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[[alternative]]A Diffie-Hellman Quantum Session Key Establishment Protocol without Entanglement

小女孩, HSIANG CHANG

Published Jan 1, 2019• 0 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

[[abstract]] 在2016到2017年間Shi等人發表了三篇量子可否認簽章，其中一篇為在對方公鑰上使用量子邏輯門運算，其餘兩篇則是雙方利用己方私鑰旋轉對方公鑰的方式獲得通訊金鑰。然而，在前者的研究中，在金鑰產生後該通訊金鑰在通訊的過程中皆無改變。但是，從資訊安全的角度來說，該通訊金鑰應在每次使用後改變。因此，難以說明上述三篇通訊金鑰建立方式有符合資訊安全要求。基此，本文透過迪菲-赫爾曼金鑰交換協議，產生每次使用過後皆能改變通訊金鑰的協議。並且在我們分析過後，確認本次提出的協議是安全的，可以抵擋多種惡意的攻擊方式。

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[[alternative]]A Quantum Money System Without Entanglement

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Abstract We propose the first tight security proof for the ordinary two-message signed Diffie–Hellman key exchange protocol in the random oracle model. Our proof is based on the strong computational Diffie–Hellman assumption and the multiuser security of a digital signature scheme. With our security proof, the signed DH protocol can be deployed with optimal parameters, independent of the number of users or sessions, without the need to compensate any security loss. We abstract our approach with a new notion called verifiable key exchange. In contrast to a known tight three-message variant of the signed Diffie–Hellman protocol (Gjøsteen and Jager, in: Shacham, Boldyreva (eds) CRYPTO 2018, Part II. LNCS, Springer, Heidelberg, 2018), we do not require any modification to the original protocol, and our tightness result is proven in the “Single-Bit-Guess” model which we know can be tightly composed with symmetric cryptographic primitives to establish a secure channel. Finally, we extend our approach to the group setting and construct the first tightly secure group authenticated key exchange protocol.

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[[abstract]] 在2016到2017年間Shi等人發表了三篇量子可否認簽章，其中一篇為在對方公鑰上使用量子邏輯門運算，其餘兩篇則是雙方利用己方私鑰旋轉對方公鑰的方式獲得通訊金鑰。然而，在前者的研究中，在金鑰產生後該通訊金鑰在通訊的過程中皆無改變。但是，從資訊安全的角度來說，該通訊金鑰應在每次使用後改變。因此，難以說明上述三篇通訊金鑰建立方式有符合資訊安全要求。基此，本文透過迪菲-赫爾曼金鑰交換協議，產生每次使用過後皆能改變通訊金鑰的協議。並且在我們分析過後，確認本次提出的協議是安全的，可以抵擋多種惡意的攻擊方式。
[[abstract]] 隨著量子信息技術的不斷突破以及對比特幣去中心化議題的熱烈討論，量子貨幣的思想也逐漸成為近來的關注焦點。因此，一些密碼學學者也紛紛提出了量子貨幣方案的設計。然而，它們的方案中大多數都要求客戶和銀行必須事先共享密鑰，並且只有銀行才能驗證量子貨幣的真實性。而這樣的設計方式，可能會遭受罪犯的攻擊，因為身份驗證過程不是即時性的，也因此，降低了商業交易的時效性。 由於這些原因，在本文中，我們基於chen等人可公開驗證的量子簽章以及量子盲簽名方案和其電子現金系統等基礎，提出了一種量子貨幣系統，此系統使用可公開驗證的量子簽章方案取得許可證，並通過量子貨幣簽章方案的現金系統架構來建立取款和支付協議。此外，我們還進行了相關的安全分析以支持我們的理論。
The Signal protocol can be considered state-of-the-art when it comes to secure messaging, but advances in quantum computing stress the importance of finding post-quantum resistant alternatives to its asymmetric cryptographic primitives. The aim is to determine whether existing post-quantum cryptography can be used as a drop-in replacement for the public-key cryptography currently used in the Signal protocol and what the performance trade-offs may be. An implementation of the Signal protocol using commutative supersingular isogeny Diffie-Hellman (CSIDH) key exchange operations in place of elliptic-curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) is proposed. The benchmark results on a Samsung Galaxy Note 8 mobile device equipped with a 64-bit Samsung Exynos 9 (8895) octa-core CPU shows that it takes roughly 8 seconds to initialize a session using CSIDH-512 and over 40 seconds using CSIDH-1024, without platform specific optimization. To the best of our knowledge, the proposed implementation is the first post-quantum resistant Signal protocol implementation and the first evaluation of using CSIDH as a drop-in replacement for ECDH in a communication protocol.
Abstract We propose the first tight security proof for the ordinary two-message signed Diffie–Hellman key exchange protocol in the random oracle model. Our proof is based on the strong computational Diffie–Hellman assumption and the multiuser security of a digital signature scheme. With our security proof, the signed DH protocol can be deployed with optimal parameters, independent of the number of users or sessions, without the need to compensate any security loss. We abstract our approach with a new notion called verifiable key exchange. In contrast to a known tight three-message variant of the signed Diffie–Hellman protocol (Gjøsteen and Jager, in: Shacham, Boldyreva (eds) CRYPTO 2018, Part II. LNCS, Springer, Heidelberg, 2018), we do not require any modification to the original protocol, and our tightness result is proven in the “Single-Bit-Guess” model which we know can be tightly composed with symmetric cryptographic primitives to establish a secure channel. Finally, we extend our approach to the group setting and construct the first tightly secure group authenticated key exchange protocol.