Advancing satellite and CubeSat quantum key distribution (QKD) requires receiver-level engineering trade studies, because secure-key feasibility in space is limited by single-photon detectors (SPDs) operating under SWaP, thermal, and radiation constraints. However, the question arises: does the literature provide sufficiently consistent evidence to guide detector selection for space QKD? This systematic evidence map examines how recent research connects SNSPDs, Si SPAD/APD, InGaAs SPAD/APD, and NFAD variants to CubeSat QKD and space-based quantum communication links. To do so, a concept-token methodology identifies mission contexts and detector families through targeted keywords and key phrases, followed by structured extraction of detection efficiency η, dark count rate (DCR), timing jitter, receiver timing window Δt, operating mode, temperature/cooling, and radiation evidence. The results show an upward trend in publications, with many appearing in the last two years. SNSPDs and APD/SPAD families are most regularly discussed, yet key parameters—especially η, jitter, and explicit Δt—are reported unevenly, limiting cross-study comparability. CubeSat-tagged studies emphasize APD/SPAD feasibility and radiation-driven DCR evolution, while SNSPDs remain performance-leading but cryogenics-limited. Standardized reporting of η, DCR, jitter, Δt, temperature, and radiation conditions emerges as a practical avenue for accelerating deployable space-QKD receivers.
Advancing satellite and CubeSat quantum key distribution (QKD) requires receiver-level engineering trade studies, because secure-key feasibility in space is limited by single-photon detectors (SPDs) operating under SWaP, thermal, and radiation constraints. However, the question arises: does the literature provide sufficiently consistent evidence to guide detector selection for space QKD? This systematic evidence map examines how recent research connects SNSPDs, Si SPAD/APD, InGaAs SPAD/APD, and NFAD variants to CubeSat QKD and space-based quantum communication links. To do so, a concept-token methodology identifies mission contexts and detector families through targeted keywords and key phrases, followed by structured extraction of detection efficiency η, dark count rate (DCR), timing jitter, receiver timing window Δt, operating mode, temperature/cooling, and radiation evidence. The results show an upward trend in publications, with many appearing in the last two years. SNSPDs and APD/SPAD families are most regularly discussed, yet key parameters—especially η, jitter, and explicit Δt—are reported unevenly, limiting cross-study comparability. CubeSat-tagged studies emphasize APD/SPAD feasibility and radiation-driven DCR evolution, while SNSPDs remain performance-leading but cryogenics-limited. Standardized reporting of η, DCR, jitter, Δt, temperature, and radiation conditions emerges as a practical avenue for accelerating deployable space-QKD receivers.
With the growing use of online communications in our modern society, information security is becoming a big concern. Along with that, the progress in quantum computers is posing severe threats to such communications. Once powerful quantum computers are available, most of today's encryption schemes, which are based on computationally hard problems, will be broken within a short period. Researchers are therefore making a great effort to establish quantum-safe encryption schemes. One such scheme is quantum key distribution (QKD), which utilizes the laws of quantum mechanics. These cryptography protocols offer unconditional security to the communication between two distant parties by providing a secure way of sharing encryption keys between them. While over the last few decades QKD has continuously progressed, it is limited to a distance of up to several hundred kilometers using terrestrial quantum links. Satellites are therefore being considered to extend the QKD range for global coverage, although implementations of the satellite-based QKD infrastructure are still in their early stage. There are many aspects of QKD that need further assessment and advancement for establishing long-term satellite-based quantum communication (QC). My thesis works were focused on developing advanced systems for single-photon detectors and quantum sources. Single-photon avalanche diodes (SPADs) are the most viable option for satellite-based quantum communications. They must travel to outer space either for receiving quantum-states in the ground-to-satellite QC or for characterizing the quantum-sources in the satellite-to-ground QC. However, while in space, SPADs exhibit damage caused by the space radiation that gradually increases their dark counts. Performing QKD is not possible when the dark counts exceed a specific threshold. Hence, methods of reducing the detectors' dark counts by mitigating the damages would help to extend the SPADs' in-space useful lifetime. Laser annealing is one such effective method, found in lab experiments, to heal the radiation-induced detector damages. We now aim to carry out this method in low Earth orbit (LEO) to verify its in-orbit effectiveness. On that goal, we are building an annealing payload (APL) for a cube satellite (CubeSat) in collaboration with the University of Illinois at Urbana Champaign (UIUC). We, the University of Waterloo team, built one of the two segments of the APL-- a space-qualified detector module containing two Excelitas C30902SH and Excelitas SLiK detectors. Our miniaturized and compact module integrates the facilities required for the detector operation and laser annealing, as well as an active detector temperature control system. The operation of the detector module is highly flexible and software controllable. Our detector module will work together with the control