Whereas the technological applications of quantum mechanics are extraordinarily abundant, its ontological implications are very controversial. Not only did several interpretations of the original quantum formalism develop throughout the last century, but modifications of the primitive formalism were also proposed, introducing new relevant theoretical elements, which gave rise to very different quantum ontologies. This article highlights that the diversity of quantum ontologies reveals the impossibility of establishing an exclusive inference from the empirical success of a theory and its ontological truth. Since scientific objectifications in general —and those of quantum mechanics in particular— have a limited cognitive scope, they don’t allow choosing a specific interpretation of the theory among the many possible ones, so that meta-scientific criteria are required.
Whereas the technological applications of quantum mechanics are extraordinarily abundant, its ontological implications are very controversial. Not only did several interpretations of the original quantum formalism develop throughout the last century, but modifications of the primitive formalism were also proposed, introducing new relevant theoretical elements, which gave rise to very different quantum ontologies. This article highlights that the diversity of quantum ontologies reveals the impossibility of establishing an exclusive inference from the empirical success of a theory and its ontological truth. Since scientific objectifications in general —and those of quantum mechanics in particular— have a limited cognitive scope, they don’t allow choosing a specific interpretation of the theory among the many possible ones, so that meta-scientific criteria are required.
Whereas the technological applications of quantum mechanics are extraordinarily abundant, its ontological implications are very controversial. Not only did several interpretations of the original quantum formalism develop throughout the last century, but modifications of the primitive formalism were also proposed, introducing new relevant theoretical elements, which gave rise to very different quantum ontologies. This article highlights that the diversity of quantum ontologies reveals the impossibility of establishing an exclusive inference from the empirical success of a theory and its ontological truth. Since scientific objectifications in general —and those of quantum mechanics in particular— have a limited cognitive scope, they don’t allow choosing a specific interpretation of the theory among the many possible ones, so that meta-scientific criteria are required.
Quantum mechanics approaches its centenary with an impressive record. It became the backbone of most research in physics, led to applications such as the transistor and laser, and prompted an upheaval in the philosophy of science. Its scope and its precision have been constantly growing, and it is now promising more powerful computers and safer cryptography. This century of conquests has also been a time of ongoing debates about the foundations and interpretation of the theory, which has been referred to as the quantum controversy. The controversy has been unusually long and remains open. Jammer called it “a story without an ending” and Laloë described this coexistence of successes and doubts with the metaphor of the colossus with feet of clay. This Handbook is a survey on this history. Some of the so-called “interpretations” are not interpretations of a fixed formalism, they are different theories, thus it has been a debate about the interpretations and the foundations of quantum mechanics. In this volume, the “history of interpretations” is used for the sake of brevity. The successive parts of the Handbook deal with the scientific and philosophical issues under debate, historical landmarks, places and contexts, historical and philosophical theses, and the proliferation of interpretations. This Handbook may serve those interested in the history of quantum mechanics and those who are engaged with, or attracted by current research on quantum information, as it may give them a flavor of the history that led to or lay the groundwork for the current investigations.
The quantum of action was found more then a century ago, but until now the meaning of quantum theory is often claimed to be “unclear” or even “not truly understandable.” Another prejudice is that quantum theory is only relevant for the range of atomic and sub-atomic phenomena. After a century of successful applications without any evidence at odds with the predictions of quantum theory, and in view of the fact that at present quantum theory is at the economic bottom of about one third of the Gross National Product, the need for a comprehensive and even popular understanding of the principles of quantum theory, preferably dispensing with the burden of the full mathematical apparatus, is more urgent than ever. Interestingly, there is a connection between quantum theory and your daily-life experience, suggesting to extend and generalize the Copenhagen interpretation in such a way that the observer and his consciousness is no longer excluded from scientific description. Moreover, Quantum theory is easier to understood, if one realizes that its range of applicability surpasses widely that of quantum mechanics, comparable to the way classical physics surpasses classical mechanics. The essential new aspect is the role of abstract quantum information, referred to as Protyposis. The idea that quantum information can have an ontological status equivalent to matter or energy was developed more than half a century ago, but it is only rather recently that, in view of the success of experimental work, the relevance of quantum information has been widely acknowledged. The concept of abstract quantum information is especially helpful in the understanding of the measuring process.
