NIST post-quantum cryptography (PQC) project selected three digital signature algorithms (Dilithium, Falcon, and SPHINCS+) to standardize as PQC digital signature standards. In addition to the PQC digital signature standards, for diversity and to address the concerns on the overheads including key/signature sizes and computational performances, NIST is considering 14 additional digital signature algorithms for further standardization. One or more algorithms from these 14 algorithms can be selected for further standardization. However due to the dynamic nature of the NIST standardization process and cryptanalysis, all these candidate algorithms go through continuous changes and updates. The latest updates in Oct 2025 outdated the previous performance analyses of these algorithms. In this paper, we study the computational performance overheads of the NIST PQC additional signature candidates (round 2 - latest submission packages) in terms of key generation time, signing time, and verification time. Our results show that additional signature candidate algorithms including Hawk, CROSS, and SNOVA are competitive and computationally outperform the PQC standards on several occasions.
NIST post-quantum cryptography (PQC) project selected three digital signature algorithms (Dilithium, Falcon, and SPHINCS+) to standardize as PQC digital signature standards. In addition to the PQC digital signature standards, for diversity and to address the concerns on the overheads including key/signature sizes and computational performances, NIST is considering 14 additional digital signature algorithms for further standardization. One or more algorithms from these 14 algorithms can be selected for further standardization. However due to the dynamic nature of the NIST standardization process and cryptanalysis, all these candidate algorithms go through continuous changes and updates. The latest updates in Oct 2025 outdated the previous performance analyses of these algorithms. In this paper, we study the computational performance overheads of the NIST PQC additional signature candidates (round 2 - latest submission packages) in terms of key generation time, signing time, and verification time. Our results show that additional signature candidate algorithms including Hawk, CROSS, and SNOVA are competitive and computationally outperform the PQC standards on several occasions.
Quantum computing challenges the mathematical problems anchoring the security of the classical public key algorithms. For quantum-resistant public key algorithms, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has undergone a multi-year standardization process and selected the post-quantum cryptography (PQC) public key digital signatures of Dilithium, Falcon, and SPHINCS+. Finding common ground to compare these algorithms can be difficult because of their design differences, including the fundamental math problems (lattice-based vs. hash-based). We use a visualization model to show the key/signature size vs. security trade-offs for all PQC algorithms. Our performance analyses compare the algorithms’ computational loads in the execution time. Building on the individual algorithms’ analyses, we analyze the communication costs and implementation overheads when integrated with Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) and with Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Transmission Control Protocol (TCP)/Internet Protocol (IP). Our results show that the lattice-based algorithms of Dilithium and Falcon induce lower computational overheads than the hash-based algorithms of SPHINCS+. In addition, the lattice-based PQC can outperform the classical algorithm with comparable security strength; for example, Dilithium 2 and Falcon 512 outperform RSA 4096 in the TLS handshake time duration.
Recent advancements in quantum computing threaten the cryptographic foundations of Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). Although the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has standardized three post-quantum digital signature algorithms, namely ML-DSA, SLH-DSA, and FALCON, fourteen additional candidates are currently under evaluation, to diversify the collection of available post-quantum signature schemes. This work presents a comprehensive performance analysis of the fourteen ‘Round 2’ digital signature candidates within a functional X. 509 PKI environment. Unlike prior studies focused on isolated benchmarking, we evaluate the complete PKI life cycle, key generation, CSR creation, as well as certificate signing and verification. Our empirical results indicate that several candidates perform competitively with current standards; notably, eight schemes outperform SLH-DSA in signing efficiency, with HAWK and CROSS approaching the performance levels of ML-DSA and FALCON. However, memory analysis reveals critical trade-offs. While HAWK and CROSS maintain high efficiency, multivariate schemes like UOV and FAEST incur significantly higher memory overheads. These observed performance characteristics provide a stronger basis for selecting suitable post-quantum signatures in practical PKI environments.
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) allows the issuance, management, and validation of digital certificates to establish trust between entities in networked systems. The security of PKI relies on cryptography and the underlying hardness problems. Recent advances in quantum computing pose significant threats to the cryptographic algorithms currently used in digital networking, including PKI. NIST launched the Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) project and standardized three post-quantum digital signature algorithms (ML-DSA, SLH-DSA, and FALCON). To diversify the PQC portfolio, NIST is now evaluating 14 additional digital signature candidates. In this work, we present a comprehensive performance analysis of these 14 additional signature candidates, evaluating their integration and operational overhead within a functional X. 509 PKI environment. Our empirical results show that several additional candidates perform competitively with standardized schemes in PKI operations. Eight of the fourteen Round 2 candidates outperform SLH-DSA in signing efficiency, with schemes such as HAWK and CROSS achieving performance levels that approach those of ML-DSA and FALCON. These findings identify which of the candidate schemes are practical alternatives for securing PKI against quantum threats.
