Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

arXiv:2609.35339

Zero Knowledge Proofs in Quantum Networks

Tuhin Paul, Srijani Das, Manasi Patra, Ramij Rahaman

quant-phcs.CRcs.SImath-phSubmitted Sep 28, 2026• Announced Sep 29, 2026• 0 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

Zero-knowledge proofs (ZKPs) enable the verification of a statement without revealing any information beyond its validity and constitute a fundamental primitive in cryptography and information theory. However, existing constructions rely on computational assumptions and are predominantly confined to bipartite settings, leaving their information-theoretic realization in bipartite or network scenarios largely unexplored. Here we develop a framework for zero-knowledge verification based on the indistinguishability of quantum states under operational constraints. Exploiting the fundamental limitations imposed by local operations, we show that a verifier is inherently restricted from extracting information about the underlying state while retaining the ability to verify correctness. We construct explicit protocols for multiparty quantum networks that achieve information-theoretic security, ensuring that no subset of collaborating parties can gain knowledge beyond the validity of the statement, independent of their joint computational power.

Comments
18 pages, 1 figure

Related papers

Zero-Knowledge Proofs for Quantum State Transfer

Jincheng Zhang

This paper explores the application of zero-knowledge proofs (ZKPs) to facilitate quantum state transfer. The core idea is to leverage ZKPs to verify the correct reception of a quantum state without revealing the state itself. Traditional quantum communication methods are susceptible to information leakage, and distance limitations restrict effective transmission. This research proposes a novel quantum communication protocol incorporating ZKPs, offering a potential solution to these challenges. The protocol utilizes a series of measurements and cryptographic proofs to guarantee the receiver accurately interprets the intended quantum state. We present a formal mathematical framework for this protocol, detailing the key components and their relationships. The resulting system significantly reduces the risk of information compromise while potentially expanding the practical range of quantum communication. The primary contribution lies in the innovative combination of quantum communication principles with the robust security guarantees provided by ZKPs. We analyze the protocol's performance and discuss its implications for secure quantum networks. ---

•Sep 6, 2026•0 citations

Quantumization of Zero-Knowledge Proofs and Verifiable Computation Circuits

Jincheng Zhang

This paper explores the quantumization of zero-knowledge proofs (ZKPs) and verifiable computation circuits (VCCs), presenting a novel approach to achieving secure and verifiable execution of quantum computation programs. The core idea involves leveraging quantum circuit hashing techniques to construct ZKP protocols that demonstrate the correctness of a VCC without revealing its underlying structure. This approach addresses a critical need within the burgeoning field of quantum computing – the provision of robust and trustworthy execution validation mechanisms. We outline the theoretical framework, detailing the key components of the system including the circuit hashing algorithm, the ZKP protocol design, and the associated mathematical formalization. The work contributes to the development of a new paradigm for quantum program verification, offering a potential pathway towards building more reliable and secure quantum computing systems. The presented methodology aims to bridge the gap between the theoretical promise of quantum computation and the practical challenges of ensuring its trustworthiness. ---

•Sep 1, 2026•0 citations

Zero-Knowledge Proofs of Quantumness

Duong Hieu Phan, Weiqiang Wen, Xingyu Yan +1 more

With the rapid development of quantum computers, proofs of quantumness have recently become an interesting research direction. However, in current schemes for proofs of quantumness, quantum provers face the risk of being maliciously exploited by classical verifiers. Through malicious strategies in interaction with quantum provers, classical verifiers could solve some instances of hard problems that arise from the specific scheme in use. This is due to the lack of formalization that prevents malicious verifiers from extracting useful information in proofs of quantumness. To address this issue, we formalize zero-knowledge proofs of quantumness. Intuitively, the zero-knowledge property necessitates that the information gained by the classical verifier from interactions with the quantum prover should not surpass what can be simulated using a simulated classical prover interacting with the same verifier. As a result, the new zero-knowledge notion can prevent a malicious verifier from exploiting quantum advantage. We find that the classical zero-knowledge proof is sufficient to compile some existing proofs of quantumness schemes into zero-knowledge proofs of quantumness schemes. It appears to be more general to require zero-knowledge proof on the verifier side instead of the prover side. This helps to regulate the verifier's behavior from malicious to be honest-but-curious. As a result, both parties will play not only one role in the proofs of quantumness but also the dual role in the classical zero-knowledge proof. Specifically, Shor's factoring-based scheme and the learning with errors-based scheme in [Brakerski et al., FOCS, 2018] can be transformed into zero-knowledge proofs of quantumness by requiring an extractable non-interactive zero-knowledge argument on the verifier side. Zero-knowledge proofs of quantumness can thus be viewed as an enhanced security notion for proofs of quantumness.

quant-pharXiv:2609.23455•IACR Communications in Cryptology•Sep 22, 2026•0 citations

