The threat of advancing quantum computers necessitates a rapid cryptographic overhaul. In response, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) published the first finalized Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) standards — including ML-KEM and ML-DSA — to mitigate the urgent risk of "harvest now, decrypt later". The objective of this study is to deploy an interactive system with the Open Radio Access Network (O-RAN) by utilizing a quantum toolkit like Qiskit, in order to demonstrate the real-time breaking of classical cryptographic schemes while simultaneously validating the necessary resilience of PQC embedded systems.
The threat of advancing quantum computers necessitates a rapid cryptographic overhaul. In response, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) published the first finalized Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) standards — including ML-KEM and ML-DSA — to mitigate the urgent risk of "harvest now, decrypt later". The objective of this study is to deploy an interactive system with the Open Radio Access Network (O-RAN) by utilizing a quantum toolkit like Qiskit, in order to demonstrate the real-time breaking of classical cryptographic schemes while simultaneously validating the necessary resilience of PQC embedded systems.
The impressively fast development of quantum computing is a serious threat to classical public-key cryptography, and algorithms such as Shor's and Grover's will render RSA and elliptic curve systems essentially useless as soon as a cryptanalytically relevant quantum computer becomes available. Although it is still some way off before such machines are available, the harvest-now-encrypt-later threat highlights the need for proactive defense. In response, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) published the first post-quantum cryptography standards in 2024, including ML-KEM (Kyber) for key establishment, ML-DSA (Dilithium) for digital signatures and SLH-DSA (SPHINCS+) as a stateless hash-based alternative. This paper is a summary of the evolving post-quantum landscape, starting with the standards and their underlying security and then moving on to migration policies such as CNSA 2.0 and CISA, NSA and NIST guidance. It also looks at integration patterns for important protocols such as TLS, IPsec, SSH, and code signing. A performance, interoperability and overhead evaluation methodology is presented with results showing that hybrid deployment and crypto-agile architectures make PQC adoption a viable option. The paper concludes by providing a governance-oriented roadmap, where inventory, prioritization and pilot deployments are identified as near-term actions, with open questions remaining on performance optimization, implementation security and algorithm resilience over time.
Current cryptographic systems, heavily reliant on classical algorithms, are increasingly vulnerable to the formidable capabilities of quantum computing. Notably, quantum algorithms such as Shor’s and Grover’s pose profound threats by accelerating decryption processes, which could soon make existing cryptosystems ineffective. This paper stresses the critical need and complexity of shifting to Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) to safeguard encrypted communications against these emerging quantum threats. It outlines the timeline of the National Institute of Standards and Technology’s (NIST) efforts in standardizing PQC, elucidating the significant challenges and the essential nature of adopting these new standards. While NIST provides structured guidance, transitioning to PQC presents substantial risks and difficulties, particularly in terms of organizational adaptation and the technical overhaul required. The discourse further explores the tangible implications of quantum advancements on both symmetric and asymmetric key cryptography, highlighting the potential vulnerabilities and the increased risk of security breaches. The paper underscores the imperative for immediate action in initiating the transition towards robust PQC systems, given the rapid development and anticipated deployment of quantum computing technologies capable of decrypting currently secure information. This transition is not merely a technical upgrade but a crucial strategic move to preemptively counteract quantum threats, ensuring the continued confidentiality and integrity of sensitive data across various sectors.
The telecommunications industry faces a dual transformation: the architectural shift toward Open Radio Access Networks (O-RAN) and the emerging threat from quantum computing. O-RAN disaggregated, multi-vendor architecture creates a larger attack surface vulnerable to crypt-analytically relevant quantum computers(CRQCs) that will break current public key cryptography. The Harvest Now, Decrypt Later (HNDL) attack strategy makes this threat immediate, as adversaries can intercept encrypted data today for future decryption. This paper presents Q-RAN, a comprehensive quantum-resistant security framework for O-RAN networks using NIST-standardized Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC). We detail the implementation of ML-KEM (FIPS 203) and ML-DSA (FIPS 204), integrated with Quantum Random Number Generators (QRNG) for cryptographic entropy. The solution deploys PQ-IPsec, PQ-DTLS, and PQ-mTLS protocols across all O-RAN interfaces, anchored by a centralized Post-Quantum Certificate Authority (PQ-CA) within the SMO framework. This work provides a complete roadmap for securing disaggregated O-RAN ecosystems against quantum adversaries.
Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to examine the emerging threat that large-scale quantum computing poses to classical public-key cryptographic systems, particularly RSA and Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC), which form the backbone of contemporary digital security infrastructures. In response to this threat, the study aims to analyze post-quantum cryptography (PQC) as a viable long-term solution capable of resisting both classical and quantum adversaries. The paper further seeks to assess the urgency of PQC adoption in light of the “harvest now, decrypt later” threat model and to evaluate the practical readiness of quantum-safe cryptographic algorithms currently under consideration by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). Materials and Methods: This study employs a qualitative and analytical research methodology grounded in an extensive review of authoritative sources, including NIST’s post-quantum cryptography standardization documents, recent academic literature, industry white papers, and policy reports from organizations such as RAND Corporation and Cloudflare. The analysis systematically surveys major families of post-quantum cryptographic algorithms namely lattice-based, code-based, and hash-based schemes and evaluates them based on security assumptions, computational efficiency, implementation complexity, and standardization maturity. Findings: The analysis indicates that Lattice-based cryptographic schemes demonstrate the highest maturity and practical readiness, evidenced by their selection in NIST’s PQC process. Code- and hash-based methods provide strong security but face key size and performance challenges. The lack of scalable quantum computers does not reduce urgency, as data harvesting persists. Artificial intelligence emerges as a key enabler for accelerating PQC adoption. Unique Contribution to Theory, Practice and Policy: The paper recommends a proactive, phased post-quantum migration using hybrid cryptographic architectures. Organizations should conduct inventories, benchmarking, and pilot deployments aligned with NIST standards. AI-driven tools are advised to improve key management and reduce complexity. Continued interdisciplinary research and policy support are encouraged to ensure a secure, scalable transition to quantum-resistant security systems.
The rapid advancement of quantum computing poses a significant threat to classical cryptographic systems, particularly to widely used public-key schemes that rely on integer factorisation and the discrete logarithm problem. To ensure long-term data security against potential quantum adversaries, post-quantum cryptography (PQC) is currently standardised by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). This paper goes beyond a theoretical overview by employing a systematic methodology to evaluate the empirical performance trade-offs of the newly standardised algorithms (ML-KEM, ML-DSA, and SLH-DSA) and key finalists (FN-DSA and HQC). Based on a comprehensive review of fragmented performance data, the work presents a comparative analysis focusing on data overhead, computational latency, and resource efficiency. As a primary contribution, this study proposes a deployment-oriented taxonomy that explicitly maps these PQC standards to optimal practical use cases, considering diverse constraints across Internet of Things, cloud environments, and blockchain networks. Furthermore, the paper addresses critical real-world deployment challenges, such as vulnerabilities to side-channel attacks and hardware-level implementation constraints. Ultimately, this work systematises current knowledge into a unified decision-making framework, guiding system architects in complex migration towards a quantum-resilient digital ecosystem.
The imminent maturation of quantum computing threatens to nullify the mathematical hardness underpinning global Public Key Infrastructure, creating an urgent “Harvest Now, Decrypt Later” vulnerability. This study investigates the operational feasibility of transitioning to NIST-standardized Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) protocols within heterogeneous network environments. Utilizing a rigorous quantitative benchmarking framework, we evaluated the performance of lattice-based primitives, specifically ML-KEM and ML-DSA, against classical standards across high-performance servers and resource-constrained IoT devices. Empirical data reveals a fundamental architectural paradigm shift: while PQC algorithms exhibit superior computational execution speeds, they introduce severe transmission overheads, resulting in memory saturation and packet fragmentation on edge hardware. Results demonstrate that hybrid encryption schemes provide valid risk mitigation but incur statistically significant latency penalties due to expanded artifact sizes. We definitively conclude that the “Encryption Apocalypse” is primarily a bandwidth and memory bottleneck rather than a computational one, mandating the immediate deployment of adaptive crypto-agility frameworks to manage the infrastructural constraints of the post-quantum era.