Background: The rapid advancement of quantum computing threatens the cryptographic foundations of e-Government infrastructure, particularly classical public-key algorithms susceptible to Shor's algorithm. Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) offers a viable pathway for securing digital signature systems against emerging quantum adversaries. Objective: This study conducts a system-level comparative evaluation of three NIST-standardized PQC digital signature schemes CRYSTALS-Dilithium2, Falcon-512, and SPHINCS+-128s to assess their suitability for secure e-Government document signing workflows. Methods: A simulation-based system-level evaluation is employed, wherein timing values are estimated from official NIST PQC parameter specifications and open-source benchmarks (PQClean, OQS), rather than measured from native cryptographic library executions. Experiments were conducted over 100 iterations, reporting mean ± standard deviation for key generation, signing, and verification times, alongside signature sizes and a RESTful API prototype demonstration. Results: Falcon-512 demonstrates the lowest estimated signing latency approximately five to six times faster than Dilithium2 and over fifty times faster than SPHINCS+-128s with the smallest signature size (666 bytes versus 2,420 and 7,856 bytes respectively). Dilithium2 provides a balanced trade-off between computational efficiency and signature robustness, while SPHINCS+-128s, despite its computational overhead, offers the strongest long-term security guarantees through its stateless hash-based construction. The RESTful API prototype confirms successful multi-scheme integration feasibility. Conclusion: This study recommends Falcon-512 for real-time mobile services, Dilithium2 for centralized server-side authentication, and SPHINCS+-128s for long-term archival security, providing evidence-based guidance for PQC adoption in national e-Government systems aligned with SPBE frameworks and NIST standards.
An important feature of the post-quantum period in cryptography is the significant uncertainty regarding the source data for cryptanalysis and counteraction in terms of the capabilities of quantum computers, their mathematical and software, as well as the application of quantum cryptanalysis to existing cryptotransformations and cryptoprotocols. Mathematical methods of digital signature (DS) have been chosen as the main methods of NIST USA, which have undergone significant analysis and substantiation in the process of extensive research by cryptographers and mathematicians at the highest level. They are described in detail and studied at the first stage of the US NIST International Competition. In the second round, a number of decisions were made to merge some candidates for the post-quantum DS standard. 9 candidates were left for further research at the 2nd round: Crystals-Dilithium, Falcon, GeMSS, LUOV, MQDSS, Picnic, qTESLA, Rainbow and SPHINCS+. Three of them (Dilithium, Falcon, qTeSLA) are based on the stability of algebraic lattices (Lattice-based), four (GeMSS, LUOV, MQDSS, Rainbow) are based on multivariate transformations (MQ-transformations), one (SPHINCS+) is based on the stability of hash-function, one (Picnic) is based on the stability of the hash-function and block stream ciphers. During the 2nd round of the US NIST Competition the following finalist algorithms and alternative algorithms were selected as digital signatures according to the results of research on promising post-quantum cryptographic algorithms. As finalists algorithms such DS algorithms as Crystals-Dilithium, Falcon and Rainbow. Alternative algorithms are GeMSS, Picnic and SPHINCS+ were selected. This paper studies the peculiarities of construction of the digital signature algorithm considered as a candidate for the promising post-quantum standard of the NIST PQC competition – Picnic, also it analyzes the protection of the algorithm from known attacks. Data from the comparison of post-quantum algorithms such as digital signature are given. The description of the Picnic algorithm and its parameters are given.
Federated learning (FL) has become one of the standard approaches for deploying machine learning models on edge devices, where private training data are distributed across clients, and a shared model is learned by aggregating locally computed updates from each client. While this paradigm enhances communication efficiency by only requiring updates at the end of each training epoch, the transmitted model updates remain vulnerable to malicious tampering, posing risks to the integrity of the global model. Although current digital signature algorithms can protect these communicated model updates, they fail to ensure quantum security in the era of large-scale quantum computing. Fortunately, various post-quantum cryptography algorithms have been developed to address this vulnerability, especially the three NIST-standardized algorithms - Dilithium, FALCON, and SPHINCS+.In this work, we empirically investigate the impact of these three NIST-standardized PQC algorithms for digital signatures within the FL procedure, covering a wide range of models, tasks, and FL settings. Our results indicate that Dilithium stands out as the most efficient PQC algorithm for digital signature in federated learning. Additionally, we offer an in-depth discussion of the implications of our findings and potential directions for future research.