This paper argues that such strictly deterministic formulations rely on idealizations that obscure an essential physical feature: the objective growth of information associated with irreversible processes. Drawing on thermodynamics, information theory, and the foundations of quantum mechanics, the paper is based on the notion of ontic entropy as a measure of the objective informational content instantiated by physical systems. This paper proposes a classification of determinism based on the informational characteristics of physical evolution. By distinguishing between strict causal determinism, probabilistic determinism, and chaotic determinism, it becomes possible to analyze causal structure without conflating necessity with lawfulness or probability with indeterminism.
This paper argues that such strictly deterministic formulations rely on idealizations that obscure an essential physical feature: the objective growth of information associated with irreversible processes. Drawing on thermodynamics, information theory, and the foundations of quantum mechanics, the paper is based on the notion of ontic entropy as a measure of the objective informational content instantiated by physical systems. This paper proposes a classification of determinism based on the informational characteristics of physical evolution. By distinguishing between strict causal determinism, probabilistic determinism, and chaotic determinism, it becomes possible to analyze causal structure without conflating necessity with lawfulness or probability with indeterminism.
This paper deals with the notion of objective randomness in classical deterministic theories. After the introduction, section 2 establishes an important distinction between a strictly metaphysical thesis of determinism (as characterized in the Montague-Earman definition, for example), and the doctrine of determinism, which can be roughly characterized as a methodological set of principles. The doctrine of determinism is associated with the idea that probability assignments can only reflect our ignorance of facts, and it also grounds the (ontological) thesis of separability: A system or process can be characterized completely in terms of the properties that a system has when in a given state, independently of the properties of other systems, The key notions of "completeness" and "independence" are only briefly discussed, as they are examined more in depth elsewhere. Section three examines attempts to characterize a notion of objective randomness in ergodic theory. The characterization can be seen to be equivalent to the formulation of a notion of a "physically impossible process". One way of expressing this idea is grounded on the thesis of the "coarse graining" of our measuring instruments. This leads to the problem of distinguishing "objective" from "apparent" randomness. The problem seems to be intrinsic to any attempt of characterizing the required notion of physical impossibility (and thus of objective randomness) in terms of an ideal observer. The alternative of trying to characterize physical impossibility in terms of a theory of algorithms suffers from the difficulty that it is not clear what would be the required notion of (non-epistemic) computability. The "coarse graining" approach, as well as the alternative in terms of a theory of algorithms seem to share the usual confusion between a strictly metaphysical thesis of determinism and the (methodological) doctrine of determinism. In section four an alternative approach is suggested. It is noticed that a denial of the thesis of separability is compatible with a strict deterministic theory, and thus that at least some classical systems (the "statistical" ones) can be described in terms of non-separable states. We do not have to think that the impossibility of preparing a classical state is too only possible explanation for physical (objective) randomness in deterministic theories. This proposal is an elaboration of an idea of Blatt (1959), although Blatt was still trying to understand objective randomness within an ideal-observer framework.[S.M.]
Abstract Uses a historical approach to explore the extent to which quantum theory mandates indeterminism. Drawing on important examples in the history of physics, it discusses explicitly the crucial distinction – often overlooked in the philosophical literature – between indeterminacy of physical quantities and causal indeterminism. It pursues at a more sophisticated level, issues raised in Ch. 2 concerning determinism and indeterminism in modern science. It concludes that quantum indeterminacy is an objective feature of the world, but that the jury is still out regarding quantum indeterminism.
Various physical examples are displayed in which the probability distribution can be traced back to its causal origin. It is argued that probability is never irreducible, but is, in principle, always derivable from a deterministic process which determines its numerical value. It is suggested that deterministic and probabilistic theories are interlocked, each presenting a different aspect of reality, yet that no description of the laws of nature in terms of either of these concepts will ever be ultimate.
Classical physics is traditionally characterized as deterministic and founded on the real number continuum, while quantum mechanics is distinguished by its indeterminism and fundamental uncertainty relations. This apparent dichotomy, however, obscures a deeper continuity. We argue that both frameworks embody a common ontological principle: the physical prohibition of absolute precision. In classical physics, this prohibition is implicit, manifesting in information-theoretic bounds, the non-physicality of infinite-precision initial conditions (chaos theory), and the breakdown of determinism in singular configurations (Norton's dome). These phenomena reveal that the classical reliance on mathematical real numbers with infinite information content is an unphysical idealization. Quantum mechanics, by contrast, does not merely reflect this prohibition; it provides its precise quantitative expression. The Heisenberg uncertainty principle σxσp≥ℏ/2 and the non-commutative structure of observables are the exact mathematical formulation of the fact that physical information is fundamentally finite. The Planck constant ℏ is the universal scale that quantifies the minimal phase space volume—the “atom” of information—below which no further refinement is possible. Thus, quantum mechanics is not a separate theory but the completion of classical physics: it supplies the missing quantification of the principle that nature admits no infinite information density, and consequently, no absolutely precise physical quantities.
