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International Academic Exchange Conference on Science and Technology Innovation (IAECST)

An Enhanced Hybrid Post-Quantum Digital Signature Scheme and Its Application

Shijun Yu

Published Dec 6, 2024• 1 citation
Publisher

Abstract

In order to meet the challenges brought by quantum computing, research on post-quantum cryptography has been carried out comprehensively. Among them, the most influential one is the post-quantum cryptography algorithm standardization project initiated by NIST. In July 2022, NIST announced that the Dilithium, Falcon, and SPHINCS+ algorithms were selected as candidate schemes for the standardization of post-quantum cryptographic digital signatures. The OQS project team is committed to promoting the transition of existing security protocols to standardized post-quantum algorithms and is currently the mainstream open-source post-quantum project. This paper improves the post-quantum hybrid digital signature scheme used by the OQS project team. Firstly, the hybrid digital signature scheme used in this project is studied, and it is found that there are security risks. Subsequently, an enhanced scheme is constructed and implemented using the hybrid algorithm combiner proposed by Nina Bindel et al., solving the security issues. The unforgeability and 2 -non-separability of the enhanced scheme are verified through formal analysis, and forward compatibility is achieved. The enhanced scheme shows obvious advantages in key generation efficiency and signature verification efficiency. Under some algorithms, the speed of signature verification of the improved scheme is 60 % of the original scheme. Meanwhile, the enhanced scheme also demonstrates stability in terms of time and storage overhead. Finally, the TLS1.3 protocol PSK mechanism is implemented using the enhanced scheme. This is the first implementation of post-quantum algorithm security protection in the PSK mechanism of the TLS protocol. This scheme can resist man-in-the-middle attacks while meeting the requirements of forward compatibility.

