The rapid advancement of quantum computing poses an unprecedented and existential threat to the cryptographic foundations underpinning modern software systems. Classical asymmetric cryptographic primitives — including RSA, Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC), and the Diffie-Hellman key exchange — are provably vulnerable to Shor's algorithm, executable on sufficiently powerful quantum hardware. This data analysis study presents a comprehensive investigation of quantum computing security threats across the software design lifecycle, employing a Fuzzy Analytic Hierarchy Process (Fuzzy-AHP) to systematically quantify and prioritize eight critical security dimensions: confidentiality, integrity, availability, authentication, non-repudiation, key management, side-channel resistance, and forward secrecy. Data were collected through structured expert surveys involving 47 domain specialists, supplemented by empirical performance benchmarks of six post-quantum cryptographic (PQC) algorithms standardized or under consideration by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) in 2024. Our Fuzzy-AHP analysis yields a global Consistency Ratio (CR) of 0.047, well within the acceptable threshold of 0.10, validating the reliability of expert judgments. Results demonstrate that confidentiality (weight: 0.920) and integrity (weight: 0.880) are the highest-priority security dimensions in the quantum threat context. Comparative data analysis of classical, hybrid, and full post-quantum deployments reveals that quantum attack resistance improves by 9,300% under full PQC adoption relative to classical cryptography alone, while introducing a 663% increase in key exchange latency. A five-phase quantum-safe software design framework is proposed and validated against the SDLC. The study concludes with actionable guidance for software architects, security engineers, and organizational decision-makers navigating the transition to quantum-resilient software infrastructure.
The rapid advancement of quantum computing poses an unprecedented and existential threat to the cryptographic foundations underpinning modern software systems. Classical asymmetric cryptographic primitives — including RSA, Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC), and the Diffie-Hellman key exchange — are provably vulnerable to Shor's algorithm, executable on sufficiently powerful quantum hardware. This data analysis study presents a comprehensive investigation of quantum computing security threats across the software design lifecycle, employing a Fuzzy Analytic Hierarchy Process (Fuzzy-AHP) to systematically quantify and prioritize eight critical security dimensions: confidentiality, integrity, availability, authentication, non-repudiation, key management, side-channel resistance, and forward secrecy. Data were collected through structured expert surveys involving 47 domain specialists, supplemented by empirical performance benchmarks of six post-quantum cryptographic (PQC) algorithms standardized or under consideration by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) in 2024. Our Fuzzy-AHP analysis yields a global Consistency Ratio (CR) of 0.047, well within the acceptable threshold of 0.10, validating the reliability of expert judgments. Results demonstrate that confidentiality (weight: 0.920) and integrity (weight: 0.880) are the highest-priority security dimensions in the quantum threat context. Comparative data analysis of classical, hybrid, and full post-quantum deployments reveals that quantum attack resistance improves by 9,300% under full PQC adoption relative to classical cryptography alone, while introducing a 663% increase in key exchange latency. A five-phase quantum-safe software design framework is proposed and validated against the SDLC. The study concludes with actionable guidance for software architects, security engineers, and organizational decision-makers navigating the transition to quantum-resilient software infrastructure.
With the arrival of fault-tolerant quantum computers, an existential threat has come to the cryptographic underpinnings of the security infrastructure in place for modern information technologies. Virtually all secure digital communication protocols used today are based on classical public-key cryptographic systems – RSA, Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) and Diffie-Hellman key exchange – that are susceptible to polynomial-time quantum attacks using Shor's algorithm. Symmetric cryptographic algorithms that are not broken are being effectively halved by Grover's algorithm, for example, AES. In this article, a complete and journal-standard systematic review of quantum computing and its implications in the field of information technology security is presented which includes 22 peer-reviewed publications from 2023-2025. The study covers the basics of quantum computing (qubits, superposition, entanglement and quantum gates), and how quantum computing specifically poses a threat to classical cryptography via algorithmic mechanisms. The three post-quantum cryptographic algorithms that were standardised by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) in August 2024 (ML-KEM, FIPS 203; ML-DSA, FIPS 204; and SLH-DSA, FIPS 205) are compared based on their security assumptions, performance, and readiness for deployment. The practical limitations and the use of Quantum Key Distribution, (QKD), as a physics based alternative to the computational security assumptions are discussed. Results show that although mature PQ solutions are now available for most cryptographic applications, the migration challenge, including legacy system transitions, migration architecture, and governance, is significant and pressing as the ‘harvest now, decrypt later’ threat model is relevant and adversaries might be collecting encrypted data for quantum decryption. The impact for financial services, health care, government, cloud infrastructure and critical national infrastructure is discussed. Lastly, the researchers list key research areas: standardisation of quantum-safe protocols, hybrid PQC-QKD designs, light-weight PQC for constrained devices, and quantum-safe blockchain.
Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to examine the emerging threat that large-scale quantum computing poses to classical public-key cryptographic systems, particularly RSA and Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC), which form the backbone of contemporary digital security infrastructures. In response to this threat, the study aims to analyze post-quantum cryptography (PQC) as a viable long-term solution capable of resisting both classical and quantum adversaries. The paper further seeks to assess the urgency of PQC adoption in light of the “harvest now, decrypt later” threat model and to evaluate the practical readiness of quantum-safe cryptographic algorithms currently under consideration by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). Materials and Methods: This study employs a qualitative and analytical research methodology grounded in an extensive review of authoritative sources, including NIST’s post-quantum cryptography standardization documents, recent academic literature, industry white papers, and policy reports from organizations such as RAND Corporation and Cloudflare. The analysis systematically surveys major families of post-quantum cryptographic algorithms namely lattice-based, code-based, and hash-based schemes and evaluates them based on security assumptions, computational efficiency, implementation complexity, and standardization maturity. Findings: The analysis indicates that Lattice-based cryptographic schemes demonstrate the highest maturity and practical readiness, evidenced by their selection in NIST’s PQC process. Code- and hash-based methods provide strong security but face key size and performance challenges. The lack of scalable quantum computers does not reduce urgency, as data harvesting persists. Artificial intelligence emerges as a key enabler for accelerating PQC adoption. Unique Contribution to Theory, Practice and Policy: The paper recommends a proactive, phased post-quantum migration using hybrid cryptographic architectures. Organizations should conduct inventories, benchmarking, and pilot deployments aligned with NIST standards. AI-driven tools are advised to improve key management and reduce complexity. Continued interdisciplinary research and policy support are encouraged to ensure a secure, scalable transition to quantum-resistant security systems.
Abstract Classical computing architectures cannot reasonably solve computationally challenging problems, such as those of RSA public-key encryption, Diffie-Hellman key exchange, and elliptic curve cryptography, which form the cryptographic foundations of modern enterprise information security. Superposition and entanglement phenomena can be used to make quantum computers efficient in solving these problems, which are efficiently solved by Shor's algorithm and Grover's algorithm, and make existing cryptographic infrastructure entirely insecure. While quantum computing is fault-tolerant and still under development, the 'harvest now, decrypt later' threat model by which adversaries can harvest encrypted data now to be decrypted later when they can operate quantum systems signals that the cryptographic threat is present, not future. The objective of this study is to examine the current state of enterprise cryptographic readiness against threats in the quantum era and to create a model for organizational transition to the new cryptographic standards in the quantum era, which is called the Quantum-Resilient Security Architecture (QRSA) Framework. It uses a mixed-methods research methodology, consisting of a systematic literature review, an expert Delphi survey of 38 cybersecurity practitioners from 16 countries, and a qualitative analysis of five enterprise organizations, to examine the state of quantum-capable cryptographic protocols, the readiness of organizations in the technical, governance and capability aspects, and the most important enablers and blockers for the post-quantum migration. The key findings include that: 94 percent of enterprise systems assessed are today still using quantum-vulnerable cryptographic primitives; less than 12 percent of organizations surveyed have started formal planning efforts for quantum migration; and, in most of the cases analyzed, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) post-quantum cryptography standardization process has not made significant impacts on enterprise security roadmaps. The QRSA Framework offers a staged migration architecture based on the NIST standardized algorithms such as CRYSTALS-Kyber, CRYSTALS-Dilithium and SPHINCS+ that integrates with the enterprise security infrastructure. Contributions include cybersecurity governance scholarship, enterprise risk management theory, and information security policy.
