Securing data transmission against eavesdropping is a critical requirement in modern communication systems. Beyond traditional encryption methods, physical-layer techniques that exploit the physics of electromagnetic wave propagation have emerged as promising solutions for enhancing security. However, existing physical-layer security approaches typically do not inherently prevent eavesdropping from listeners positioned along the line-of-sight path. Here, we propose, simulate, and experimentally demonstrate a line-of-sight physical-layer security scheme that employs a longitudinally structured artificial-noisecarrying beam co-propagating with the data-carrying signal beam. This noise beam spatially overlaps the signal beam throughout the propagation path but undergoes significant spatial broadening only near the legitimate receiver, resulting in a low-intensity noise region at the receiver's aperture. Consequently, the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) exhibits a tailored distance dependence, enabling successful data recovery only at the intended receiver's location while significantly degrading reception elsewhere. We demonstrate the feasibility of this approach across diverse electromagnetic carrier frequencies through proof-of-concept wireless experiments: a 120-Gbit/s 16-QAM optical link at 1550 nm and a 20-Gbit/s QPSK sub-terahertz link at 300 GHz. The measured SNR values along the propagation path outside the designed receiver region remain at least 17 dB lower than those at the receiver's aperture.
Securing data transmission against eavesdropping is a critical requirement in modern communication systems. Beyond traditional encryption methods, physical-layer techniques that exploit the physics of electromagnetic wave propagation have emerged as promising solutions for enhancing security. However, existing physical-layer security approaches typically do not inherently prevent eavesdropping from listeners positioned along the line-of-sight path. Here, we propose, simulate, and experimentally demonstrate a line-of-sight physical-layer security scheme that employs a longitudinally structured artificial-noisecarrying beam co-propagating with the data-carrying signal beam. This noise beam spatially overlaps the signal beam throughout the propagation path but undergoes significant spatial broadening only near the legitimate receiver, resulting in a low-intensity noise region at the receiver's aperture. Consequently, the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) exhibits a tailored distance dependence, enabling successful data recovery only at the intended receiver's location while significantly degrading reception elsewhere. We demonstrate the feasibility of this approach across diverse electromagnetic carrier frequencies through proof-of-concept wireless experiments: a 120-Gbit/s 16-QAM optical link at 1550 nm and a 20-Gbit/s QPSK sub-terahertz link at 300 GHz. The measured SNR values along the propagation path outside the designed receiver region remain at least 17 dB lower than those at the receiver's aperture.
Security against eavesdropping is one of the key concerns in the design of any communication system. Many common considerations of the security of a wireless communication channel rely on comparing the signal level measured by Bob (the intended receiver) to that accessible to Eve (a single eavesdropper). Frameworks such as Wyner's wiretap model ensure the security of a link, in an average sense, when Bob's signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) exceeds Eve's. Unfortunately, because these guarantees rely on the noise realizations at Eve, statistically, Eve can still occasionally succeed in decoding information. The goal of achievingexactly zeroprobability of intercept over an engineered region of the broadcast sector, which we term absolute security, remains elusive. Here, we describe the first architecture for a wireless link with a single eavesdropper, that provides absolute security. I.e., a cryptographic deterministic and non-probabilistic security approach that does not rely on statistical assumptions about noise, shared secure key, or Eve's computational power. Our approach relies on the inherent properties of broadband and high-gain antennas, and is therefore ideally suited for implementation in millimeter-wave and terahertz wireless systems, where such antennas will generally be employed. We exploit spatial minima of the antenna pattern at different frequencies, the union of which defines a wide region where Eve is guaranteed to fail regardless of her computational capabilities, and regardless of the noise in the channels. Unlike conventional zero-forcing beam forming methods, we show that, for realistic assumptions about the antenna configuration and power budget, this absolute security guarantee can be achieved over most possible eavesdropper locations. Since we use relatively simple frequency-multiplexed coding, together with the underlying physics of a diffracting aperture, this idea is broadly applicable in many contexts.
Security against eavesdropping is one of the key concerns in the design of any communication system. Many common considerations of the security of a wireless communication channel rely on comparing the signal level measured by Bob (the intended receiver) to that accessible to Eve (an eavesdropper). Frameworks such as Wyner's wiretap model ensure the security of a link, in an average sense, when Bob's signal-to-noise ratio exceeds Eve's. Unfortunately, because these guarantees rely on statistical assumptions about noise, Eve can still occasionally succeed in decoding information. The goal of achieving exactly zero probability of intercept over an engineered region of the broadcast sector, which we term absolute security, remains elusive. Here, we describe the first architecture for a wireless link which provides absolute security. Our approach relies on the inherent properties of broadband and high-gain antennas, and is therefore ideally suited for implementation in millimeter-wave and terahertz wireless systems, where such antennas will generally be employed. We exploit spatial minima of the antenna pattern at different frequencies, the union of which defines a wide region where Eve is guaranteed to fail regardless of her computational capabilities, and regardless of the noise in the channels. Unlike conventional zero-forcing beam forming methods, we show that, for realistic assumptions about the antenna configuration and power budget, this absolute security guarantee can be achieved over most possible eavesdropper locations. Since we use relatively simple frequency-multiplexed coding, together with the underlying physics of a diffracting aperture, this idea is broadly applicable in many contexts.