We shall draw an affirmative answer to the question posed in the title.The key point will be a quantum description of physical reality.Once fixed at ontic level two basic elements, namely the laws of physics and the matter, we argue that the underlying physical reality emerges from the interconnection between these two elements.We consider any physical process, including measurement, modeled by unitary evolution.In this context, we will deduce quantum randomness as a consequence of inclusion of the observer into the quantum system.The global picture of the universe is in a sense deterministic, but from our own local perspective (as part of the system) we perceive quantum mechanical randomness.Then, the notion of "information" turns out to be a derivative concept.I've spent much more time thinking about the photon problem [i.e., about quantum theory] than about relativity. A. Einstein
My thesis investigates a debate between Vienna and Berlin about the view that the basic laws of nature are genuinely indeterministic that started long before the advent of quantum mechanics. It involved two different readings of Ludwig Boltzmann's legacy statistical mechanics and two different answers to how causality and ontology ought to be combined. Having adopted Ernst Mach's weak notion of causality, the local Viennese tradition could more easily contemplate ontologies for irreducibly statistical laws that were different from classical physics, while the Berlin tradition departed from Planck's reading of the Kantian tradition, according to which strictly deterministic laws represented an indispensable basis even for probabilistic theories.\nVienna Indeterminism, as I shall call the first reading, became characteristic for a series of physicist-philosophers connected to the Institute of Physics at the University of Vienna, among them Franz Serafin Exner, Erwin Schrödinger, Philipp Frank and Richard von Mises. It involved the acceptance of the highly improbable events admitted by the second law of thermodynamics, an assent to Mach's definition of causality in terms of functional dependencies, an empiricist shift of the burden of proof on the determinist's shoulders, and the adoption of the relative frequency interpretation of probability. Planck and his student Moritz Schlick initially rejected all of these creeds.\nWhile the Viennese reading of Boltzmann's legacy made it possible to accept probabilistic laws as genuine laws years before the advent of quantum mechanics, Schlick had to take a strictly verificationist tack to reconcile his views on probability with the failure of a Kant-inspired notion of causality enforced by the changes in physics. Until his death however, Schlick remained committed to the Spielraum interpretation of Johannes von Kries, compensating his qualified acceptance of indeterminism with an emphasis on the limits of language that were enforced by Heisenberg's uncertainty relations.\nIn view of claims that scientists' abandonment of determinism and causality was triggered, or at least enhanced, by external factors, among them the anti-scientific Weimar milieu and Bohr's power politics, the reconstruction of the philosophical debates between Vienna and Berlin requires historical contextualization. To this end, I initially recapitulate the Forman thesis and the discussions ensuing from it. Most important among them are the recent books of Cushing and Beller that, rejecting Forman's strong claims, nevertheless deny any constructive influence of the scientific aspirations of German physicists on the philosophical debates about causality and indeterminism in the 1920s.\nAgainst this picture, I argue that the philosophical aspirations of physicist-philosophers were rather genuine and followed influential role models, among them Helmholtz and Mach. They represent a characteristic trait of the German-speaking scientific world and were expressed in academic addresses and in the publication of popular writings. After 1913, this philosophical discourse was conducted, to an increasing extent, on the pages of Die Naturwissenschaften. In a separate chapter, I study the role of philosophical and cultural matters in this journal, which can hardly be separated from the personality of its founding editor Arnold Berliner. At about 1930, this discourse among physicist-philosophers partly merged into scientific philosophy, as conducted by Logical Empiricists, and the newly founded Erkenntnis.\nOne of the characteristic features of the discourse among physicist-philosophers was that they were not strictly indebted to philosophical schools but rather willing to form strategic alliances. Such alliances emphasized one philosophical aspect that was considered pivotal at the time which other features, often expressing severe disagreements of content, were played down. This process can be witnessed at the end of the discussion between the Viennese and the Berliners in the 1930s, at a time when Schlick had already become the center of the Vienna Circle. Being confronted with a plethora of "metaphysical" misinterpretations and having taken the linguistic turn, Frank and Schlick formed a strategic alliance on the 1936 Copenhagen Congress for the Unity of Science. It brought them into opposition with Schrödinger's quest for a modification of quantum mechanics, although Schrödinger continued to be a staunch advocate of indeterminism. This year thus signifies the end of the coherence of Vienna Indeterminism, a tradition that reaches back to the publication of Boltzmann's Lectures of Gas Theory.