In a recent paper, I have analysed and criticised Leggett and Garg’s argument to the effect that macroscopic realism contradicts quantum mechanics, by contrasting their assumptions to the example of Bell’s stochastic pilot-wave theories, and have applied Dzhafarov and Kujala’s analysis of contextuality in the presence of signalling to the case of the Leggett–Garg inequalities. In this chapter, I discuss more in general the motivations for macroscopic realism, taking a cue from Einstein’s criticism of the Bohm theory, then go on to summarise my previous results, with a few additional comments on other recent work on Leggett and Garg. [To appear in: E. Dzhafarov (ed.), Contextuality from Quantum Physics to Psychology (Singapore: World Scientific).]
In a recent paper, I have analysed and criticised Leggett and Garg’s argument to the effect that macroscopic realism contradicts quantum mechanics, by contrasting their assumptions to the example of Bell’s stochastic pilot-wave theories, and have applied Dzhafarov and Kujala’s analysis of contextuality in the presence of signalling to the case of the Leggett–Garg inequalities. In this chapter, I discuss more in general the motivations for macroscopic realism, taking a cue from Einstein’s criticism of the Bohm theory, then go on to summarise my previous results, with a few additional comments on other recent work on Leggett and Garg. [To appear in: E. Dzhafarov (ed.), Contextuality from Quantum Physics to Psychology (Singapore: World Scientific).]
In this paper we first analyse Leggett and Garg's argument to the effect that macroscopic realism contradicts quantum mechanics. After making explicit all the assumptions in Leggett and Garg's reasoning, we argue against the plausibility of their auxiliary assumption of non-invasive measurability, using Bell's construction of stochastic pilot-wave theories as a counterexample. Violations of the Leggett-Garg inequality thus do not provide a good argument against macrorealism per se. We then apply Dzhafarov and Kujala's analysis of contextuality in the presence of signalling to the case of the Leggett-Garg inequalities, with rather surprising results. An analogy with pilot-wave theory again helps to clarify the situation.
In this paper I attempt to broaden Feyerabend scholarship by asking whether and how Feyerabend's philosophy of science, in particular his commitments to realism and pluralism about scientific theories as well as anarchism about scientific methods, is borne out in multidisciplinary research concerning the Leggett–Garg inequalities. These inequalities were derived explicitly to be a temporal analogue to Bell's inequalities: the viability of macroscopic realism is tested against the predictions of quantum mechanics by performing a series measurements on a macroscopic variable of one system at different time intervals, then evaluating correlations among resultant values. In the nearly forty years since Leggett and Garg's paper, questions continue to be raised whether common tests of these inequalities reveal genuine violations or merely experimental disturbances. There is also much debate about what genuine violations in fact signify, if (as most agree) they are not straight-forwardly analogous to Bell tests. Taking this fascinating and as yet largely unsettled episode from physics as a case study, I derive three Feyerabendian lessons that demonstrate the relevance of his views even today.
In 1985, Leggett and Garg put forward the concept of macroscopic realism (macrorealism) and, in analogy to Bell's theorem, derived a necessary condition in terms of inequalities, which are now known as the Leggett-Garg inequalities. In this paper, we discuss another necessary condition called no-signaling in time. It solely bases on comparing the probability distribution for a macrovariable at some time for the cases where previously a measurement has or has not been performed. Although the concept is analogous to the no-signaling condition in the case of Bell tests, it can be violated according to quantum mechanical predictions even in situations where no violation of Leggett-Garg inequalities is possible.
The descriptions of the quantum realm and the macroscopic classical world di�er signi
�cantly not only in their mathematical formulations, but also in their foundational concepts
and philosophical consequences. The assumptions of local realism, non-contextuality
and macroscopic realism (macro-realism) along with the quantum mechanical violations
of these assumptions are discussed.
A complete generalization is provided of Wigner's argument inferring quantum nonlocality,
originally restricted for the EPR-Bohm entangled state, based on assuming joint
probability distributions for all the relevant dichotomic observables. Such Generalized
Wigner Inequality (GWI) turns out to be the N-partite local realist inequality which is
violated by quantum mechanics for all pure entangled states for any N.
We then exploit the non-trivial manifestation of quantum non-locality via local contextuality
on three qubit system. Here, we propose an experimental scheme to realize this
feature by deriving a new local realist inequality. The way quantum entanglement can
be used for global contextual value assigning is discussed in a quantum pseudo-telepathy
game.
