The advent of cryptographically relevant quantum computers poses a fundamental threat to classical public-key cryptography. This poster examines whether NIST-standardised post-quantum cryptography (PQC) can be deployed on resource-constrained embedded platforms via a hybrid TLS 1.3 design. We implement and evaluate a complete system combining ML-KEM (Kyber) key encapsulation with ML-DSA (Dilithium) digital signatures atop standard TLS 1.3 on an NVIDIA Jetson Xavier NX within a UAV-based infrastructure inspection scenario.
The advent of cryptographically relevant quantum computers poses a fundamental threat to classical public-key cryptography. This poster examines whether NIST-standardised post-quantum cryptography (PQC) can be deployed on resource-constrained embedded platforms via a hybrid TLS 1.3 design. We implement and evaluate a complete system combining ML-KEM (Kyber) key encapsulation with ML-DSA (Dilithium) digital signatures atop standard TLS 1.3 on an NVIDIA Jetson Xavier NX within a UAV-based infrastructure inspection scenario.
The advent of quantum computing threatens classical cryptographic protocols, necessitating urgent adoption of post-quantum cryptography (PQC). However, deploying PQC algorithms for key encapsulation and digital signing in real-world resource-constrained embedded systems such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) might not be feasible. While existing research benchmarks PQC in controlled environments, its real-world feasibility in UAVs is unverified. This thesis addresses this gap by investigating the computational and operational impact of hybrid PQC protocols on UAV-based critical infrastructure detection system ICARUS. Current systems rely on classical algorithms like Elliptic-Curve Diffie–Hellman (ECDH) and Elliptic-Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA), which are vulnerable to quantum attacks. Despite NIST’s standardization of PQC algorithms, their integration into UAVs is hindered by uncertainties about performance resource trade-offs. This work tackles these challenges by proposing a Hybrid TLS 1.3 Protocol combining Module-Lattice-based Key Encapsulation Mechanism (ML-KEM), Module-Lattice-based Digital Signature Algorithm (ML-DSA) and classical ECDH/ECDSA. The methodology integrates this hybrid model into ICARUS, a UAV application for power infrastructure inspection, using NVIDIA Jetson boards as clients and a multithreaded ground station server. For evaluation, real-world performance metrics were collected, including session establishment time, encryption and signing latency and throughput, transmission speed, round-trip time (RTT), message size, CPU and GPU utilization, RAM usage, and power consumption. These metrics were assessed under emulated infrastructure inspection scenarios while varying the security level of the ML-KEM Kyber algorithm. The experimental results demonstrate that it is indeed feasible to integrate post-quantum cryptography (PQC) into the ICARUS system without introducing significant additional hardware overhead. However, incorporating PQC into the TLS 1.3 protocol leads to a noticeable decrease in transmission speed, on average a 3.65× slowdown for sending and 3.75× for receiving, increasing as security levels increase. These findings support the viability of hybrid PQC deployment in UAVs, with Kyber and Dilithium emerging as suitable option for the ICARUS system, offering a favorable balance between security and performance. By quantifying the trade-offs between cryptographic strength and system performance, this thesis provides empirical evidence that can guide future efforts toward resource-efficient post-quantum implementations in embedded and autonomous systems.
Nowadays, Quantum computing presents a greater threat to classical cryptography, pushing towards the need for post-quantum cryptographic (PQC) solutions. This study assesses the performance of hybrid (classical and PQC) and pure PQC algorithms-specifically ML-KEM (Kyber) and MLDSA (Dilithium)-in VPN deployments on resource-constrained devices. Benchmarks across NIST security levels 1, 3, and 5 assess per-phase cryptographic runtime (key generation, encapsulation/decapsulation, signing/verification), connectionestablishment latency under network impairments, and bandwidth during sustained transfer. Results show pure PQC algorithms offer superior computational runtime, while hybrid approaches provide dual-algorithm assurance and comparable steady-state bandwidth once tunnels are established. We report wall-clock runtime on the stated platform and refrain from energy or peak-memory claims; platform-specific energy/memory profiling is deferred to future work. We provide artifacts and methodology to enable reproduction.