DOI
10.1109/iaecst64597.2024.11117218

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In order to meet the challenges brought by quantum computing, research on post-quantum cryptography has been carried out comprehensively. Among them, the most influential one is the post-quantum cryptography algorithm standardization project initiated by NIST. In July 2022, NIST announced that the Dilithium, Falcon, and SPHINCS+ algorithms were selected as candidate schemes for the standardization of post-quantum cryptographic digital signatures. The OQS project team is committed to promoting the transition of existing security protocols to standardized post-quantum algorithms and is currently the mainstream open-source post-quantum project. This paper improves the post-quantum hybrid digital signature scheme used by the OQS project team. Firstly, the hybrid digital signature scheme used in this project is studied, and it is found that there are security risks. Subsequently, an enhanced scheme is constructed and implemented using the hybrid algorithm combiner proposed by Nina Bindel et al., solving the security issues. The unforgeability and 2 -non-separability of the enhanced scheme are verified through formal analysis, and forward compatibility is achieved. The enhanced scheme shows obvious advantages in key generation efficiency and signature verification efficiency. Under some algorithms, the speed of signature verification of the improved scheme is 60 % of the original scheme. Meanwhile, the enhanced scheme also demonstrates stability in terms of time and storage overhead. Finally, the TLS1.3 protocol PSK mechanism is implemented using the enhanced scheme. This is the first implementation of post-quantum algorithm security protection in the PSK mechanism of the TLS protocol. This scheme can resist man-in-the-middle attacks while meeting the requirements of forward compatibility.
Hybrid cryptographic protocol was proposed by integrating quantum-safe algorithms (Kyber and Dilithium) together with a classical ECDSA-based signature scheme to verify secure proof on blockchain. Since quantum computers pose some loopholes in existing cryptography algorithms, the proposed mechanism addresses those vulnerabilities by maintaining compatibility with the existing infrastructure. The protocol integrates post-quantum key exchange to derive shared secrets securely. The shared secrets are used to enable hybrid encryption for efficient data protection. Additionally, the implementation uses a dual-signature approach, using quantum safe and classical signatures. These signatures are combined to ensure robust and tamper-resistant proof verification. The deployed solution validates its feasibility and efficiency for smart contract-based verification. The protocol maintains backward compatibility with existing systems while providing strong resistance to quantum attacks. Benchmark results demonstrate the system’s scalability and robustness under high transaction loads, with efficient gas usage for on-chain proof validation. This approach paves the way for post-quantum secure applications, including verifiable proofs, secure key exchanges, and decentralized systems resilient to quantum adversaries.
Quantum computing challenges the mathematical problems anchoring the security of the classical public key algorithms. For quantum-resistant public key algorithms, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has undergone a multi-year standardization process and selected the post-quantum cryptography (PQC) public key digital signatures of Dilithium, Falcon, and SPHINCS+. Finding common ground to compare these algorithms can be difficult because of their design differences, including the fundamental math problems (lattice-based vs. hash-based). We use a visualization model to show the key/signature size vs. security trade-offs for all PQC algorithms. Our performance analyses compare the algorithms’ computational loads in the execution time. Building on the individual algorithms’ analyses, we analyze the communication costs and implementation overheads when integrated with Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) and with Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Transmission Control Protocol (TCP)/Internet Protocol (IP). Our results show that the lattice-based algorithms of Dilithium and Falcon induce lower computational overheads than the hash-based algorithms of SPHINCS+. In addition, the lattice-based PQC can outperform the classical algorithm with comparable security strength; for example, Dilithium 2 and Falcon 512 outperform RSA 4096 in the TLS handshake time duration.
The advent of quantum computing presents a significant threat to the security of asymmetric cryptographic algorithms, necessitating the adoption of new cryptographic mechanisms resilient to quantum-based attacks. This need is particularly critical for applications that rely exclusively on public-key cryptography, such as digital signatures. This paper presents a comprehensive analysis of the performance of various post-quantum cryptographic algorithms, focusing specifically on NIST-standardized digital signature algorithms—SPHINCS+ and Dilithium—and their practical implementations. The study evaluates these algorithms across different programming languages to identify optimal environments for diverse applications. Comparative analyses with the widely used RSA algorithm reveal that the computational cost of adopting post-quantum cryptographic systems is relatively low. Notably, some post-quantum algorithms demonstrate performance advantages over classical RSA in specific scenarios.
Information security is a fundamental and urgent issue in the digital transformation era. Cryptographic techniques and digital signatures have been applied to protect and authenticate relevant information. However, with the advent of quantum computers and quantum algorithms, classical cryptographic techniques have been in danger of collapsing because quantum computers can solve complex problems in polynomial time. Stemming from that risk, researchers worldwide have stepped up research on post-quantum algorithms to resist attack by quantum computers. In this review paper, we survey studies in recent years on post-quantum cryptography (PQC) and provide statistics on the number and content of publications, including a literature overview, detailed explanations of the most common methods so far, current implementation status, implementation comparisons, and discussion on future work. These studies focused on essential public cryptography techniques and digital signature schemes, and the US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) launched a competition to select the best candidate for the expected standard. Recent studies have practically implemented the public key encryption/key encapsulation mechanism (PKE/KEM) and digital signature schemes on different hardware platforms and applied various optimization measures based on other criteria. Along with the increasing number of scientific publications, the recent trend of PQC research is increasingly evident and is the general trend in the cryptography industry. The movement opens up a promising avenue for researchers in public key cryptography and digital signatures, especially on algorithms selected by NIST.
Recent advances in quantum-computing technology have threatened the security of classical cryptographic algorithms. This initiated research on Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC), and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) PQC standardization is in progress. Coping with the current situation in which the security of existing cryptographic algorithms is already in question and that of new cryptographic algorithms is not yet certain, there has been active research on hybrid schemes combining two algorithms such that the security of the combined scheme is based on both underlying algorithms. For digital signatures, a naive solution for a hybrid scheme is to simply concatenate a classical signature and a quantum-resistant signature. In this paper, however, we propose a compact hybrid signature construction method that combines two randomized signatures such that the size of the combined signature is shorter than that of naive concatenation. Our construction allows for selective verification, which provides backward compatibility and conformance with existing regulations. We demonstrate the feasibility of the proposed method by combining ECDSA P-256 and Falcon-512, which are representative classical and post-quantum signature schemes, respectively. We prove that the combined signature is existentially unforgeable against an adaptive chosen-message attack, even if one of the underlying signature schemes is completely broken and only the other one remains secure. Through experiments on a desktop PC and Raspberry Pi 3 Model B, we verify that the proposed method effectively reduces the combined signature size with negligible computational overhead. Our experimental results demonstrate the proposed method is also applicable to PQC-PQC combinations.
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) generates and distributes digital certificates to provide the root of trust for securing digital networking systems. To continue securing digital networking in the quantum era, PKI should transition to use quantum-resistant cryptographic algorithms. The cryptography community is developing quantum-resistant primitives/algorithms, studying, and analyzing them for cryptanalysis and improvements. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) selected finalist algorithms for the post-quantum digital signature cipher standardization, which are Dilithium, Falcon, and Rainbow. We study and analyze the feasibility and the processing performance of these algorithms in memory/size and time/speed when used for PKI, including the key generation from the PKI end entities (e.g., a HTTPS/TLS server), the signing, and the certificate generation by the certificate authority within the PKI. The transition to post-quantum from the classical ciphers incur changes in the parameters in the PKI, for example, Rainbow I significantly increases the certificate size by 163 times when compared with RSA 3072. Nevertheless, we learn that the current X.509 supports the NIST post-quantum digital signature ciphers and that the ciphers can be modularly adapted for PKI. According to our empirical implementations-based study, the post-quantum ciphers can increase the certificate verification time cost compared to the current classical cipher and therefore the verification overheads require careful considerations when using the post-quantum-cipher-based certificates.