Quantum Security of Zero Knowledge Protocols

Morcos Doueihy, Jean-Paul

A Zero-Knowledge Proof basically is a protocol between two parties, the Prover and the Verifier, that allows the Prover to convince the Verifier about the truthness of a non trivial statement without revealing any additional information. Zero Knowledge Proofs have found a lot of practical applications covering most of the protocols concerning about data privacy and protocol verification. Examples of that are anonymous cash or electronic voting. The possibility to have real quantum computers with a reasonable size in a near future is forcing the cryptographic community to devise new methods to provide security that resist quantum attacks. Most of the zero-knowledge protocols used nowadays are based on computational problems like the discrete logarithm problem that can no longer be considered hard, since there are known efficient ways to solve them with quantum algorithms. Cryptographic research about the quantum security of zero knowledge proofs started nearly 20 years ago in a very theoretical approach, but not many papers on that topic appeared since then. The goal of this thesis is writing a survey including the main concepts about quantum secure zero-knowledge protocols, the state-of-the-art both from the theoretical and practical approaches, and an exploration of their potential application areas. The survey will be a good starting document for further students willing to do research in this topic.

•Sep 10, 2024•0 citations

Device-independent quantum randomness–enhanced zero-knowledge proof

Cheng-Long Li, Kaiyi Zhang, Xingjian Zhang +15 more

Zero-knowledge proof (ZKP) is a fundamental cryptographic primitive that allows a prover to convince a verifier of the validity of a statement without leaking any further information. As an efficient variant of ZKP, noninteractive zero-knowledge proof (NIZKP) adopting the Fiat-Shamir heuristic is essential to a wide spectrum of applications, such as federated learning, blockchain, and social networks. However, the heuristic is typically built upon the random oracle model that makes ideal assumptions about hash functions, which does not hold in reality and thus undermines the security of the protocol. Here, we present a quantum solution to the problem. Instead of resorting to a random oracle model, we implement a quantum randomness service. This service generates random numbers certified by the loophole-free Bell test and delivers them with postquantum cryptography (PQC) authentication. By employing this service, we conceive and implement NIZKP of the three-coloring problem. By bridging together three prominent research themes, quantum nonlocality, PQC, and ZKP, we anticipate this work to inspire more innovative applications that combine quantum information science and the cryptography field.

arXiv:2111.06717•Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences•Nov 2, 2023•7 citations

Formal security analysis of MPC-in-the-head zero-knowledge protocols

Nikolaj Sidorenco, Sabine Oechsner, Bas Spitters

Zero-knowledge proofs allow a prover to convince a verifier of the veracity of a statement without revealing any other information. An interesting class of zero-knowledge protocols are those following the MPC-in-the-head paradigm (Ishai et al., STOC '07) which use secure multiparty computation (MPC) protocols as the basis. Efficient instances of this paradigm have emerged as an active research topic in the last years, starting with ZKBoo (Giacomelli et al., USENIX '16). Zero-knowledge protocols are a vital building block in the design of privacy-preserving technologies as well as cryptographic primitives like digital signature schemes that provide post-quantum security. This work investigates the security of zero-knowledge protocols following the MPC-in-the-head paradigm. We provide the first machine-checked security proof of such a protocol on the example of ZKBoo. Our proofs are checked in the EasyCrypt proof assistant. To enable a modular security proof, we develop a new security notion for the MPC protocols used in MPC-in-the-head zero-knowledge protocols. This allows us to recast existing security proofs in a black-box fashion which we believe to be of independent interest.

IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop (CSFW)•Jun 1, 2021•12 citations
Zero-knowledge proofs (ZKPs) enable the verification of a statement without revealing any information beyond its validity and constitute a fundamental primitive in cryptography and information theory. However, existing constructions rely on computational assumptions and are predominantly confined to bipartite settings, leaving their information-theoretic realization in bipartite or network scenarios largely unexplored. Here we develop a framework for zero-knowledge verification based on the indistinguishability of quantum states under operational constraints. Exploiting the fundamental limitations imposed by local operations, we show that a verifier is inherently restricted from extracting information about the underlying state while retaining the ability to verify correctness. We construct explicit protocols for multiparty quantum networks that achieve information-theoretic security, ensuring that no subset of collaborating parties can gain knowledge beyond the validity of the statement, independent of their joint computational power.
This paper explores the application of zero-knowledge proofs (ZKPs) to facilitate quantum state transfer. The core idea is to leverage ZKPs to verify the correct reception of a quantum state without revealing the state itself. Traditional quantum communication methods are susceptible to information leakage, and distance limitations restrict effective transmission. This research proposes a novel quantum communication protocol incorporating ZKPs, offering a potential solution to these challenges. The protocol utilizes a series of measurements and cryptographic proofs to guarantee the receiver accurately interprets the intended quantum state. We present a formal mathematical framework for this protocol, detailing the key components and their relationships. The resulting system significantly reduces the risk of information compromise while potentially expanding the practical range of quantum communication. The primary contribution lies in the innovative combination of quantum communication principles with the robust security guarantees provided by ZKPs. We analyze the protocol's performance and discuss its implications for secure quantum networks. ---
This paper explores the quantumization of zero-knowledge proofs (ZKPs) and verifiable computation circuits (VCCs), presenting a novel approach to achieving secure and verifiable execution of quantum computation programs. The core idea involves leveraging quantum circuit hashing techniques to construct ZKP protocols that demonstrate the correctness of a VCC without revealing its underlying structure. This approach addresses a critical need within the burgeoning field of quantum computing – the provision of robust and trustworthy execution validation mechanisms. We outline the theoretical framework, detailing the key components of the system including the circuit hashing algorithm, the ZKP protocol design, and the associated mathematical formalization. The work contributes to the development of a new paradigm for quantum program verification, offering a potential pathway towards building more reliable and secure quantum computing systems. The presented methodology aims to bridge the gap between the theoretical promise of quantum computation and the practical challenges of ensuring its trustworthiness. ---
With the rapid development of quantum computers, proofs of quantumness have recently become an interesting research direction. However, in current schemes for proofs of quantumness, quantum provers face the risk of being maliciously exploited by classical verifiers. Through malicious strategies in interaction with quantum provers, classical verifiers could solve some instances of hard problems that arise from the specific scheme in use. This is due to the lack of formalization that prevents malicious verifiers from extracting useful information in proofs of quantumness. To address this issue, we formalize zero-knowledge proofs of quantumness. Intuitively, the zero-knowledge property necessitates that the information gained by the classical verifier from interactions with the quantum prover should not surpass what can be simulated using a simulated classical prover interacting with the same verifier. As a result, the new zero-knowledge notion can prevent a malicious verifier from exploiting quantum advantage. We find that the classical zero-knowledge proof is sufficient to compile some existing proofs of quantumness schemes into zero-knowledge proofs of quantumness schemes. It appears to be more general to require zero-knowledge proof on the verifier side instead of the prover side. This helps to regulate the verifier's behavior from malicious to be honest-but-curious. As a result, both parties will play not only one role in the proofs of quantumness but also the dual role in the classical zero-knowledge proof. Specifically, Shor's factoring-based scheme and the learning with errors-based scheme in [Brakerski et al., FOCS, 2018] can be transformed into zero-knowledge proofs of quantumness by requiring an extractable non-interactive zero-knowledge argument on the verifier side. Zero-knowledge proofs of quantumness can thus be viewed as an enhanced security notion for proofs of quantumness.
A Zero-Knowledge Proof basically is a protocol between two parties, the Prover and the Verifier, that allows the Prover to convince the Verifier about the truthness of a non trivial statement without revealing any additional information. Zero Knowledge Proofs have found a lot of practical applications covering most of the protocols concerning about data privacy and protocol verification. Examples of that are anonymous cash or electronic voting. The possibility to have real quantum computers with a reasonable size in a near future is forcing the cryptographic community to devise new methods to provide security that resist quantum attacks. Most of the zero-knowledge protocols used nowadays are based on computational problems like the discrete logarithm problem that can no longer be considered hard, since there are known efficient ways to solve them with quantum algorithms. Cryptographic research about the quantum security of zero knowledge proofs started nearly 20 years ago in a very theoretical approach, but not many papers on that topic appeared since then. The goal of this thesis is writing a survey including the main concepts about quantum secure zero-knowledge protocols, the state-of-the-art both from the theoretical and practical approaches, and an exploration of their potential application areas. The survey will be a good starting document for further students willing to do research in this topic.
Zero-knowledge proof (ZKP) is a fundamental cryptographic primitive that allows a prover to convince a verifier of the validity of a statement without leaking any further information. As an efficient variant of ZKP, noninteractive zero-knowledge proof (NIZKP) adopting the Fiat-Shamir heuristic is essential to a wide spectrum of applications, such as federated learning, blockchain, and social networks. However, the heuristic is typically built upon the random oracle model that makes ideal assumptions about hash functions, which does not hold in reality and thus undermines the security of the protocol. Here, we present a quantum solution to the problem. Instead of resorting to a random oracle model, we implement a quantum randomness service. This service generates random numbers certified by the loophole-free Bell test and delivers them with postquantum cryptography (PQC) authentication. By employing this service, we conceive and implement NIZKP of the three-coloring problem. By bridging together three prominent research themes, quantum nonlocality, PQC, and ZKP, we anticipate this work to inspire more innovative applications that combine quantum information science and the cryptography field.
Zero-knowledge proofs allow a prover to convince a verifier of the veracity of a statement without revealing any other information. An interesting class of zero-knowledge protocols are those following the MPC-in-the-head paradigm (Ishai et al., STOC '07) which use secure multiparty computation (MPC) protocols as the basis. Efficient instances of this paradigm have emerged as an active research topic in the last years, starting with ZKBoo (Giacomelli et al., USENIX '16). Zero-knowledge protocols are a vital building block in the design of privacy-preserving technologies as well as cryptographic primitives like digital signature schemes that provide post-quantum security. This work investigates the security of zero-knowledge protocols following the MPC-in-the-head paradigm. We provide the first machine-checked security proof of such a protocol on the example of ZKBoo. Our proofs are checked in the EasyCrypt proof assistant. To enable a modular security proof, we develop a new security notion for the MPC protocols used in MPC-in-the-head zero-knowledge protocols. This allows us to recast existing security proofs in a black-box fashion which we believe to be of independent interest.