Quantum mechanics exhibits a singular contrast: it is the most precise and technologically potent physical theory ever constructed, yet it continues to generate the most profound interpretative controversy in the history of science. This article argues that this persistent tension does not reveal a deficiency in the theory, but a profound categorial error in our epistemological expectations: the demand for a classical ontological narrative that translates quantum formalism into intuitive, spatiotemporal images. We trace this demand to a contingent historical isomorphism between classical physics, our mesoscopic cognition, and a mechanistic ideal of explanation. Evaluating leading narrative interpretations (Bohmian mechanics, the many-worlds interpretation) through the Lakatosian criterion of integrated scientific fruitfulness, we demonstrate that while logically consistent, they exhibit marginal theoretical productivity and engage in non-binding ontological inflation. In contrast, we identify and champion the structural-operative understanding already driving progress in fields like quantum information and decoherence. This program—prefigured in the works of Fine, Mermin, and Bitbol, and aligned with ontological structuralism—redefines “understanding” as: (1) architectural mastery of the formalism, (2) predictive-technological competence, and (3) the investigation of constitutive phenomena (e.g., entanglement) as guides to structure. We conclude that quantum mechanics demands epistemological maturity: deep scientific comprehension can be non-narrative, residing in our successful interaction with the theory’s formal architecture and its empirical prowess.
Abstract Metaphysicians should pay attention to quantum mechanics, but not because it provides definitive answers to many metaphysical questions. The theory itself is remarkably silent on the nature of the physical world, and the various interpretations of the theory on offer present conflicting ontological pictures. Rather, quantum mechanics is essential to the metaphysician because it reshapes standard metaphysical debates and opens up unforeseen new metaphysical possibilities. Even if quantum mechanics provides few clear answers, there are good reasons to think that any adequate understanding of the quantum world will result in a radical reshaping of our classical worldview in some way or other. Whatever the world is like at the atomic scale, it is almost certainly not the swarm of particles pushed around by forces that is often presupposed. This book guides readers through the theory of quantum mechanics and its implications for metaphysics in a clear and accessible way. The theory and its various interpretations are presented with a minimum of technicality. The consequences of these interpretations for metaphysical debates concerning realism, indeterminacy, causation, determinism, holism, and individuality (among other topics) are explored in detail, stressing the novel form that the debates take given the empirical facts in the quantum domain. While quantum mechanics may not deliver unconditional pronouncements on these issues, the range of possibilities consistent with our knowledge of the empirical world is relatively small—and each possibility is metaphysically revisionary in some way.
Quantum mechanics exhibits a singular contrast: it is the most precise and technologically potent physical theory ever constructed, yet it continues to generate the most profound interpretative controversy in the history of science. This article argues that this persistent tension does not reveal a deficiency in the theory, but a profound categorial error in our epistemological expectations: the demand for a classical ontological narrative that translates quantum formalism into intuitive, spatiotemporal images. We trace this demand to a contingent historical isomorphism between classical physics, our mesoscopic cognition, and a mechanistic ideal of explanation. Evaluating leading narrative interpretations (Bohmian mechanics, the many-worlds interpretation) through the Lakatosian criterion of integrated scientific fruitfulness, we demonstrate that while logically consistent, they exhibit marginal theoretical productivity and engage in non-binding ontological inflation. In contrast, we identify and champion the structural-operative understanding already driving progress in fields like quantum information and decoherence. This program—prefigured in the works of Fine, Mermin, and Bitbol, and aligned with ontological structuralism—redefines “understanding” as: (1) architectural mastery of the formalism, (2) predictive-technological competence, and (3) the investigation of constitutive phenomena (e.g., entanglement) as guides to structure. We conclude that quantum mechanics demands epistemological maturity: deep scientific comprehension can be non-narrative, residing in our successful interaction with the theory’s formal architecture and its empirical prowess.