Quantum mechanics seems to use complex numbers in a fundamentally different way when compared to classical physics. Selected episodes from early stages of the theory are presented to identify different approaches to the use of complex numbers. If for Heisenberg it seemed quite natural to use complex exponentials, Schrödinger clearly struggled with the complex nature of his wave function and tried to assign physical meaning only to its real component. Dirac was probably the first to stress that complex quantities in quantum mechanics cannot be split up into pure real and imaginary parts. Possible educational implications are outlined.
Quantum mechanics seems to use complex numbers in a fundamentally different way when compared to classical physics. Selected episodes from early stages of the theory are presented to identify different approaches to the use of complex numbers. If for Heisenberg it seemed quite natural to use complex exponentials, Schrödinger clearly struggled with the complex nature of his wave function and tried to assign physical meaning only to its real component. Dirac was probably the first to stress that complex quantities in quantum mechanics cannot be split up into pure real and imaginary parts. Possible educational implications are outlined.
Complex numbers are broadly used in physics, normally as a calculation tool that makes things easier due to Euler's formula. In the end, it is only the real component that has physical meaning or the two parts (real and imaginary) are treated separately as real quantities. However, the situation seems to be different in quantum mechanics, since the imaginary unit i appears explicitly in its fundamental equations. From a learning perspective, this can create some challenges to newcomers. In this article, four conceptually different justifications for the use/need of complex numbers in quantum mechanics are presented and some pedagogical implications are discussed.
In this contribution I outline some of Schrödinger’s initial resistance to the complex nature of his wave function. It is shown how he first attached physical meaning only to its real component and even tried to avoid the explicit appearance of the imaginary unit in his fundamental (timedependent) equation. This attitude is quite understandable, since he was committed to the classical framework of wave theory, not only ontologically, but also formally. Around two years after the publication of his famous papers on wave mechanics, Schrödinger seems to have accepted that the wave function must be complex and that the physical interpretation is to be related to its absolute square. This is justified by him both due to equivalence considerations with matrix mechanics and in analogy with Maxwell’s equations. This episode can be of special pedagogical relevance as students often struggle with the complex nature of the wave function on their first encounter with it.
In 1927, Nobel prize winning physicist, E. Schrodinger, in correspondence with Ehrenfest, wrote the following about the new theory: “What is unpleasant here, and indeed directly to be objected to, is the use of complex numbers. Psi is surely fundamentally a real function.” This seemingly simple issue remains unexplained almost ninety years later. In this dissertation I elucidate the physical and theoretical origins of the complex requirement. I identify a freedom/constraint situation encountered by vectors when, employed in accordance with adopted quantum representational methodology, and representing angular momentum states in particular. Complex vectors, quite simply, provide more available adjustable variables than do real vectors. The additional variables relax the constraint situation allowing the theory’s representational program to carry through. This complex number issue, which lies at the deepest foundations of the theory, has implications for important issues located higher in the theory. For example, any unification of the classical and quantum accounts of the settled order of nature, will rest squarely on our ability to account for the introduction of the imaginary unit.
In this paper, some of Schrödinger's initial struggles with the complex nature of his wave function are outlined. It is shown that he first attached physical meaning only to its real component and even tried to avoid the explicit appearance of the imaginary unit i in his fundamental (time-dependent) equation. This attitude is quite understandable, since he was committed to the classical framework of wave theory, not only ontologically, but also formally. Around one year after the publication of his famous papers on wave mechanics, Schrödinger seems to have accepted that the wave function must be complex and that the physical interpretation is to be related to its absolute square. This is justified by him both due to equivalence considerations with matrix mechanics and in analogy with Maxwell's equations. It is argued that an awareness of the struggles Schrödinger went through to accept a complex wave function can be a relief to students who themselves wonder why ψ needs to be complex when they encounter the topic for the first time.
Complex numbers, i.e., numbers with a and an imaginary part, are essential for mathematical analysis, while their role in other subjects, such as electromagnetism or special relativity, is far less fundamental. Quantum is the only physical theory where these numbers seem to play an indispensible role, as the theory is explicitly formulated in terms of operators acting on complex Hilbert spaces. The occurrence of complex numbers within the quantum formalism has nonetheless puzzled countless physicists, including the fathers of the theory, for whom a version of quantum physics, where states and observables are represented by operators, seemed much more natural. In fact, previous works showed that such real quantum physics can reproduce the outcomes of any multipartite experiment, as long as the parts share arbitrary quantum states. Thus, are complex numbers really needed for a quantum description of nature? Here, we show this to be case by proving that and complex quantum make different predictions in network scenarios comprising independent quantum state sources. This allows us to devise a Bell-type quantum experiment whose input-output correlations cannot be approximated by any quantum model. The successful realization of such an experiment would disprove quantum physics, in the same way as standard Bell experiments disproved local physics.
Abstract Although complex numbers are essential in mathematics, they are not needed to describe physical experiments, as those are expressed in terms of probabilities, hence real numbers. Physics, however, aims to explain, rather than describe, experiments through theories. Although most theories of physics are based on real numbers, quantum theory was the first to be formulated in terms of operators acting on complex Hilbert spaces 1,2 . This has puzzled countless physicists, including the fathers of the theory, for whom a real version of quantum theory, in terms of real operators, seemed much more natural 3 . In fact, previous studies have shown that such a ‘real quantum theory’ can reproduce the outcomes of any multipartite experiment, as long as the parts share arbitrary real quantum states 4 . Here we investigate whether complex numbers are actually needed in the quantum formalism. We show this to be case by proving that real and complex Hilbert-space formulations of quantum theory make different predictions in network scenarios comprising independent states and measurements. This allows us to devise a Bell-like experiment, the successful realization of which would disprove real quantum theory, in the same way as standard Bell experiments disproved local physics.