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Beyond Bell?

Richard Healey

Published Aug 4, 2019• 0 citations

Abstract

In a recent archive post Shan Gao has argued that quantum theory is incompatible with relativity. He calls this a new proof beyond Bell's theorem, arguing elsewhere that it closes the superdeterminism loophole in Bell's theorem. Such strong claims must be backed up by irrefutable arguments. My aim in this post to the workshop "Beyond Bell's theorem" is to refute Gao's "proof" and to show how quantum theory is compatible with relativity theory and so why Gao's "proof" does not take us beyond Bell's theorem.

Related papers

Beyond Bell?

Richard Healey

In a recent archive post Shan Gao has argued that quantum theory is incompatible with relativity. He calls this a new proof beyond Bell's theorem, arguing elsewhere that it closes the superdeterminism loophole in Bell's theorem. Such strong claims must be backed up by irrefutable arguments. My aim in this post to the workshop "Beyond Bell's theorem" is to refute Gao's "proof" and to show how quantum theory is compatible with relativity theory and so why Gao's "proof" does not take us beyond Bell's theorem.

•Nov 14, 2021•0 citations

Quantum theory is incompatible with relativity: A new proof beyond Bell's theorem and a test of unitary quantum theories

Shan Gao

It has been debated whether quantum mechanics and special relativity are incompatible and whether there is a preferred Lorentz frame if they are incompatible. Bell's theorem is an important cornerstone, but it does not give us a definite positive answer due to the existence of supplementary assumptions or theoretical loopholes; there are unitary quantum theories which evade Bell's theorem and claim that they are compatible with special relativity. In this paper, I address the important issue of whether unitary quantum theories are compatible with special relativity. I propose a new Gedankenexperiment, a variant of the EPR-Bohm experiment with a superobserver who can undo a measurement. In this experiment, there is a stronger correlation (between the results of two spacelike separated measurements) than the correlation investigated in Bell's theorem. Based on an analysis of the correlations in different Lorentz frames, I prove that unitary single-world theories are incompatible with special relativity, and in order to avoid the incompatibility, there must exist a preferred Lorentz frame in these theories. Moreover, I argue that the incompatibility proof also applies to a proper version of the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics. This closes the major theoretical loopholes of Bell's theorem, including relationalism, retrocausality, and superdeterminism. Finally, I argue that the stronger correlation found in the Gedankenexperiment cannot be explained by retrocausal processes or even the common causes in the past, but only be explained by nonlocal processes or actions at a distance. This provides a test of unitary quantum theories, as well as a further support for the new incompatibility proof beyond Bell's theorem.

•Jun 27, 2019•5 citations

Disproof of Bell's Theorem: Reply to Critics

Joy Christian

This is a collection of my responses to the criticisms of my argument against the impossibility proof of John Bell, which aims to undermine any conceivable local realistic completion of quantum mechanics. I plan to periodically update this preprint instead of creating a new one for each response.

arXiv:quant-ph/0703244•Mar 26, 2007•7 citations

Einstein’s Reply to Bell and Others? a Simple Constructive Classical Foundation for Quantum Theory

Gordon Watson

Having elsewhere refuted Bell’s theorem irrefutably with elementary mathematics, we here advance Einstein’s ideas similarly with a classical Lorentz-invariant theory, observationally-indistinguishable from quantum mechanics. Given that our elementary theory is straight-forward and non-mysterious, we provide an Einsteinian—a specifically local and truly realistic—advance toward understanding the classical nature of physical reality at the quantum level. We thus resolve Bell’s dilemma in Einstein’s favor: as Bell half-expected, he and his supporters were being rather silly.

•Aug 1, 2018•0 citations

On the failure of Bell's theorem

Gyula Bene

Using a new approach to quantum mechanics we revisit Hardy's proof for Bell's theorem and point out a loophole in it. We also demonstrate on this example that quantum mechanics is a local realistic theory.

arXiv:quant-ph/9706054•Jun 24, 1997•0 citations

Are there really two different Bell's theorems?