board containing the laser annealing system (built by the UIUC team). Once the satellite has been launched in 2020, the in-orbit experiment will enable us to study the in-space SPAD radiation damage and their healing using the integrated annealing system. During a second project, we designed and built a new simple readout circuit for the negative feedback avalanche diodes (NFADs), which are free-running single-photon detectors at telecom wavelengths. These detectors suffer from strong afterpulsing effects, which limits their overall performances. Therefore, our readout system incorporates features to suppress NFAD afterpulses. We also used this custom readout to characterize two NFADs (from Princeton Lightwave) and assessed the performance of the new electronics. Our analysis showed that even at higher detection efficiencies, a 20 mus hold-off time after each avalanche event is enough to extensively reduce the number of afterpulses and to keep the dark count rate below 100 Hz at 192 K temperature. Both the detectors showed timing jitter of less than 75 ps FWHM at their maximum efficiencies. The best figure of merit is found to be 1.6times107, which is comparable to that of the high-performing superconducting nanowire single-photon detectors. This result demonstrates the suitability of our readout and the NFADs in various quantum optics applications, such as in long-distance quantum key distribution, where the detection rate is usually low. We then performed a blinding attack, which enables an Eavesdropper in QKD to gain information on the key, on these NFADs using bright illumination. These detectors are usually threshold detectors that generate a click when the optical power is above a certain threshold, otherwise they do not click. Blinding attack utilizes detectors' inability to resolve the photon numbers. During the experiment, we sent controlled optical pulses with a high time resolution to deterministically force detection at the detectors. The result demonstrated the NFADs' susceptibility to these attacks, which tells us to include countermeasures into the system to protect the communications. Finally, we built a quantum source to produce 785 nm polarized photons to implement decoy-state BB84 QKD. Our source utilized the sum-frequency generation scheme to generate 785 nm laser pulses. Its modulator system includes an intensity modulator and two-phase modulators in the Mach-Zehnder configuration to prepare polarized quantum states with different intensities. Our source provides a repetition rate of 500 MHz, which was successfully used in an airborne QKD demonstration with a moving receiver up to 10km distance. To summarize, my research projects are a contribution to the development of advanced devices, particularly single-photon detectors for quantum communications.
Quantum communications and quantum cryptography are developing rapidly during the last decades caused partly by a fast progress in quantum computing. Quantum cryptography provides an unconditionally secure way of communicating whereas traditional classical cryptographic protocols are likely to be broken by super powerful quantum computers. In the past few years distances covered by quantum communications have increased by an order of magnitude. To provide a global coverage for the quantum networks, a satellite based quantum communications is the most promising solution. \n \nAs an emerging field, QKD systems are still under evolution process. Despite outstanding security proven theoretically, it has loopholes caused by their implementations. To test QKD, find the possible loopholes and suggest ways to fix them, is a job of many scientific groups. \nIn this thesis I start with presenting my work for a securing test of a commercial QKD system Clavis2. A Trojan-horse attack on Bob's apparatus was prepared by testing reflections and transmissions of all optical components in Bob's scheme. The attack was implemented and found to be unsuccessful at the tested wavelengths due to afterpulsing effect in Bob's single-photon detectors reacting to the bright light attack pulses. \n \nThree chapters of the thesis are dedicated to custom built single-photon detectors (SPDs) based on commercial Silicon avalanche photodiodes (APDs). Those detectors demonstrate parameters that altogether are not possible to find in commercially available SPDs, especially if combined with a very compact size. One of the in-lab-built SPDs was implemented in 143 km teleportation experiment, where a low dark count rate was crucial for the success of the experiment. The next generation SPD is already built, characterized and ready to be implemented. \n \nAnother 4-channel SPD was built as a prototype for a quantum satellite SPD. It has light weight, low electrical power consumption, low dark count rate and decent other parameters. It was used in the airborne demonstration of QKD receiver payload experiment, when a secret key was successfully generated between a moving aircraft and a ground station. \n \nSPDs installed on a satellite have to be able to work in the harsh space environment during a mission life time. Space radiation dramatically increases dark count rate of APDs. The last project presented in the thesis committed to a radiation test of three types of APDs and one type of photo multiplier tube. The experiment included characterization of all SPDs before and after irradiation by four levels of proton radiation, equivalent to 3 months - 2 years duration in a 600 km low Earth orbit. Three methods for mitigating radiation damage were tested and found to be successful with perspective to use some of them on a quantum satellite to extent life time of SPDs. \n \nTo summarize, this work makes a contribution to the development of SPDs for global quantum communications.