6G networks will require quantum-secure cryptography deployed across core infrastructure, edge nodes, resource-constrained IoT devices. Although post-quantum cryptographic (PQC) algorithms have been standardized by NIST, their practical deployability in bandwidth and latency limited wireless systems remains unclear. This paper presents a practical evaluation of NIST selected PQC schemes, including ML-KEM (Kyber), ML-DSA (Dilithium), and Falcon. Benchmarks conducted with OpenSSL and the OQS provider on heterogeneous platforms show that while computational performance is acceptable, ciphertext and signature size expansion significantly impact handshake reliability and bandwidth efficiency, particularly at the network edge. The results highlight key system-level trade-offs and motivate the need for PQC optimization and deployment-aware design for future quantum-secure 6G networks.
A sufficiently capable quantum computer would break the public-key cryptography that secures the modern internet, and data captured today can be stored until that machine arrives. This harvest-now-decrypt-later threat has pushed standards bodies to act well ahead of the hardware. In 2024 NIST published the first finished post-quantum standards: ML-KEM, derived from CRYSTALS-Kyber, for key establishment, and ML-DSA, derived from CRYSTALS-Dilithium, for digital signatures. This paper examines how these algorithms move into the two protocols that carry most secured traffic, TLS 1.3 and IPsec. We describe the hybrid handshake that runs a classical and a post-quantum key-encapsulation mechanism side by side, we measure the cost of the larger keys and signatures these schemes carry, and we discuss the practical friction points such as oversized certificate chains and fragmented handshake records. Benchmarks reported in the literature show that a hybrid X25519 plus Kyber-768 handshake adds only a small latency penalty on a healthy network, while Dilithium signatures inflate the certificate path enough to matter on constrained links. We close with a staged migration plan built around crypto-agility.
The impressively fast development of quantum computing is a serious threat to classical public-key cryptography, and algorithms such as Shor's and Grover's will render RSA and elliptic curve systems essentially useless as soon as a cryptanalytically relevant quantum computer becomes available. Although it is still some way off before such machines are available, the harvest-now-encrypt-later threat highlights the need for proactive defense. In response, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) published the first post-quantum cryptography standards in 2024, including ML-KEM (Kyber) for key establishment, ML-DSA (Dilithium) for digital signatures and SLH-DSA (SPHINCS+) as a stateless hash-based alternative. This paper is a summary of the evolving post-quantum landscape, starting with the standards and their underlying security and then moving on to migration policies such as CNSA 2.0 and CISA, NSA and NIST guidance. It also looks at integration patterns for important protocols such as TLS, IPsec, SSH, and code signing. A performance, interoperability and overhead evaluation methodology is presented with results showing that hybrid deployment and crypto-agile architectures make PQC adoption a viable option. The paper concludes by providing a governance-oriented roadmap, where inventory, prioritization and pilot deployments are identified as near-term actions, with open questions remaining on performance optimization, implementation security and algorithm resilience over time.
ABSTRACT This paper presents a simulation- and model-based study — all results are derived from validated simulation frameworks rather than physical hardware measurements — of the post-quantum migration of unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) command-and-control links. The advent of cryptographically relevant quantum computers (CRQCs) fundamentally threatens the security of unmanned aerial systems (UAS), particularly command and control links that rely on classical public-key cryptography. Compounded by "harvest now, decrypt later” strategies, this necessitates a proactive transition to post-quantum cryptography (PQC). We develop a quantum threat model for UAV communications and evaluates a migration pathway anchored by the NIST-standardized ML-KEM (Kyber) algorithm. We model and benchmark ML-KEM on a simulated ARM Cortex-M4-class flight controller plat-form, analysing computational performance, memory footprint, energy consumption, and real-time scheduling behaviour. Results demonstrate that ML-KEM-768 encapsulation reduces latency by approximately 39% compared to elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman, while a hybrid ECDH+ML-KEM-768 configuration introduces moderate computational and memory overhead. However, the substantial increase in ciphertext size creates critical fragmentation bottlenecks on low-bandwidth telemetry links such as LoRa, motivating a proposed symmetric key derivation architecture for bandwidth-efficient rekeying. Side-channel analysis under an idealised leakage model confirms susceptibility to correlation power analysis, highlighting the necessity for hardened implementations. Furthermore, real-time operating system scheduling simulations under a two-task discrete-event model reveal that naive task co-scheduling induces significant jitter, necessitating strict priority isolation to maintain flight controller determinism. These findings establish simulation-grounded guidance for integrating PQC into resource-constrained UAV platforms without compromising real-time performance or communication reliability.