Abstract This is a review of the issue of randomness in quantum mechanics, with special emphasis on its ambiguity; for example, randomness has different antipodal relationships to determinism, computability, and compressibility. Following a (Wittgensteinian) philosophical discussion of randomness in general, I argue that deterministic interpretations of quantum mechanics (like Bohmian mechanics or ’t Hooft’s Cellular Automaton interpretation) are strictly speaking incompatible with the Born rule. I also stress the role of outliers, i.e. measurement outcomes that are not 1-random. Although these occur with low (or even zero) probability, their very existence implies that the no-signaling principle used in proofs of randomness of outcomes of quantum-mechanical measurements (and of the safety of quantum cryptography) should be reinterpreted statistically, like the second law of thermodynamics. In three appendices I discuss the Born rule and its status in both single and repeated experiments, review the notion of 1-randomness (or algorithmic randomness) that in various guises was investigated by Kolmogorov and others and treat Bell’s (Physics 1:195–200, 1964) Theorem and the Free Will Theorem with their implications for randomness.
Abstract This is a review of the issue of randomness in quantum mechanics, with special emphasis on its ambiguity; for example, randomness has different antipodal relationships to determinism, computability, and compressibility. Following a (Wittgensteinian) philosophical discussion of randomness in general, I argue that deterministic interpretations of quantum mechanics (like Bohmian mechanics or ’t Hooft’s Cellular Automaton interpretation) are strictly speaking incompatible with the Born rule. I also stress the role of outliers, i.e. measurement outcomes that are not 1-random. Although these occur with low (or even zero) probability, their very existence implies that the no-signaling principle used in proofs of randomness of outcomes of quantum-mechanical measurements (and of the safety of quantum cryptography) should be reinterpreted statistically, like the second law of thermodynamics. In three appendices I discuss the Born rule and its status in both single and repeated experiments, review the notion of 1-randomness (or algorithmic randomness) that in various guises was investigated by Kolmogorov and others and treat Bell’s (Physics 1:195–200, 1964) Theorem and the Free Will Theorem with their implications for randomness.
This is a review of the issue of randomness in quantum mechanics, with special emphasis on its ambiguity; for example, randomness has different antipodal relationships to determinism, computability, and compressibility. Following a (Wittgensteinian) philosophical discussion of randomness in general, I argue that deterministic interpretations of quantum mechanics (like Bohmian mechanics or 't Hooft's Cellular Automaton interpretation) are strictly speaking incompatible with the Born rule. I also stress the role of outliers, i.e. measurement outcomes that are not 1-random. Although these occur with low (or even zero) probability, their very existence implies that the no-signaling principle used in proofs of randomness of outcomes of quantum-mechanical measurements (and of the safety of quantum cryptography) should be reinterpreted statistically, like the second law of thermodynamics. In appendices I discuss the Born rule and its status in both single and repeated experiments, and review the notion of 1-randomness \nintroduced by Kolmogorov, Chaitin, Martin-Lo"f, Schnorr, and others.
Abstract I argue that Bohmian mechanics (or any similar pilot-wave theory) cannot reasonably be claimed to be a deterministic theory. If one assumes the “quantum equilibrium distribution” provided by the wave function of the universe, Bohmian mechanics requires an external random oracle in order to describe the (Kolmogorov–Levin–Chaitin) algorithmic randomness properties of typical outcome sequences of long runs of repeated identical experiments (which provably follow from the Born rule). This oracle lies beyond the scope of Bohmian mechanics (or any deterministic extension thereof), including the impossibility of explaining the randomness property in question from “random” initial conditions. Thus the advantages of Bohmian mechanics over other interpretations of quantum mechanics, if any, must lie at an ontological level, and in its potential to derive the quantum equilibrium distribution and hence the Born rule.
Both deterministic and indeterministic physical laws are incompatible with control by genuine (non-illusory) free will. We propose that an indeterministic dynamics can be weakly compatible with free will (FW), whereby the latter acts by altering the probability distribution over allowed outcomes. In the quantum physical world, such a FW can collapse the wave function, introducing deviations from the Born rule. In principle, this deviation would stand in conflict with both special relativity and (a variant of) the Strong Church-Turing thesis, implying that the brain may be an arena of exotic, non-standard physics. However, in practice, these deviations would not be directly or easily observable, because they occur in sub-neuronal superpositions in the brain, where they would be shrouded in random measurement errors, noise and statistical fluctuations. Our result elucidates the difference between the FW of human observers and that of observed particles in the Free Will Theorem. This difference is a basic reason for why FW (and, in general, consciousness) cannot be recreated by standard artificial intelligence (AI) technology. We propose various neurobiological experiments to test our proposed theory. We speculate that for observers to be aware of a physical theory such as quantum mechanics, FW is necessary and that the theory must therefore not be universal. We suggest that FW may be regarded as a primitive principle in Nature for explaining quantum indeterminism.
The predictions of quantum mechanics are probabilistic. Quantum probabilities are extracted using a postulate of the theory called the Born rule, the status of which is central to the problem of quantum mechanics. Efforts to justify the Born rule from other physical principles, and thus elucidate the measurement process, have involved lengthy statistical or information-theoretic arguments. Here we show that Bohm's deterministic formulation of quantum mechanics allows the Born rule for measurements on a single system to be derived, without any statistical assumptions. We solve a simple example where the creation of an ensemble of identical quantum states, together with position measurements on those states, are described by Bohm's quantum dynamics. The calculated measurement outcomes agree with the Born-rule probabilities, which are thus a consequence of deterministic evolution. Our results demonstrate that quantum probabilities can emerge from simple dynamical laws alone, and they support the view that there is no underlying indeterminism in quantum phenomena.
The notion of probability plays a crucial role in quantum mechanics. It appears in quantum mechanics as the Born rule. In modern mathematics which describes quantum mechanics, however, probability theory means nothing other than measure theory, and therefore any operational characterization of the notion of probability is still missing in quantum mechanics. In this paper, based on the toolkit of algorithmic randomness, we present a refinement of the Born rule, as an alternative rule to it, for specifying the property of the results of quantum measurements in an operational way. Algorithmic randomness is a field of mathematics which enables us to consider the randomness of an individual infinite sequence. We then present an operational refinement of the Born rule for mixed states, as an alternative rule to it, based on algorithmic randomness. In particular, we give a precise definition for the notion of mixed state. We then show that all of the refined rules of the Born rule for both pure states and mixed states can be derived from a single postulate, called the principle of typicality, in a unified manner. We do this from the point of view of the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics. Finally, we make an application of our framework to the BB84 quantum key distribution protocol in order to demonstrate how properly our framework works in practical problems in quantum mechanics, based on the principle of typicality.
The notion of probability plays a crucial role in quantum mechanics. It appears in quantum mechanics as the Born rule. In modern mathematics which describes quantum mechanics, however, probability theory means nothing other than measure theory, and therefore any operational characterization of the notion of probability is still missing in quantum mechanics. In our former works [K. Tadaki, arXiv:1804.10174], based on the toolkit of algorithmic randomness, we presented a refinement of the Born rule, called the principle of typicality, for specifying the property of results of measurements in an operational way. In this paper, we make an application of our framework to the argument of Bell's inequality versus quantum mechanics for refining it, in order to demonstrate how properly our framework works in practical problems in quantum mechanics.