Comments On Leggett's "Macroscopic Realism

Kun Zhang, Jin Wang

N. Nikitin, K. S. Toms

C. S. Unnikrishnan

Guido Bacciagaluppi

In a recent paper, I have analysed and criticised Leggett and Garg’s argument to the effect that macroscopic realism contradicts quantum mechanics, by contrasting their assumptions to the example of Bell’s stochastic pilot-wave theories, and have applied Dzhafarov and Kujala’s analysis of contextuality in the presence of signalling to the case of the Leggett–Garg inequalities. In this chapter, I discuss more in general the motivations for macroscopic realism, taking a cue from Einstein’s criticism of the Bohm theory, then go on to summarise my previous results, with a few additional comments on other recent work on Leggett and Garg. [To appear in: E. Dzhafarov (ed.), Contextuality from Quantum Physics to Psychology (Singapore: World Scientific).]

Anthony J. Leggett

Jesse Fulton, Manushan Thenabadu, Run Yan Teh +1 more

The violation of a Leggett–Garg inequality confirms the incompatibility between quantum mechanics and the combined premises (called macro-realism) of macroscopic realism (MR) and noninvasive measurability (NIM). Arguments can be given that the incompatibility arises because MR fails for systems in a superposition of macroscopically distinct states—or else, that NIM fails. In this paper, we consider a strong negation of macro-realism, involving superpositions of coherent states, where the NIM premise is replaced by Bell’s locality premise. We follow recent work and propose the validity of a subset of Einstein–Podolsky–Rosen (EPR) and Leggett–Garg premises, referred to as weak macroscopic realism (wMR). In finding consistency with wMR, we identify that the Leggett–Garg inequalities are violated because of failure of both MR and NIM, but also that both are valid in a weaker (less restrictive) sense. Weak MR is distinguished from deterministic macroscopic realism (dMR) by recognizing that a measurement involves a reversible unitary interaction that establishes the measurement setting. Weak MR posits that a predetermined value for the outcome of a measurement can be attributed to the system after the interaction, when the measurement setting is experimentally specified. An extended definition of wMR considers the “element of reality” defined by EPR for system A, where one can predict with certainty the outcome of a measurement on A by performing a measurement on system B. Weak MR posits that this element of reality exists once the unitary interaction determining the measurement setting at B has occurred. We demonstrate compatibility of systems violating Leggett–Garg inequalities with wMR but point out that dMR has been shown to be falsifiable. Other tests of wMR are proposed, the predictions of wMR agreeing with quantum mechanics. Finally, we compare wMR with macro-realism models discussed elsewhere. An argument in favour of wMR is presented: wMR resolves a potential contradiction pointed out by Leggett and Garg between failure of macro-realism and assumptions intrinsic to quantum measurement theory.