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Physical Review A

From uniformity to fluctuations: Quantifying the security cost of imperfect randomness in quantum key distribution

Andrei Gaidash, Pavel V. Yakovlev, George P. Miroshnichenko, Козубов Антон Владимирович

Published Feb 4, 2026• 1 citation
Publisher
DOI
10.1103/nqpb-8h13

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