The emergence of quantum computing poses unprecedented challenges to contemporary cryptographic systems, particularly those relying on integer factorization and discrete logarithm assumptions. While the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has standardized post-quantum cryptographic algorithms including Dilithium for digital signatures, existing verification processes often involve computationally intensive operations unsuitable for resource-constrained environments. This paper presents Dilion, a novel digital signature scheme that synergistically combines the quantum-resistant foundation of Dilithium with an innovative homomorphic pairwise verification mechanism. Unlike conventional signature schemes requiring expensive decryption operations during verification, Dilion performs verification directly on encrypted data through elliptic curve-based homomorphic encryption. Our approach introduces a lightweight verification protocol that leverages Dilithium's challenge-response structure while incorporating cryptographically secure pairwise identity binding. Comprehensive experimental evaluation demonstrates that Dilion maintains equivalent security guarantees to standard Dilithium while achieving approximately 40% reduction in verification computational complexity. We provide rigorous security proofs demonstrating that Dilion achieves existential unforgeability under chosen message attacks, context-binding security, and privacy preservation under standard cryptographic assumptions.
The emergence of quantum computing poses unprecedented challenges to contemporary cryptographic systems, particularly those relying on integer factorization and discrete logarithm assumptions. While the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has standardized post-quantum cryptographic algorithms including Dilithium for digital signatures, existing verification processes often involve computationally intensive operations unsuitable for resource-constrained environments. This paper presents Dilion, a novel digital signature scheme that synergistically combines the quantum-resistant foundation of Dilithium with an innovative homomorphic pairwise verification mechanism. Unlike conventional signature schemes requiring expensive decryption operations during verification, Dilion performs verification directly on encrypted data through elliptic curve-based homomorphic encryption. Our approach introduces a lightweight verification protocol that leverages Dilithium's challenge-response structure while incorporating cryptographically secure pairwise identity binding. Comprehensive experimental evaluation demonstrates that Dilion maintains equivalent security guarantees to standard Dilithium while achieving approximately 40% reduction in verification computational complexity. We provide rigorous security proofs demonstrating that Dilion achieves existential unforgeability under chosen message attacks, context-binding security, and privacy preservation under standard cryptographic assumptions.
Quantum computing represents one of the most disruptive technological advancements of the 21st century, with profound implications for modern cryptographic systems. Traditional digital signature algorithms—such as RSA, DSA, and Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC)—derive their security from mathematical problems like integer factorization and discrete logarithms, which are computationally infeasible for classical computers. However, the advent of quantum algorithms, particularly Shor’s and Grover’s algorithms, poses a direct threat to these cryptographic assumptions by drastically reducing the time required to solve such problems. This development renders existing Digital Signature infrastructures potentially obsolete once large-scale quantum computers become operational. To counter this threat, researchers have proposed a range of post-quantum cryptographic (PQC) algorithms, including lattice-based, hash-based, and multivariate polynomial-based signature schemes, which are designed to resist quantum attacks. This paper critically examines the extent of quantum vulnerability in current Digital Signature systems and evaluates the comparative performance, efficiency, and security trade-offs of post-quantum alternatives. The study aims to provide a structured understanding of the ongoing transition toward quantum-resistant digital authentication and to propose a roadmap for secure implementation in future cryptographic environments.
The advent of quantum computing poses a significant threat to the cryptographic foundations of current electronic voting (e-voting) systems, which commonly rely on algorithms such as Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) and Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC). These algorithms are believed to be vulnerable to attacks imposed by quantum computers, jeopardizing core e-voting properties, including ballot secrecy, integrity, and auditability. To address these challenges, this work presents a quantum-resistant electronic-voting (e-voting) system, named post-quantum e-voting system (PQEVS) built entirely upon cryptographic primitives standardized by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) for post-quantum security. The proposed PQEVS utilizes Dilithium for secure voter authentication, Brakerski/Fan-Vercauteren (BFV)-based Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) for privacy-preserving vote tallying, and Picnic-based Zero-Knowledge Proofs (ZKPs) to ensure vote validity without compromising voter anonymity. Designed for modularity and scalability, our PQEVS delivers enhanced security while achieving significant performance gains, reducing vote processing latency by 85% and supporting throughputs of up to 36,000 votes per second. These results highlight the practicality and robustness of post-quantum cryptography in securing large-scale electoral processes, setting a new benchmark for verifiable and future-proof e-voting systems.