Travis Norsen

This is a polemical response to Howard Wiseman's recent paper, "The two Bell's theorems of John Bell". Wiseman argues that, in 1964, Bell established a conflict between the quantum mechanical predictions and the joint assumptions of determinism and (what is now usually known as) "parameter independence". Only later, in 1976, did Bell, according to Wiseman, first establish a conflict between the quantum mechanical predictions and locality alone (in the specific form that Bell would sometimes call "local causality"). Thus, according to Wiseman, the long-standing disagreements about what, exactly, Bell's theorem does and does not prove can be understood largely as miscommunications resulting from the fact that there are really two quite distinct "Bell's theorems". My goal here is to lay out what Wiseman briefly describes as an "alternate reading" of Bell's 1964 paper, according to which (quoting Wiseman here) "the first paragraph of Bell's `Formulation' section [should be seen] as an essential part of his 1964 theorem, the first part of a two-part argument." I will argue in particular that this "alternate reading" is the correct way to understand Bell's 1964 paper and that Wiseman's reading is strongly inconsistent with the available evidence.

arXiv:1503.05017•International journal of quantum foundations•Mar 17, 2015•16 citations

In a recent archive post Shan Gao has argued that quantum theory is incompatible with relativity. He calls this a new proof beyond Bell's theorem, arguing elsewhere that it closes the superdeterminism loophole in Bell's theorem. Such strong claims must be backed up by irrefutable arguments. My aim in this post to the workshop "Beyond Bell's theorem" is to refute Gao's "proof" and to show how quantum theory is compatible with relativity theory and so why Gao's "proof" does not take us beyond Bell's theorem.

In a recent archive post Shan Gao has argued that quantum theory is incompatible with relativity. He calls this a new proof beyond Bell's theorem, arguing elsewhere that it closes the superdeterminism loophole in Bell's theorem. Such strong claims must be backed up by irrefutable arguments. My aim in this post to the workshop "Beyond Bell's theorem" is to refute Gao's "proof" and to show how quantum theory is compatible with relativity theory and so why Gao's "proof" does not take us beyond Bell's theorem.

It has been debated whether quantum mechanics and special relativity are incompatible and whether there is a preferred Lorentz frame if they are incompatible. Bell's theorem is an important cornerstone, but it does not give us a definite positive answer due to the existence of supplementary assumptions or theoretical loopholes; there are unitary quantum theories which evade Bell's theorem and claim that they are compatible with special relativity. In this paper, I address the important issue of whether unitary quantum theories are compatible with special relativity. I propose a new Gedankenexperiment, a variant of the EPR-Bohm experiment with a superobserver who can undo a measurement. In this experiment, there is a stronger correlation (between the results of two spacelike separated measurements) than the correlation investigated in Bell's theorem. Based on an analysis of the correlations in different Lorentz frames, I prove that unitary single-world theories are incompatible with special relativity, and in order to avoid the incompatibility, there must exist a preferred Lorentz frame in these theories. Moreover, I argue that the incompatibility proof also applies to a proper version of the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics. This closes the major theoretical loopholes of Bell's theorem, including relationalism, retrocausality, and superdeterminism. Finally, I argue that the stronger correlation found in the Gedankenexperiment cannot be explained by retrocausal processes or even the common causes in the past, but only be explained by nonlocal processes or actions at a distance. This provides a test of unitary quantum theories, as well as a further support for the new incompatibility proof beyond Bell's theorem.

Having elsewhere refuted Bell’s theorem irrefutably with elementary mathematics, we here advance Einstein’s ideas similarly with a classical Lorentz-invariant theory, observationally-indistinguishable from quantum mechanics. Given that our elementary theory is straight-forward and non-mysterious, we provide an Einsteinian—a specifically local and truly realistic—advance toward understanding the classical nature of physical reality at the quantum level. We thus resolve Bell’s dilemma in Einstein’s favor: as Bell half-expected, he and his supporters were being rather silly.

This is a polemical response to Howard Wiseman's recent paper, "The two Bell's theorems of John Bell". Wiseman argues that, in 1964, Bell established a conflict between the quantum mechanical predictions and the joint assumptions of determinism and (what is now usually known as) "parameter independence". Only later, in 1976, did Bell, according to Wiseman, first establish a conflict between the quantum mechanical predictions and locality alone (in the specific form that Bell would sometimes call "local causality"). Thus, according to Wiseman, the long-standing disagreements about what, exactly, Bell's theorem does and does not prove can be understood largely as miscommunications resulting from the fact that there are really two quite distinct "Bell's theorems". My goal here is to lay out what Wiseman briefly describes as an "alternate reading" of Bell's 1964 paper, according to which (quoting Wiseman here) "the first paragraph of Bell's `Formulation' section [should be seen] as an essential part of his 1964 theorem, the first part of a two-part argument." I will argue in particular that this "alternate reading" is the correct way to understand Bell's 1964 paper and that Wiseman's reading is strongly inconsistent with the available evidence.