Nowadays, Quantum computing presents a greater threat to classical cryptography, pushing towards the need for post-quantum cryptographic (PQC) solutions. This study assesses the performance of hybrid (classical and PQC) and pure PQC algorithms-specifically ML-KEM (Kyber) and MLDSA (Dilithium)-in VPN deployments on resource-constrained devices. Benchmarks across NIST security levels 1, 3, and 5 assess per-phase cryptographic runtime (key generation, encapsulation/decapsulation, signing/verification), connectionestablishment latency under network impairments, and bandwidth during sustained transfer. Results show pure PQC algorithms offer superior computational runtime, while hybrid approaches provide dual-algorithm assurance and comparable steady-state bandwidth once tunnels are established. We report wall-clock runtime on the stated platform and refrain from energy or peak-memory claims; platform-specific energy/memory profiling is deferred to future work. We provide artifacts and methodology to enable reproduction.
Nowadays, Quantum computing presents a greater threat to classical cryptography, pushing towards the need for post-quantum cryptographic (PQC) solutions. This study assesses the performance of hybrid (classical and PQC) and pure PQC algorithms-specifically ML-KEM (Kyber) and MLDSA (Dilithium)-in VPN deployments on resource-constrained devices. Benchmarks across NIST security levels 1, 3, and 5 assess per-phase cryptographic runtime (key generation, encapsulation/decapsulation, signing/verification), connectionestablishment latency under network impairments, and bandwidth during sustained transfer. Results show pure PQC algorithms offer superior computational runtime, while hybrid approaches provide dual-algorithm assurance and comparable steady-state bandwidth once tunnels are established. We report wall-clock runtime on the stated platform and refrain from energy or peak-memory claims; platform-specific energy/memory profiling is deferred to future work. We provide artifacts and methodology to enable reproduction.
6G networks will require quantum-secure cryptography deployed across core infrastructure, edge nodes, resource-constrained IoT devices. Although post-quantum cryptographic (PQC) algorithms have been standardized by NIST, their practical deployability in bandwidth and latency limited wireless systems remains unclear. This paper presents a practical evaluation of NIST selected PQC schemes, including ML-KEM (Kyber), ML-DSA (Dilithium), and Falcon. Benchmarks conducted with OpenSSL and the OQS provider on heterogeneous platforms show that while computational performance is acceptable, ciphertext and signature size expansion significantly impact handshake reliability and bandwidth efficiency, particularly at the network edge. The results highlight key system-level trade-offs and motivate the need for PQC optimization and deployment-aware design for future quantum-secure 6G networks.
As quantum computing advances, modern cryptographic standards face an existential threat, necessitating a transition to post-quantum cryptography (PQC). The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has selected CRYSTALS-Kyber and CRYSTALS-Dilithium as standardized PQC algorithms for secure key exchange and digital signatures, respectively. This study conducts a comprehensive performance analysis of these algorithms by benchmarking execution times across cryptographic operations such as key generation, encapsulation, decapsulation, signing, and verification. Additionally, the impact of AVX2 optimizations is evaluated to assess hardware acceleration benefits. Our findings demonstrate that Kyber and Dilithium achieve efficient execution times, outperforming classical cryptographic schemes such as RSA and ECDSA at equivalent security levels. Beyond technical performance, the real-world deployment of PQC introduces challenges in telecommunications networks, where large-scale infrastructure upgrades, interoperability with legacy systems, and regulatory constraints must be addressed. This paper examines the feasibility of PQC adoption in telecom environments, highlighting key transition challenges, security risks, and implementation strategies. Through industry case studies, we illustrate how telecom operators are integrating PQC into 5G authentication, subscriber identity protection, and secure communications. Our analysis provides insights into the computational trade-offs, deployment considerations, and standardization efforts shaping the future of quantum-safe cryptographic infrastructure.
The fast development of quantum computing presents a great threat to the security of classical cryptographic algorithms that support secure communication systems like Virtual Private Networks (VPNs). RSA and ECC algorithms that are commonly employed in key exchange and digital authentication can fall victim to quantum attacks from Shor’s and Grover’s algorithms. This study introduces the design and deployment of a post-quantum-resistant VPN protocol using post-quantum cryptographic (PQC) primitives, i.e., Kyber for key encapsulation and Dilithium for digital signatures. The suggested structure is incorporated into OpenVPN via the Open Quantum Safe (OQS) framework for uninterrupted post-quantum compatibility. The protocol is also capable of supporting hybrid cryptography for smooth transition from classical to post-quantum systems. Performance benchmarks are performed over metrics like handshake latency, tunnel throughput, CPU usage, and certificate overhead. The findings illustrate that post-quantum secure VPNs are not only achievable but also feasible for near-future deployment. This work adds a future-proof framework to improve the resilience of secure communications in the post-quantum era with a focus on scalability, crypto-agility, and real-world implementation readiness.
