An Ontological Modification of Quantum Mechanics

Claudia E. Vanney

Whereas the technological applications of quantum mechanics are extraordinarily abundant, its ontological implications are very controversial. Not only did several interpretations of the original quantum formalism develop throughout the last century, but modifications of the primitive formalism were also proposed, introducing new relevant theoretical elements, which gave rise to very different quantum ontologies. This article highlights that the diversity of quantum ontologies reveals the impossibility of establishing an exclusive inference from the empirical success of a theory and its ontological truth. Since scientific objectifications in general —and those of quantum mechanics in particular— have a limited cognitive scope, they don’t allow choosing a specific interpretation of the theory among the many possible ones, so that meta-scientific criteria are required.

Hilary Putnam

Michaël Esfeld, Nicolas Gisin

John Bell proposed an ontology for the GRW modification of quantum mechanics in terms of flashes occurring at space-time points. The paper spells out the motivation for this ontology, enquires into the status of the wave-function in it, critically examines the claim of its being Lorentz-invariant and considers whether it is a parsimonious, but nevertheless physically adequate ontology.

Claudia E. Vanney

Whereas the technological applications of quantum mechanics are extraordinarily abundant, its ontological implications are very controversial. Not only did several interpretations of the original quantum formalism develop throughout the last century, but modifications of the primitive formalism were also proposed, introducing new relevant theoretical elements, which gave rise to very different quantum ontologies. This article highlights that the diversity of quantum ontologies reveals the impossibility of establishing an exclusive inference from the empirical success of a theory and its ontological truth. Since scientific objectifications in general —and those of quantum mechanics in particular— have a limited cognitive scope, they don’t allow choosing a specific interpretation of the theory among the many possible ones, so that meta-scientific criteria are required.

Shan Gao