currently in widespread use and emerging post-quantum cryptographic schemes designed to withstand quantum adversaries. [24]. We review the cryptographic mechanisms underpinning modern internet security, outline the mathematical foundations of quantum attacks, and evaluate the security, performance, and implementation feasibility of quantum-resistant alternatives such as Kyber, Dilithium, and Falcon. [25]. Additionally, we assess the hybrid approaches currently being explored by institutions and tech companies to enable a smooth transition to post-quantum cryptography. [23]. By providing an in-depth comparison, this study aims to guide researchers, developers, and policymakers in understanding the critical implications of quantum computing on cryptographic infrastructures and the necessary steps for securing communications in the quantum era. [16].