Hybrid cryptographic protocol was proposed by integrating quantum-safe algorithms (Kyber and Dilithium) together with a classical ECDSA-based signature scheme to verify secure proof on blockchain. Since quantum computers pose some loopholes in existing cryptography algorithms, the proposed mechanism addresses those vulnerabilities by maintaining compatibility with the existing infrastructure. The protocol integrates post-quantum key exchange to derive shared secrets securely. The shared secrets are used to enable hybrid encryption for efficient data protection. Additionally, the implementation uses a dual-signature approach, using quantum safe and classical signatures. These signatures are combined to ensure robust and tamper-resistant proof verification. The deployed solution validates its feasibility and efficiency for smart contract-based verification. The protocol maintains backward compatibility with existing systems while providing strong resistance to quantum attacks. Benchmark results demonstrate the system’s scalability and robustness under high transaction loads, with efficient gas usage for on-chain proof validation. This approach paves the way for post-quantum secure applications, including verifiable proofs, secure key exchanges, and decentralized systems resilient to quantum adversaries.
The advent of quantum computing threatens the cryptographic security of traditional blockchain systems, potentially rendering current encryption techniques obsolete. This paper explores quantum-resistant blockchain protocols that leverage post-quantum cryptographic algorithms to ensure secure transactions. We analyze various quantum-safe cryptographic methods, such as lattice-based, hash-based, and multivariate polynomial cryptography, evaluating their feasibility for blockchain applications. Through comparative analysis, we discuss their computational efficiency and security guarantees. Our findings suggest that integrating quantum-resistant cryptographic techniques into blockchain frameworks is essential for future-proofing decentralized systems. This paper explores the integration of quantum-resistant cryptographic algorithms within blockchain technology. The proposed approach utilizes CRYSTALS-Dilithium for digital signatures, ensuring secure transaction verification in a post-quantum era. While Kyber is a robust key exchange mechanism, it is not suitable for signing transactions. The implementation is tested on standard hardware, demonstrating feasibility without requiring specialized quantum computing infrastructure.
In order to meet the challenges brought by quantum computing, research on post-quantum cryptography has been carried out comprehensively. Among them, the most influential one is the post-quantum cryptography algorithm standardization project initiated by NIST. In July 2022, NIST announced that the Dilithium, Falcon, and SPHINCS+ algorithms were selected as candidate schemes for the standardization of post-quantum cryptographic digital signatures. The OQS project team is committed to promoting the transition of existing security protocols to standardized post-quantum algorithms and is currently the mainstream open-source post-quantum project. This paper improves the post-quantum hybrid digital signature scheme used by the OQS project team. Firstly, the hybrid digital signature scheme used in this project is studied, and it is found that there are security risks. Subsequently, an enhanced scheme is constructed and implemented using the hybrid algorithm combiner proposed by Nina Bindel et al., solving the security issues. The unforgeability and 2 -non-separability of the enhanced scheme are verified through formal analysis, and forward compatibility is achieved. The enhanced scheme shows obvious advantages in key generation efficiency and signature verification efficiency. Under some algorithms, the speed of signature verification of the improved scheme is 60 % of the original scheme. Meanwhile, the enhanced scheme also demonstrates stability in terms of time and storage overhead. Finally, the TLS1.3 protocol PSK mechanism is implemented using the enhanced scheme. This is the first implementation of post-quantum algorithm security protection in the PSK mechanism of the TLS protocol. This scheme can resist man-in-the-middle attacks while meeting the requirements of forward compatibility.
The National Institute of Standards and Technology is in the process of selecting post-quantum public-key cryptography (PQC) algorithms through a public competition-like process. Dilithium, a lattice-based signature scheme, is a PQC candidate submitted to the NIST. It offers a fairly good performance with relatively straightforward implementation. In this study, we considered a secure two-party Dilithium signing protocol. We described how to build a distributed key generation and distributed signing protocol for Dilithium. Our protocol achieves a coordinated two-party Dilithium signature generation using Brakersiki/Fan-Vercauteren homomorphic encryption scheme. Our protocol is proven secure against active adversaries corrupting one of the players. Compared with other protocols, our protocol has advantage in resisting quantum computing attacks.