The telecommunications industry faces a dual transformation: the architectural shift toward Open Radio Access Networks (O-RAN) and the emerging threat from quantum computing. O-RAN disaggregated, multi-vendor architecture creates a larger attack surface vulnerable to crypt-analytically relevant quantum computers(CRQCs) that will break current public key cryptography. The Harvest Now, Decrypt Later (HNDL) attack strategy makes this threat immediate, as adversaries can intercept encrypted data today for future decryption. This paper presents Q-RAN, a comprehensive quantum-resistant security framework for O-RAN networks using NIST-standardized Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC). We detail the implementation of ML-KEM (FIPS 203) and ML-DSA (FIPS 204), integrated with Quantum Random Number Generators (QRNG) for cryptographic entropy. The solution deploys PQ-IPsec, PQ-DTLS, and PQ-mTLS protocols across all O-RAN interfaces, anchored by a centralized Post-Quantum Certificate Authority (PQ-CA) within the SMO framework. This work provides a complete roadmap for securing disaggregated O-RAN ecosystems against quantum adversaries.
The telecommunications industry faces a dual transformation: the architectural shift toward Open Radio Access Networks (O-RAN) and the emerging threat from quantum computing. O-RAN disaggregated, multi-vendor architecture creates a larger attack surface vulnerable to crypt-analytically relevant quantum computers(CRQCs) that will break current public key cryptography. The Harvest Now, Decrypt Later (HNDL) attack strategy makes this threat immediate, as adversaries can intercept encrypted data today for future decryption. This paper presents Q-RAN, a comprehensive quantum-resistant security framework for O-RAN networks using NIST-standardized Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC). We detail the implementation of ML-KEM (FIPS 203) and ML-DSA (FIPS 204), integrated with Quantum Random Number Generators (QRNG) for cryptographic entropy. The solution deploys PQ-IPsec, PQ-DTLS, and PQ-mTLS protocols across all O-RAN interfaces, anchored by a centralized Post-Quantum Certificate Authority (PQ-CA) within the SMO framework. This work provides a complete roadmap for securing disaggregated O-RAN ecosystems against quantum adversaries.
With its disaggregated and open interfaces, the Open Radio Access Network (O-RAN) architecture promises flexibility, innovation, and cost-effectiveness for future wireless networks. However, the increased reliance on software and open interfaces also introduces new security challenges. As the threat of quantum computing looms, the traditional cryptographic algorithms used in O-RAN will become vulnerable to potential attacks. This paper proposes the integration of Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) into O-RAN to enhance its security against post-quantum adversaries. We discuss the specific vulnerabilities of current O-RAN security mechanisms to quantum attacks and identify key areas where PQC can be applied, such as key exchange, authentication, and data protection. We present a framework for evaluating the suitability of different PQC algorithms for O-RAN and outline potential challenges and implementation considerations. By proactively integrating PQC into O-RAN, we aim to ensure the long-term security and resilience of this emerging network architecture in the era of quantum computing.
Open Radio Access Networks (O-RAN) introduce unprecedented flexibility, interoperability, and intelligence into next-generation wireless systems, but their disaggregated and software-defined architecture also expands the attack surface and creates new security vulnerabilities. Conventional cryptographic mechanisms, while effective against classical threats, may become insufficient in the presence of quantum-enabled adversaries. This article presents a comprehensive perspective on quantum security for O-RAN, examining how quantum-resilient mechanisms can enhance confidentiality, authentication, and trust across the RAN ecosystem. It discusses post-quantum cryptography (PQC), quantum cryptography, quantum authentication, and quantum-enhanced threat detection within a zero-trust architecture based on continuous verification, least privilege, and micro-segmentation. Their integration with the Near-Real-Time (Near-RT) RAN Intelligent Controller, O-Cloud, and open interfaces is analyzed, together with practical deployment considerations, technology maturity, and adoption timelines. Finally, open research directions are outlined toward secure, resilient, and future-proof O-RAN architectures for 6G networks.
