Zero Knowledge Proofs based on computational hardness assumptions are fundamental primitives for secure user authentication. This paper proposes a novel Designated Verifier Zero Knowledge Proof that leverages the inherent randomness of quantum bits. Unlike traditional constructions relying on computationally intractable NP problems, the proposed protocol derives its security from the physical layer, specifically the uncertainty principle of quantum state projections in misaligned measurement bases. A rigorous formal mathematical analysis establishes the completeness, soundness and zero knowledge properties of the scheme. Furthermore, the protocol’s performance is evaluated via a quantum simulator under realistic error-prone conditions. The results demonstrate that the construction is robust against dishonest parties while remaining feasible under constrained quantum resources, offering a scalable approach for secure quantum authentication.
Zero Knowledge Proofs based on computational hardness assumptions are fundamental primitives for secure user authentication. This paper proposes a novel Designated Verifier Zero Knowledge Proof that leverages the inherent randomness of quantum bits. Unlike traditional constructions relying on computationally intractable NP problems, the proposed protocol derives its security from the physical layer, specifically the uncertainty principle of quantum state projections in misaligned measurement bases. A rigorous formal mathematical analysis establishes the completeness, soundness and zero knowledge properties of the scheme. Furthermore, the protocol’s performance is evaluated via a quantum simulator under realistic error-prone conditions. The results demonstrate that the construction is robust against dishonest parties while remaining feasible under constrained quantum resources, offering a scalable approach for secure quantum authentication.
A new interactive quantum zero-knowledge protocol for identity authentication implementable in currently available quantum cryptographic devices is proposed and demonstrated. The protocol design involves a verifier and a prover knowing a pre-shared secret, and the acceptance or rejection of the proof is determined by the quantum bit error rate. It has been implemented in modified Quantum Key Distribution devices executing two fundamental cases. In the first case, all players are honest, while in the second case, one of the users is a malicious player. We demonstrate an increase of the quantum bit error rate around 25% in the latter case compared to the case of honesty. The protocol has also been validated for distances from a back-to-back setup to more than 60 km between verifier and prover. The security and robustness of the protocol has been analysed, demonstrating its completeness, soundness and zero-knowledge properties.
Zero-knowledge proofs (ZKPs) enable the verification of a statement without revealing any information beyond its validity and constitute a fundamental primitive in cryptography and information theory. However, existing constructions rely on computational assumptions and are predominantly confined to bipartite settings, leaving their information-theoretic realization in bipartite or network scenarios largely unexplored. Here we develop a framework for zero-knowledge verification based on the indistinguishability of quantum states under operational constraints. Exploiting the fundamental limitations imposed by local operations, we show that a verifier is inherently restricted from extracting information about the underlying state while retaining the ability to verify correctness. We construct explicit protocols for multiparty quantum networks that achieve information-theoretic security, ensuring that no subset of collaborating parties can gain knowledge beyond the validity of the statement, independent of their joint computational power.
This work presents a new scheme based on a quantum zero-knowledge proof for identity authentication. The novelty of this research is the migration of the classical concept Zero-knowledge into the quantum cryptographic framework that, to the best of our knowledge, has never been explored. This approach allows us to take advantage of the principles of quantum mechanics to build a protocol, which is secure against quantum computer attacks, for authenticating several users having access to the same network node. The protocol has been designed, its security analysed and implemented in modified Quantum Key Distribution devices. Two scenarios have been analysed experimentally, the first being both the prover and the verifier honest players, and the second case being the prover a malicious player, the latter demonstrating a notable increase in the quantum bit error rate that prevents a fraudulent authentication.
With the rapid development of quantum computers, proofs of quantumness have recently become an interesting research direction. However, in current schemes for proofs of quantumness, quantum provers face the risk of being maliciously exploited by classical verifiers. Through malicious strategies in interaction with quantum provers, classical verifiers could solve some instances of hard problems that arise from the specific scheme in use. This is due to the lack of formalization that prevents malicious verifiers from extracting useful information in proofs of quantumness. To address this issue, we formalize zero-knowledge proofs of quantumness. Intuitively, the zero-knowledge property necessitates that the information gained by the classical verifier from interactions with the quantum prover should not surpass what can be simulated using a simulated classical prover interacting with the same verifier. As a result, the new zero-knowledge notion can prevent a malicious verifier from exploiting quantum advantage. We find that the classical zero-knowledge proof is sufficient to compile some existing proofs of quantumness schemes into zero-knowledge proofs of quantumness schemes. It appears to be more general to require zero-knowledge proof on the verifier side instead of the prover side. This helps to regulate the verifier's behavior from malicious to be honest-but-curious. As a result, both parties will play not only one role in the proofs of quantumness but also the dual role in the classical zero-knowledge proof. Specifically, Shor's factoring-based scheme and the learning with errors-based scheme in [Brakerski et al., FOCS, 2018] can be transformed into zero-knowledge proofs of quantumness by requiring an extractable non-interactive zero-knowledge argument on the verifier side. Zero-knowledge proofs of quantumness can thus be viewed as an enhanced security notion for proofs of quantumness.
In the rapidly evolving landscape of cloud computing, ensuring secure user authentication and protection against cyber-attacks has become increasingly critical. This research proposes a novel security framework for cloud systems based on the Quantum Zero-Knowledge Proof (ZKP) technique, aiming to provide a privacy-preserving and quantum-resilient authentication mechanism. The core of the proposed model lies in leveraging photon polarization at specific quantum angles to implement secure and non-disclosive verification, effectively allowing users (provers) to prove their identity without revealing any sensitive credentials. The system's architecture integrates a Zero Knowledge Proof Engine (ZKE), which forms the backbone of the security protocol, enhancing resilience against Denial-of-Service (DoS) and Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks. The quantum properties of photons enable a high level of randomness and unpredictability, significantly improving the robustness of the system. A Python-based simulation environment has been developed to model the proposed engine and conduct experimental validations. Furthermore, a web-based application interface has been designed to facilitate seamless interaction between cloud users and the authentication system, demonstrating real-time threat detection and response. Experimental results, visualized through performance metrics and interface output, confirm the effectiveness and practicality of the proposed model. This approach not only enhances security but also offers a scalable and user-friendly solution for modern cloud environments, marking a significant step toward integrating quantum principles into mainstream cybersecurity infrastructures.
On-demand authentication is critical for scalable quantum systems, yet many existing quantum signature and message-authentication schemes are signer-initiated, requiring advance distribution of authentication material even when no verification occurs. We introduce verifier-initiated quantum digital signatures (VIQDS), in which the verifier requests authentication only when needed and the signer responds once; after issuance, verification proceeds without further interaction. Practically, shifting authentication to a verifier-driven, on-demand workflow reduces avoidable communication and storage overhead and aligns with deployments where verification is sporadic, such as distributed services and audit-oriented infrastructures. Our approach leverages quantum zero-knowledge techniques so that verification reveals nothing about the signer's secret key beyond the fact that the signature is valid. We present a general conversion principle from suitable quantum proof protocols to VIQDS, together with a concrete realization based on elementary qubit platforms. Here, we show information-theoretic security against forgery and privacy against curious verifiers without computational hardness assumptions.