Advancing quantum computing capabilities pose an existential threat to the public-key cryptographic infrastructure—RSA, elliptic curve cryptography (ECC), and Diffie-Hellman key exchange—that secures national security systems, critical infrastructure, and classified communications. National Security Memorandum 10 (NSM-10) mandates that federal agencies complete migration to post-quantum cryptography (PQC) by 2035, yet the feasibility of achieving this deadline remains empirically unquantified. This quantitative study assessed four interrelated dimensions of the post-quantum migration challenge for U.S. national security systems through analysis of six curated datasets: quantum hardware metrics (N = 46), PQC algorithm benchmarks (N = 24), National Vulnerability Database cryptographic vulnerabilities (N = 856), cryptographic library vulnerabilities (N = 39), federal agency migration data (N = 22), and PQC TLS network performance data (N = 19). Analytical methods included polynomial and logistic regression, Kruskal-Wallis tests, chi-square analysis, logistic regression, and Monte Carlo simulation (10,000 iterations). Results revealed four convergent findings. First, a cubic polynomial model (R² = .906) projected that a cryptographically relevant quantum computer (CRQC) could compromise RSA-2048 by approximately 2042, while a logistic saturation model (R² = .991) suggested a potential qubit plateau at approximately 1,237 qubits. Second, statistically significant performance differences existed across PQC algorithm families (p < .01), with ML-KEM demonstrating the fastest key generation (12–31 µs) and effect sizes up to η² = .893. Third, implementation vulnerabilities constituted 82.1% of cryptographic CVEs, with no significant association with severity (χ² = 4.216, p = .239). Fourth, the probability of all federal agencies completing migration by 2035 was 0.03% (median completion: 2041.2). These findings reveal a significant urgency-readiness gap between quantum threat emergence and federal migration capacity. Algorithm migration alone addresses less than 20% of the cryptographic vulnerability surface. Risk-based prioritization, phased compliance frameworks, and concurrent investment in implementation security are recommended to bridge the gap between the quantum threat timeline and organizational readiness.
The advent of large-scale quantum computers poses an existential threat to the cryptographic algorithms that underpin modern digital security. Shor's algorithm enables quantum computers to factor large integers and compute discrete logarithms in polynomial time, rendering RSA, Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC), and Diffie-Hellman key exchange fundamentally insecure. Meanwhile, Grover's algorithm provides a quadratic speedup for brute-force search, effectively halving the security strength of symmetric ciphers and hash functions. This paper presents a comprehensive investigation into the impact of quantum computing on both asymmetric and symmetric cryptographic algorithms. We analyze the computational resources required by quantum attacks on current standards, evaluate the timeline of quantum threats based on hardware roadmaps from leading quantum computing companies, and conduct a systematic performance comparison of NIST-standardized post-quantum cryptographic (PQC) algorithms. Our experimental evaluation covers key generation time, encapsulation/decapsulation latency, signature generation/verification speed, key sizes, and bandwidth overhead across lattice-based, code-based, hash-based, and multivariate cryptographic schemes. Results indicate that lattice-based schemes, particularly CRYSTALS-Kyber and CRYSTALS-Dilithium, offer the most favorable balance of security and performance for practical deployment. We also propose a phased migration framework for transitioning existing cryptographic infrastructure to quantum-resistant alternatives, addressing compatibility, performance, and operational challenges.
The rapid advancement of quantum computing introduces unprecedented security threats to modern cloud and edge computing infrastructures. Classical public-key cryptographic algorithms such as RSA, Diffie–Hellman, and Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) are fundamentally vulnerable to quantum attacks enabled by Shor’s algorithm. As a result, the confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity of data stored and processed in distributed systems are at serious risk.Post-quantum cryptography (PQC) aims to develop cryptographic algorithms that are resistant to both classical and quantum adversaries. This paper presents a comprehensive quantum-resilient cryptographic framework designed specifically for post-quantum cloud and edge computing environments. The framework integrates post-quantum cryptographic primitives, hybrid cryptographic approaches, crypto-agile architectures, and secure key management mechanisms. The proposed framework addresses performance constraints, scalability requirements, and deployment challenges in heterogeneous environments. A detailed discussion of security threats, architectural components, performance considerations, and future research directions is provided. The proposed approach enables longterm security and supports a smooth transition toward quantum-safe distributed computing systems.