The terahertz communications display an important role in high-speed wireless communications, the security threat from the eavesdroppers in the terahertz communications has been gaining attention recently. The true randomness in the physical layer can ensure one-time-pad encryption for secured terahertz communications, however, physical layer security schemes like the quantum key distribution methods suffer from device imperfections that limit the desirable signal rate and link distance. Herein, we present the quantum noise secured terahertz wireless communications with photonic terahertz signal generation schemes. With the high-order diffusion algorithms, the signal is masked by the quantum noise ciphers to the eavesdroppers and cannot be detected because the inevitable randomness by quantum noise measurement will cause physical measurement errors. In the experiment, we demonstrate 16 Gbits−1quantum noise secured terahertz wireless communications with the conventional optical communication realms and devices, operating at 300 GHz terahertz frequency. This quantum noise secured terahertz communication approach is a significant step toward high-security wireless communications.
Physical layer security (PLS) has grown in popularity as it guarantees secure and reliable communication between wireless devices without restricting the ability of data analysts to eavesdrop. PLS benefits from the randomization property of the wireless channel, which improves immunity and protects against many dangers of information breaches from eavesdroppers. MIMO and Massive MIMO, which use numerous antennas at the transmitter and receiver ends, are fundamental technologies for improving efficiency in 5G and future network systems. The PLS still requires a significant amount of work before it can be employed in practical systems. The interception of eavesdroppers can be made difficult by adding artificial noise. This paper focuses on the physical layer security considering maximal ratio combining, and artificial noise with beamforming techniques to further enhance the secrecy rate. The proposed work demonstrates that the use of transmitter beamforming with artificial noise can significantly improve the degree of confidentiality of information being transmitted between a transmitter and an intended receiver while making it more difficult for eavesdroppers to intercept. The simulation results in terms of bit error rate show that the proposed method has a significant impact on the error rate performance of the eavesdropper.
In this chapter, we described the fundamental system model, challenges, and technical solutions to THz physical layer security. Despite the good security performance provided by the high directivity of THz wireless communications, THz physical layer security still faces security challenges, including eavesdroppers inside beam sector, eavesdroppers in close proximity and THz covertness problem. In light of these challenges, three THz-specific security schemes were described. First, the DA-APM proposes to transmit signals at sides of molecular absorption peaks to enhance the wireless security and covertness. This scheme effectively combats eavesdroppers inside the beam sector and can even enhance the covertness of THz wireless communications. Second, the SIC-free RAN scheme takes the advantage of the distance-dependent temporal broadening effect to jam Eve in close proximity while not jamming Bob. This method handles the eavesdroppers in close proximity with a lower-complexity receiver AN mechanism. Third, we described the WSA and beamforming scheme to combat near eavesdropping without the aid of other nodes. The size rationality of practical THz WSA is justified.Despite the fruitful research progress on THz physical layer security, there are still open challenges remaining to be tackled, which are described as follows. First, since the optimal molecular absorption coefficients depend on the propagation distance, it is necessary to adjust the carrier frequency as the distance between Alice and Bob varies. How to efficiently and practically tune the carrier frequency to use proper sub-bands needs investigation. Second, the hybrid beamforming structure is usually adopted in THz communications. However, the hybrid beamformer design for the WSA is a non-convex optimization problem. It is necessary to investigate efficient and low-complexity solutions for the WSA beamformer design. Finally, active security attacks, for instance, eavesdroppers may send the jamming signal to the legitimate receiver while overhearing the secret message, need to be handled for THz physical layer security. In line with this, security mechanisms simultaneously combating active and passive eavesdropping are awaited to be explored as a future direction.
In single-input single-output (SISO) systems, transmitting the expected signals with artificially generated noise can effectively enhance the physical layer security (PLS). However, the traditional noise suppression at the intended receivers will increase algorithm complexity, particularly over multi-path fading channels, which poses challenges for some massive Internet-of-Things (IoT) networks that take advantage of low-cost and resource-constrained nodes. In this paper, we design a novel self-noise (SN) waveform for transmission security. The transmitter stacks the signal segments periodically, and the additive SN in the current signal period derives from the previous signal periods. Based on this, SN can be completely suppressed at intended receivers by differential operations between two adjacent signal periods. Both analysis and simulation results confirm that the proposed scheme can significantly reduce the complexity of noise suppression and its performance is not affected by multi-path channel environments. Besides, the proposed scheme can effectively worsen the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of eavesdroppers while having negligible impacts on intended receivers.