Space-based quantum key distribution (QKD) has emerged as the leading approach for establishing information-theoretically secure communication links beyond the reach of terrestrial fiber networks. Over the past decade, missions ranging from the 635 kg Micius satellite to 3U CubeSats such as SpooQy-1 have demonstrated satellite-to-ground QKD, entanglement distribution, and quantum teleportation across distances exceeding 1,200 km. However, existing reviews of these missions focus primarily on quantum protocols and link layer physics, leaving the system level engineering trade offs particularly those governing platform selection, SWaP budgets, and subsystem integration largely unexamined. This paper presents a systems engineering review of space based quantum communication missions developed between 2016 and 2025. Each mission is analyzed through a unified framework encompassing link budget decomposition, payload miniaturization trends, and Acquisition, Tracking, and Pointing (ATP) architectures. A comparative SWaP analysis reveals that payload mass has decreased by approximately one order of magnitude from ~230 kg (Micius) to ~23 kg (Jinan-1) while reported quantum bit error rates have remained below 5%. The analysis identifies three critical gaps: (i) the absence of formal Multidisciplinary Design Optimization (MDO) frameworks in quantum satellite design, (ii) the lack of standardized performance metrics for cross mission comparison, and (iii) the disconnect between constellation level network studies and subsystem level hardware constraints. Based on these findings, system-level design strategies and a technology roadmap are proposed to support the transition from single-link demonstrations to scalable, constellation-ready quantum communication infrastructures.
We provide a direct comparison between the InGaAs avalanche photodiode (APD) and the NbN superconducting single photon detector (SSPD) for applications in fiber-based quantum cryptography. The quantum efficiency and dark count rate were measured for each detector, and used to calculate the quantum bit error rate (QBER) and shared key rate for a QKD link. The results indicate that, despite low quantum efficiency, the speed of the SSPD makes it a superior detector for quantum information applications. Finally, we present results of an initial integration of an SSPD into a receiver node of the DARPA quantum network to perform quantum key distribution. Encoding quantum information on single photons has enabled the realization of a number of unique communication schemes such as the implementation of the BB84 protocol for quantum key distribution 1 and quantum dense coding. 2 Furthermore, the implementation of these schemes using photons at telecommunication wavelengths has permitted their extension to fiber optic networks, 3,4 drastically increasing the practicality of quantum information processing. To date, the state of the art in commercially available single photon detection at telecommunication wavelengths (1550 nm) has been the thermo-electrically cooled InGaAs avalanche photodiode (APD). The cooled InGaAs APD is generally operated at T = -60°C in the reverse-biased Geiger mode. Though these detectors have been successfully implemented in operating QKD links in optical fiber, the InGaAs APD suffers from afterpulsing effects that limit the key exchange rates. New SPD (single photon detector) technologies based on superconducting materials are emerging that hold tremendous promise for drastically increasing the photon counting rate and eliminating dark noise.57 The SSPD consists of a NbN thin film (t ∼ 5 nm) patterned into a narrow (w ∼ 100 nm) microstrip meander that is ∼ 500μm in length. The detector is cooled to T < 4K in a closed cycle refrigeration unit and a bias current I b is supplied to the device just below the superconducting critical current (I c ). When a photon is incident upon the microstrip superconductivity is broken in the region local to photon absorption and a normal state region is formed in the device. The current passing through the device causes a measurable voltage pulse in the detector that can be amplified and shaped to act as an input for traditional logic circuitry. Due to the unique electronic bandstructure in a superconducting material the intrinsic response time of the device is on the order of picoseconds, so that the repetition rate may be increased above 1 GHz 8 without being susceptible to afterpulsing effects that plague the InGaAs APD. 9 To make a direct comparison between the InGaAs APD and the SSPD both were placed in a SPD characterization testbed to measure quantum efficiency and dark count rate at a variety of bias conditions. The QBER for a QKD link is calculated from the measured parameters and then compared to requirements for a provably secure QKD link. Following detector characterization, one of the nodes of the DARPA Quantum Network operated by BBN Technologies 3 utilized an SSPD in the receiver to transmit key material. The demonstration provides an in situ comparison between the InGaAs APD, normally operated in the BBN link, and the SSPD.