The evolving 5G architecture, moving from proprietary monolithic hardware towards the disaggregated and modular Open Radio Access Network (Open RAN), introduces new, critical interfaces requiring robust security. While IPSec is a prevalent solution for securing IP communications, the advent of quantum computing threatens its traditional cryptographic underpinnings; it may be deprecated in the near future. To address this, we propose a quantum-safe Open RAN framework for securing fronthaul (i.e., Radio Unit-Distributed Unit) and backhaul (i.e., Centralized Unit-5G core) interfaces. Our framework employs a hybrid key exchange scheme, combining post-quantum cryptography (PQC) with quantum keys as cryptographic material, designed for seamless integration with TLS, IKEv2/IPSec, and MACSec standards, and compatible with ETSI QKD 004 and 014 APIs. Furthermore, we present a novel key distribution protocol for Quantum Key Distribution Networks (QKDN). This protocol incorporates encapsulation techniques inspired by onion routing, combined with PQC, to ensure confidentiality, integrity, authenticity, and anonymity. It also leverages post-quantum public key encryption to protect shared secrets from intermediate nodes within the QKDN, mitigating intermediary attacks. We have deployed a proof-of-concept of our proposal, experimentally validating both air-based and fiber-based QKD, primarily using ML-KEM and ML-DSA standards for PQC algorithms.
The threat of advancing quantum computers necessitates a rapid cryptographic overhaul. In response, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) published the first finalized Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) standards — including ML-KEM and ML-DSA — to mitigate the urgent risk of "harvest now, decrypt later". The objective of this study is to deploy an interactive system with the Open Radio Access Network (O-RAN) by utilizing a quantum toolkit like Qiskit, in order to demonstrate the real-time breaking of classical cryptographic schemes while simultaneously validating the necessary resilience of PQC embedded systems.
Cryptographically relevant quantum computers do not yet exist, but the transition away from classical public-key cryptography is already underway: adversaries can record encrypted traffic today and decrypt it once a sufficiently capable quantum computer becomes available, a threat known as harvest-now, decrypt-later. This paper examines the engineering case for combining post-quantum cryptography (PQC) with quantum key distribution (QKD) as a strategy for securing next-generation communication infrastructure, focusing on 6G core and radio-access networks, Open RAN (O-RAN), and constrained Internet of Things (IoT) deployments. Rather than treating the two mechanisms as symmetric, interchangeable layers, the paper examines what each one actually guarantees, surveys the empirical evidence available for deployment cost, and describes where national security authorities and standards bodies disagree on the value of QKD. The architecture is grounded in the finalized National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) PQC standards and its 2025 hybrid key-establishment guidance, drawing on empirical Open RAN latency and energy measurements published during 2025 and 2026, embedded-hardware benchmarks for constrained devices, and the small number of quantum key distribution deployments operating at metropolitan or national backbone scale today. The paper is explicit about which figures are measured results and which remain illustrative proposals, and it closes by naming the specific standardization and field-trial gaps that separate current practice from the architecture it describes. The purpose of the work is to give network architects and policymakers a single, evidence-graded reference for deciding where each mechanism belongs in a real deployment, rather than treating post-quantum and quantum-distributed keying as equivalent options.
The imminent advent of a Cryptographically Relevant Quantum Computer (CRQC) poses an existential threat to the US financial infrastructure.Current payment rails including FedWire, CHIPS, and ACH rely on RSA and ECC standards that are mathematically vulnerable to Shor's Algorithm.This facilitates "Harvest Now, Decrypt Later" (HNDL) attacks, where encrypted data is intercepted today for future decryption.This paper evaluates the migration to NIST-standardized Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC), specifically ML-KEM and ML-DSA.We analyze the architectural challenges of integrati ng these primitives into ISO 20022 formats, focusing on the trade-offs between increased packet size and sub-millisecond latency requirements.By proposing a phased migration framework using Hybrid Cryptographic Wrappers, this research provides a roadmap for maintaining regulatory compliance under NSM-10 while preventing a systemic collapse of digital trust and the associated multitrillion-dollar risk to the US GDP.