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Quantum Information Processing

Estimating security of the quantum key distribution from the guesswork

Hong-Wei Li, Jianhong Shi, Qing-yu Cai, Chang-Pu Sun

Published Apr 1, 2022• 4 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/s11128-022-03487-9

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Traditional methods of cryptographic key distribution rest on judgments about an attacker.With the advent of quantum key distribution (QKD) came proofs of security for the mathematical models that define the protocols BB84 and B92; however, applying such proofs to actual transmitting and receiving devices has been questioned.Proofs of QKD security are propositions about models written in the mathematical language of quantum mechanics, and the issue is the linking of such models to actual devices in an experiment on security.To explore this issue, we adapt Wittgenstein's method of language games to view quantum language in its application to experimental activity involving transmitting and receiving devices.We sketch concepts with which to think about models in relation to experiments, without assuming the experiments accord with any model; included is a concept of one quantummechanical model enveloping another.For any model that agrees with given experimental results and implies the security of a key, there is an enveloping model that agrees with the same results while denying that security.As a result there is a gap between equations and the behavior recorded from devices in an experiment, a gap bridged only by resort to something beyond the reach of logic and measured data, well named by the word guesswork.While this recognition of guesswork encourages eavesdropping, a related recognition of guesswork in the design of feedback loops can help a transmitter and receiver to reduce their vulnerability to eavesdropping.
Proofs of the security of quantum key distribution are propositions about models written in the mathematical language of quantum mechanics, and the issue is the linking of such models to actual devices in an experiment on security. To explore this issue, we adapt Wittgenstein's method of language games to view quantum language in its application to experimental activity involving transmitting and receiving devices. We sketch concepts with which to think about models in relation to experiments, without assuming the experiments accord with any model included is a concept of one quantum-mechanical model enveloping another. For any model that agrees with given experimental results and implies the security of a key, there is an enveloping model that agrees with the same results while denying that security. As a result there is a gap between equations and the behavior recorded from devices in an experiment, a gap bridged only by resort to something beyond the reach of logic and measured data, well named by the word guesswork. While this recognition of guesswork encourages eavesdropping, a related recognition of guesswork in the design of feedback loops can help a transmitter and receiver to reduce their vulnerability to eavesdropping.
What is the minimum number of guesses needed on average to correctly guess a realization of a random variable? The answer to this question led to the introduction of the notion of a quantity called guesswork by Massey in 1994, which can be viewed as an alternate security criterion to entropy. In this paper, we consider guesswork in the presence of quantum side information, and show that a general sequential guessing strategy is equivalent to performing a single quantum measurement and choosing a guessing strategy based on the outcome. We use this result to deduce entropic one-shot and asymptotic bounds on the guesswork in the presence of quantum side information, and to formulate a semi-definite program (SDP) to calculate the quantity. We evaluate the guesswork for a simple example involving the BB84 states, and we prove a continuity result that certifies the security of slightly imperfect key states when the guesswork is used as the security criterion.