In the absence of technically mature quantum repeaters, losses in optical fibers limit the distance for ground-bound quantum key distribution. One way to overcome these losses is via optical links to satellites, which has been demonstrated in course of the Chinese-Austrian QUESS mission. Though its findings were impressive, such a large-scale project requires massive financial and time resources. We propose a 32x10x10cm³ nanosatellite orders of magnitude cheaper which is able to perform quantum key distribution (QKD) in a trusted-node scenario, using only commercially available components. We have performed a detailed analysis of such a CubeSat mission (“Q³Sat”), finding that cost and complexity can be reduced by sending the photons from ground to satellite, i.e. using an uplink. Calculations have been done for a prepare-and-send protocol (BB84 with decoy pulses) and for a protocol exploiting quantum entanglement (E91), both using polarization as information carrier. We specified the minimum requirements for the sender stations for these two different protocols. Possible orbits have been assessed, regarding both height and ellipticity to maximize link time and minimize losses. Using long-term weather data, we developed a beam model taking into account absorption, turbulence-induced beam divergence and pointing stability of sender and receiver telescope. Using light pollution measurements from space and their spectra, we arrive at maximum expectable noise count rates. We also specify the requirements for clock stability, classical communication speed and computing requirements. Incorporating all these parameters into our model, we arrive at a link budget which we can use to calculate the expected quantum secure key rates. We have also created a preliminary design of such a 3U CubeSat including a detailed size, weight and power budget and a CAD to account for the assembly of the components. Deploying a 10 cm long mirror telescope covering the small surface of the satellite leaves enough space for a polarization analysis module and housekeeping, communication and computing electronics. Polarization analysis can be done via a polarizing beam splitter and single-photon detectors with a cross section small enough to rule out radiation damage. Pointing stability and detumbling is crucial especially for such a small satellite and can be achieved via spinning wheels, achieving a precision in the tilt and yaw axis of 40 mrad. For one such CubeSat, we estimate the quantum secure key to be acquired between two ground stations during one year to be about 13 Mbit when deploying a decoy protocol. A Bell test between ground and satellite would also be feasible. The uplink design allows to keep the more sensitive, computation-intensive and expensive devices on ground. The experiment proposed by us therefore poses a comparably low-threshold quantum space mission. For a two-year lifetime of the satellite, the price per kilobit would amount to about 20 Euro. In large constellations, Q³Sats could be used to establish a global quantum network, which would further lower the cost. Summarizing, our detailed design and feasibility study can be readily used as a template for global-scale quantum communication.
Single photons detectors are required for applications like quantum key distribution and testing Bell's inequalities. Silicon avalanche photodiodes (Si APD's) have advantages like low dark count rate. This thesis aims to experimentally characterize Si APD's under conditions experienced in low earth orbit on board a satellite and also develop supporting algorithms and simulations. \n \nIn chapter 1, I motivate the use of Si APD's as single photon detectors on a satellite. I also briefly explain the how these APD's work and the related electronics. \n \nIn chapter 2, I describe the test setup used in the laboratory at the Institute for Quantum Computing to characterize the APD's. I then explain how one goes about measuring and/or calculating the different characteristic parameters of the APD. These characteristics include breakdown voltage, output pulse characteristics, recharge time, dark counts, detection efficiency, timing jitter of APD, saturation value and afterpulsing probability. The aim of the lab characterization is to form a baseline measurement under nominal conditions before we introduce the APD to conditions of low Earth orbit. \n \nIn chapter 3, the APD's are exposed to proton radiation which is expected in low Earth orbit. Such radiation causes displacement defects in the APD's substrate and increases dark counts. Previous work [1] has shown that thermal annealing (increasing the APD temperature for a period of time) is successful in decreasing the dark count rate to operational range. It is anticipated that multiple annealing instance would be needed in operation under constant bombardment of protons. The work in this thesis explores possibility of using annealing repeatedly by alternating instances of proton irradiation and annealing. Other parameters of the APD are also under scrutiny to see if they change over the course of this experiment. A secondary objective explores if it is better to anneal only when the dark count rate drops below a threshold value or anneal after fixed intervals of time regardless of the dark count rates. A novel algorithm is also developed to analyze the afterpulsing probability. The algorithm is applied to simulated thermal count and afterpulse timetags to demonstrate its effectiveness. It is also applied to the data set drawn from the experimental tests of proton irradiation and thermal annealing to calculate the afterpulsing probability. \n \nIn chapter 4 the APD's are exposed to the vacuum conditions that they would encounter in low Earth orbit. The bracket and radiator are set to different temperatures to simulate thermal variations in orbit. The detectors are then characterized for the aforementioned parameters to ensure they are in operable range. \n \nIn chapter 5, I distinguish between the usual notion of afterpulsing probability which relates to the probability of trapping of charge carriers and the observed afterpulsing probability which differs from the former due to dead time and recharge time. I then use first principles to derive the observed afteprulsing probability as a function of charge trapping probability, charge detrapping lifetime, dead time and thermal count rate. I further go on to lay the theoretical ground work the afterpulsing algorithm developed in section 3.3.8 by deriving the analytical expression for the histogram between time differences of consecutive time tags and then justifying the linearity of the thermal region of the histogram. \n \nFinally, in chapter 6, I devise a numerical experiment where I simulated a quantum link to implement the quantum key distribution. I model the photon statistics of a weak coherent pulsed laser and the parameters of a Si APD (the one mentioned above). I then model the coincidence algorithm to determine photon coincidences and model a simple intercept and resend attack. I calculate statistical quantities of quantum bit error ratio and sifted key generation rate.