This thesis examines the contradiction between the deterministic dynamics of Bohmian mechanics and the probabilistic outcomes of the Born rule due to a new challenge raised by Klaas Landsman: that sequences of measurement results that are typical relative to the Born product measure are Martin-Löf random and cannot be generated by any computable deterministic process from compressible initial data. Regarding this new challenge, I assess two contemporary accounts of the Born rule: the typicality program and the Best System Account (BSA). In this thesis, I show that both these approaches fail to resolve Landsman's challenge. As an alternative, I propose a propensity interpretation: the Born rule expresses objective propensities grounded in Bohmian ontology, together with supplementary lawlike structure beyond standard BM. I argue that this alternative view reconciles deterministic laws with a dynamically grounded yet irreducible Born rule and addresses Landsman's critique
This thesis examines the contradiction between the deterministic dynamics of Bohmian mechanics and the probabilistic outcomes of the Born rule due to a new challenge raised by Klaas Landsman: that sequences of measurement results that are typical relative to the Born product measure are Martin-Löf random and cannot be generated by any computable deterministic process from compressible initial data. Regarding this new challenge, I assess two contemporary accounts of the Born rule: the typicality program and the Best System Account (BSA). In this thesis, I show that both these approaches fail to resolve Landsman's challenge. As an alternative, I propose a propensity interpretation: the Born rule expresses objective propensities grounded in Bohmian ontology, together with supplementary lawlike structure beyond standard BM. I argue that this alternative view reconciles deterministic laws with a dynamically grounded yet irreducible Born rule and addresses Landsman's critique
The predictions of quantum mechanics are probabilistic. Quantum probabilities are extracted using a postulate of the theory called the Born rule, the status of which is central to the problem of quantum mechanics. Efforts to justify the Born rule from other physical principles, and thus elucidate the measurement process, have involved lengthy statistical or information-theoretic arguments. Here we show that Bohm's deterministic formulation of quantum mechanics allows the Born rule for measurements on a single system to be derived, without any statistical assumptions. We solve a simple example where the creation of an ensemble of identical quantum states, together with position measurements on those states, are described by Bohm's quantum dynamics. The calculated measurement outcomes agree with the Born-rule probabilities, which are thus a consequence of deterministic evolution. Our results demonstrate that quantum probabilities can emerge from simple dynamical laws alone, and they support the view that there is no underlying indeterminism in quantum phenomena.
Abstract I argue that Bohmian mechanics (or any similar pilot-wave theory) cannot reasonably be claimed to be a deterministic theory. If one assumes the “quantum equilibrium distribution” provided by the wave function of the universe, Bohmian mechanics requires an external random oracle in order to describe the (Kolmogorov–Levin–Chaitin) algorithmic randomness properties of typical outcome sequences of long runs of repeated identical experiments (which provably follow from the Born rule). This oracle lies beyond the scope of Bohmian mechanics (or any deterministic extension thereof), including the impossibility of explaining the randomness property in question from “random” initial conditions. Thus the advantages of Bohmian mechanics over other interpretations of quantum mechanics, if any, must lie at an ontological level, and in its potential to derive the quantum equilibrium distribution and hence the Born rule.
Appeals to typicality are common in physics, but it is often unclear what it means for a physical state to be typical relative to a probability measure, and correspondingly unclear what a law that appeals to typicality asserts. Here we consider how one might characterize physical typicality using ideas from the theory of algorithmic randomness. As a concrete example, we show how taking a physical state to be typical relative to a computable measure when it is Martin-Löf random allows one to formulate the distribution postulate in Bohmian mechanics as a statistical constraining law of the theory. Using a toy model, we show how this constraint guarantees the standard Born statistics for computable experimental protocols. Algorithmic Bohmian mechanics (aBM) thus illustrates how algorithmic randomness may be used to provide precise content to a statistical law.
This is a review of the issue of randomness in quantum mechanics, with special emphasis on its ambiguity; for example, randomness has different antipodal relationships to determinism, computability, and compressibility. Following a (Wittgensteinian) philosophical discussion of randomness in general, I argue that deterministic interpretations of quantum mechanics (like Bohmian mechanics or 't Hooft's Cellular Automaton interpretation) are strictly speaking incompatible with the Born rule. I also stress the role of outliers, i.e. measurement outcomes that are not 1-random. Although these occur with low (or even zero) probability, their very existence implies that the no-signaling principle used in proofs of randomness of outcomes of quantum-mechanical measurements (and of the safety of quantum cryptography) should be reinterpreted statistically, like the second law of thermodynamics. In appendices I discuss the Born rule and its status in both single and repeated experiments, and review the notion of 1-randomness \nintroduced by Kolmogorov, Chaitin, Martin-Lo"f, Schnorr, and others.
Abstract This is a review of the issue of randomness in quantum mechanics, with special emphasis on its ambiguity; for example, randomness has different antipodal relationships to determinism, computability, and compressibility. Following a (Wittgensteinian) philosophical discussion of randomness in general, I argue that deterministic interpretations of quantum mechanics (like Bohmian mechanics or ’t Hooft’s Cellular Automaton interpretation) are strictly speaking incompatible with the Born rule. I also stress the role of outliers, i.e. measurement outcomes that are not 1-random. Although these occur with low (or even zero) probability, their very existence implies that the no-signaling principle used in proofs of randomness of outcomes of quantum-mechanical measurements (and of the safety of quantum cryptography) should be reinterpreted statistically, like the second law of thermodynamics. In three appendices I discuss the Born rule and its status in both single and repeated experiments, review the notion of 1-randomness (or algorithmic randomness) that in various guises was investigated by Kolmogorov and others and treat Bell’s (Physics 1:195–200, 1964) Theorem and the Free Will Theorem with their implications for randomness.
The predictions of quantum mechanics are probabilistic. Quantum probabilities are extracted using a postulate of the theory called the Born rule, the status of which is central to the "measurement problem" of quantum mechanics. Efforts to justify the Born rule from other physical principles, and thus elucidate the measurement process, have involved lengthy statistical or information-theoretic arguments. Here we show that Bohm's deterministic formulation of quantum mechanics allows the Born rule for measurements on a single system to be derived, without any statistical assumptions. We solve a simple example where the creation of an ensemble of identical quantum states, together with position measurements on those states, are described by Bohm's quantum dynamics. The calculated measurement outcomes agree with the Born-rule probabilities, which are thus a consequence of deterministic evolution. Our results demonstrate that quantum probabilities can emerge from simple dynamical laws alone, and they support the view that there is no underlying indeterminism in quantum phenomena.