In the second part of this report, we formulate Leggett-Garg inequality (LGI) in terms
of joint probability and demonstrate its quantum mechanical violation for two state oscillation,
which is initial state dependent, unlike the case of standard LGI. It has been
shown that, the newly formulated LGI reveals robustness against unsharp measurement
for testing compatibility between macro-realism and quantum mechanics. Finally we
show that, the recently proposed No-signaling in time condition, contradicts with quantum
mechanical predictions for any degree of unsharpness in measurement.
Macroscopic Realism (MR) says that a macroscopic system is always determinately in one or other of the macroscopically distinguishable states available to it. The Leggett-Garg (LG) inequality was derived to allow experimental test of whether or not this doctrine is true; it is also often thought of as a temporal version of a Bell-inequality. Despite recent interest in the inequality, controversy remains regarding what would be shown by its violation. Here we resolve this controversy, which arises due to an insufficiently general and model-independent approach to the question so far. We argue that LG's initial characterisation of MR does not pick out a particularly natural realist position, so we articulate an operationally well-defined and well-motivated position in its place. We show that much weaker conditions than LG's are sufficient to derive the inequality: in the first instance, its violation only demonstrates that certain measurements fail to be non-disturbing at the operational level. We articulate three distinct species of MR-ist position, and argue that it is only the first of these which can be refuted by LG inequality violation. This first position is an attractive one, so ruling it out remains of interest, however. A crucial role is played in LG's argument by the assumption of noninvasive measurability. We show that this notion is ambiguous between the weaker notion of disturbance at the operational level, and the stronger notion of invasiveness at the ontic level of properties of the system. Ontic noninvasiveness would be required to rule out MR per se but this property is not entailed by MR, and its presence cannot be established in a model-independent way. It follows that despite the formal parallels, Bell's and LG's inequalities are not methodologically on a par. We close with some reflections on the implications of our analysis for the pedagogy of quantum superposition.
While quantum theory has been tested to an incredible degree on microscopic scales, quantum effects are seldom observed in our everyday macroscopic world. The curious results of applying quantum mechanics to macroscopic objects are perhaps best illustrated by Erwin Schrödinger's famous thought experiment, where a cat can be put into a superposition state of being both dead and alive. Obviously, these quantum predictions are in stark contradiction to our common experience. Even with plenty of theoretical explanations put forward to explain this discrepancy, a large number of questions about the frontier between the quantum and the classical world remain unanswered. To distinguish between classical and quantum behavior, two fundamental concepts inherent to classical physics have been established over the years: The world view of local realism limits the power of classical experiments to establish correlations over space, while the world view of macroscopic realism (or macrorealism) restricts temporal correlations. Necessary conditions for both world views have been formulated in the form of Bell and Leggett-Garg inequalities, and Bell inequalities have been shown to be violated by quantum mechanics through increasingly conclusive experiments. Furthermore, many challenging steps towards convincing violations of macrorealism have been taken in a number of recent experiments. In the first part of this thesis, conditions for macrorealism are analyzed in detail. Two necessary conditions for macrorealism, the original Leggett-Garg inequality and the recently proposed no-signaling in time condition, are presented. It is then shown that a combination of no-signaling in time conditions is not only necessary but also sufficient for the existence of a macrorealistic description. Finally, an operational formulation of no-signaling in time, in terms of positive-operator valued measurements and Hamiltonians, is derived. In the next part, we argue that these results lead to a suitable definition of classical behavior. In particular, we provide a formalism to judge the classicality of measurements and time evolutions. We then proceed to apply it to a number of exemplary measurement operators and Hamiltonians. Finally, we argue for the importance of spontaneously realized Hamiltonians in our intuition of classical behavior. Next, differences between local realism and macrorealism are analyzed. For this purpose, the probability polytopes for spatially and temporally separated experiments are compared, and a fundamental difference in the power of quantum mechanics to build both types of correlations is discovered. This result shows that Fine's theorem, which states that a set of Bell inequalities is necessary and sufficient for local realism, is not transferable to macrorealism. Thus, (Leggett-Garg) inequalities are in principle not well-suited for tests of macrorealism, as they can never form a necessary and sufficient condition, and unnecessarily restrict the violating parameter space. No-signaling in time is both better suited and more strongly motivated from the underlying physical theory. In the final part of this thesis, a concrete experimental setup for implementing quantum experiments with macroscopic objects is proposed. It consists of a superconducting micro-sphere in the Meißner state, which is levitated by magnetic fields. Through its expelled magnetic field, the sphere's center-of-mass motion couples to a superconducting quantum circuit. Properly tuned, ground state cooling can be realized, since the sphere's motion is extremely well isolated from the surrounding environment. This setup therefore is a promising candidate for the observation of quantum effects in macroscopic systems.