Quantum Science and Technology
Compromising qubit control in quantum computing via hardware Trojans in multitone generators
Ayisat Adedokun, Yerzhan Mustafa, Selçuk Köse
Abstract
Abstract Superconducting qubits have emerged as the leading qubit modality for quantum computing. Recent efforts by both academic and industrial researchers aim to enable high-speed, low-noise, and potentially scalable control and measurement of these qubits with superconducting digital electronics. Because the technology is still in an early phase of development, the classical control plane that communicates with quantum systems represents an attack surface that has not yet been thoroughly examined. This work exposes a critical vulnerability by presenting a frequency-activated hardware Trojan—termed as the data transmission Trojan (DT-Trojan)—embedded within a single-flux-quantum (SFQ) digital logic path. The DT-Trojan is functionally indistinguishable from a nominal flip-flop during conventional low-frequency bias-margin testing, but gets triggered at higher frequencies through a magnetically coupled feedback loop that introduces deterministic phase perturbations. Once triggered, the Trojan corrupts high-frequency SFQ pulse streams by disrupting phase coherence, which reduces quantum gate fidelity and leaks information covertly through spectral sidebands. Comprehensive circuit-level simulations using the JoSIM superconducting circuit simulator validate this dual-mode behavior. The results demonstrate a greater than 75% reduction in control fidelity and measurable spectral leakage once activated, underscoring the difficulty of detecting frequency-dependent Trojans in cryogenic environments. This work highlights an emerging class of security threats in SFQ-based quantum control and calls for verification strategies that account for high-frequency switching dynamics and magnetic-coupling effects in superconducting electronics.