The emergence of large-scale quantum computing presents an imminent threat to contemporary public-key cryptosystems, with quantum algorithms such as Shor’s algorithm capable of efficiently breaking RSA and elliptic curve cryptography (ECC). This vulnerability has catalyzed accelerated standardization efforts for post-quantum cryptography (PQC) by the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and global security stakeholders. While theoretical security analysis of these quantum-resistant algorithms has advanced considerably, comprehensive real-world performance benchmarks spanning diverse computing environments—from high-performance cloud infrastructure to severely resource-constrained IoT devices—remain insufficient for informed deployment planning. This paper presents the most extensive cross-platform empirical evaluation to date of NIST-selected PQC algorithms, including CRYSTALS-Kyber and NTRU for key encapsulation mechanisms (KEMs), alongside BIKE as a code-based alternative, and CRYSTALS-Dilithium and Falcon for digital signatures. Our systematic benchmarking framework measures computational latency, memory utilization, key sizes, and protocol overhead across multiple security levels (NIST Levels 1, 3, and 5) in three distinct hardware environments and various network conditions. Results demonstrate that contemporary server architectures can implement these algorithms with negligible performance impact (<5% additional latency), making immediate adoption feasible for cloud services. In contrast, resource-constrained devices experience more significant overhead, with computational demands varying by up to 12× between algorithms at equivalent security levels, highlighting the importance of algorithm selection for edge deployments. Beyond standalone algorithm performance, we analyze integration challenges within existing security protocols, revealing that naive implementation of PQC in TLS 1.3 can increase handshake size by up to 7× compared to classical approaches. To address this, we propose and evaluate three optimization strategies that reduce bandwidth requirements by 40–60% without compromising security guarantees. Our investigation further encompasses memory-constrained implementation techniques, side-channel resistance measures, and hybrid classical-quantum approaches for transitional deployments. Based on these comprehensive findings, we present a risk-based migration framework and algorithm selection guidelines tailored to specific use cases, including financial transactions, secure firmware updates, vehicle-to-infrastructure communications, and IoT fleet management. This practical roadmap enables organizations to strategically prioritize systems for quantum-resistant upgrades based on data sensitivity, resource constraints, and technical feasibility. Our results conclusively demonstrate that PQC is deployment-ready for most applications, provided that implementations are carefully optimized for the specific performance characteristics and security requirements of target environments. We also identify several remaining research challenges for the community, including further optimization for ultra-constrained devices, standardization of hybrid schemes, and hardware acceleration opportunities.
As quantum computing advances, widely deployed public-key cryptosystems face a credible long-term risk, motivating a transition to post-quantum cryptography (PQC). Building on NIST’s standardization, this paper evaluates the practical performance of CRYSTALS-Kyber and CRYSTALS-Dilithium through both microbenchmarks and TLS 1.3 deployments, with the expectation that compute costs remain competitive while deployment overhead is dominated by larger handshake messages. At the algorithm level, we measure key generation, encapsulation/decapsulation, signing, and verification for reference and AVX2-optimized implementations using a consistent toolchain and runtime configuration, and compare them against classical baselines (RSA, ECDH, and ECDSA). Across tested parameter sets, AVX2 delivers multifold speedups and keeps operations in the sub-millisecond range, with Kyber and Dilithium execution times that are competitive with or better than security-aligned classical counterparts. At the protocol level, we integrate ML-KEM and ML-DSA into TLS 1.3 and extract handshake latency (ClientHello→ServerHello and ClientHello→END) and handshake message sizes from captured traces in a low-RTT setting. PQC handshakes incur only a modest latency increase at the 128-bit level relative to P-256, while at 192- and 256-bit security they complete substantially faster than P-384 and P-521 configurations. The main cost is bandwidth: server-to-client handshake traffic increases from a few kilobytes in classical TLS to roughly 8–15 kB under PQC. Overall, the results indicate that deployment challenges are driven less by computation than by larger handshake footprints, especially on bandwidth- or RTT-constrained links.
The advent of cryptographically relevant quantum computers poses a fundamental threat to classical public-key cryptography. This poster examines whether NIST-standardised post-quantum cryptography (PQC) can be deployed on resource-constrained embedded platforms via a hybrid TLS 1.3 design. We implement and evaluate a complete system combining ML-KEM (Kyber) key encapsulation with ML-DSA (Dilithium) digital signatures atop standard TLS 1.3 on an NVIDIA Jetson Xavier NX within a UAV-based infrastructure inspection scenario.