In the 19th century, determinism was often seen as a presupposition of scientific thinking, although its validity was not universally accepted among scientists and philosophers. There were different conceptions of causality, and the concept of cause was often linked to that of force or energy; but toward the end of the 19th century, the causal conception of forces was increasingly criticised and some argued that the concept of cause should be abandoned altogether. After the development of the modern theory of quantum mechanics in 1925, many physicists and philosophers claimed that this theory implied an overthrow of the classical conception of causality; however, only few authors abandoned causality altogether. The debate of the implications of quantum mechanics for causality soon became muddled because of the many different meanings attached to the term “causality”.
In the 19th century, determinism was often seen as a presupposition of scientific thinking, although its validity was not universally accepted among scientists and philosophers. There were different conceptions of causality, and the concept of cause was often linked to that of force or energy; but toward the end of the 19th century, the causal conception of forces was increasingly criticised and some argued that the concept of cause should be abandoned altogether. After the development of the modern theory of quantum mechanics in 1925, many physicists and philosophers claimed that this theory implied an overthrow of the classical conception of causality; however, only few authors abandoned causality altogether. The debate of the implications of quantum mechanics for causality soon became muddled because of the many different meanings attached to the term “causality”.
As with any scientific revolution, quantum mechanics entailed a profound revision of our fundamental epistemological concepts and also of our worldview as a whole. This was the case for the concepts of causality and reality. Around these concepts, there arose in the third decade of the last century a heated debate in which almost all the scientists and philosophers of the time took part and which in a certain sense is still going on today. The Author provides a reconstruction of the various different positions, from the conservative attempt to defend determinism to the most radical stochastic positions, and singles out in Ernst Cassirer’s solution the most convincing approach.
Determinism is related to other fundamental concepts such as causality. However, with the growth of quantum physics, determinism became a scientific "dilemma" and has created many challenges in various contemporary sciences. Most of modern physicists chose elimination of determinism. The basic question is: Is determinism completely removable? To answer this question, this paper is to investigate this concept analytically. At first we consider different aspects of the terminology and definition of determinism. Particularly, we pay attention to different kinds of determinism including global/local domain, complete/incomplete form, and the main factor in the formation of events. It is discussed that although determinism took a complete and universal form in classical physics, because of some philosophical ideas, determinism changed into a different concept, even as a problem and an undesirable element, in the standard (Copenhagen interpretation of) quantum mechanics. It is explained that determinism is a complex concept with a number of aspects and characteristics. Prediction, the world accessibility, and connection between the past and the future are the characteristics of the concept of determinism which cannot be set aside from the science. The final result is that, without any pre-assumption or alternative interpretation as what is done in already known realistic and deterministic theories as Bohmian quantum mechanics and/or many worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics, determinism cannot be completely denied in the standard (Copenhagen interpretation of) quantum mechanics.
Abstract There is widespread agreement that quantum mechanics has something radical to teach us about causation. But opinions differ on what this is. Physicists have often taken the central lesson to be that many physical events occur spontaneously, so that a principle of causality is violated whenever an atom emits light, or a uranium nucleus decays, even though nothing that happened beforehand made this inevitable. Feynman urged philosophers to acknowledge that this implication of quantum mechanics undermines the view that causal determinism forms a precondition of scientific inquiry. But while some physicists have denied the implication, most philosophers since Reichenbach have accepted it with alacrity, and sought to develop accounts of causation equally applicable in an indeterministic or a deterministic world.
Although physical laws or theories are often invoked in debates over “causality” and “determinism,” our best current understanding of physics assigns only a limited (though still very broad) validity to these concepts. It may be, thus, helpful (particularly when having to deal with the challenges posed by quantum mechanics) to think of them as prejudices, extrapolated from our experience with a limited (essentially classical) set of phenomena and/or theoretical models. This paper discusses how, over time, different physical theories have either reinforced or challenged these prejudices, focusing specifically on conservative “Laplacian” mechanics, dissipative mechanics (thermal physics), and quantum mechanics.
Concept of has had many transformations throughout the history of physics, and it has been so influential in this field. However, with the growth of quantum physics, became a scientific dilemma and has created many challenges in various contemporary sciences. If this concept is understood correctly, many misconceptions corresponding to it in natural sciences, especially physics can be removed. The aim of this paper is to investigate this concept analytically to solve the existing problems. To do this, first we consider the terminology of including characteristic, necessary connection, and exact prediction. Then, William James definition of determinism, Laplacian determinism, Popper definition of determinism, causal determinism, logical determinism, epistemic determinism, metaphysical determinism, and theological are introduced. After which, we pay attention to different kinds of including global/local domain, complete/incomplete form, and the main factor in the formation of events. In the next step, it is discussed that although had been vague and causal in ancient Greece, it has become global and theological in middle Ages. In classical physics, it took a complete and universal form. Laplace provided the most complete picture of determinism. Because of some philosophical ideas, changed into a different concept in quantum mechanics. Copenhagen school physicists, especially Bohr, regarded determinism as a problem and an undesirable element. It is shown that is a complex subject with a number of aspects and characteristics which cannot be set aside from the science. The final result is that cannot be denied in the science; in particular, the quantum mechanics is a deterministic theory but in an incomplete or local manner.
My thesis investigates a debate between Vienna and Berlin about the view that the basic laws of nature are genuinely indeterministic that started long before the advent of quantum mechanics. It involved two different readings of Ludwig Boltzmann's legacy statistical mechanics and two different answers to how causality and ontology ought to be combined. Having adopted Ernst Mach's weak notion of causality, the local Viennese tradition could more easily contemplate ontologies for irreducibly statistical laws that were different from classical physics, while the Berlin tradition departed from Planck's reading of the Kantian tradition, according to which strictly deterministic laws represented an indispensable basis even for probabilistic theories.\nVienna Indeterminism, as I shall call the first reading, became characteristic for a series of physicist-philosophers connected to the Institute of Physics at the University of Vienna, among them Franz Serafin Exner, Erwin Schrödinger, Philipp Frank and Richard von Mises. It involved the acceptance of the highly improbable events admitted by the second law of thermodynamics, an assent to Mach's definition of causality in terms of functional dependencies, an empiricist shift of the burden of proof on the determinist's shoulders, and the adoption of the relative frequency interpretation of probability. Planck and his student Moritz Schlick initially rejected all of these creeds.\nWhile the Viennese reading of Boltzmann's legacy made it possible to accept probabilistic laws as genuine laws years before the advent of quantum mechanics, Schlick had to take a strictly verificationist tack to reconcile his views on probability with the failure of a Kant-inspired notion of causality enforced by the changes in physics. Until his death however, Schlick remained committed to the Spielraum interpretation of Johannes von Kries, compensating his qualified acceptance of indeterminism with an emphasis on the limits of language that were enforced by Heisenberg's uncertainty relations.\nIn view of claims that scientists' abandonment of determinism and causality was triggered, or at least enhanced, by external factors, among them the anti-scientific Weimar milieu and Bohr's power politics, the reconstruction of the philosophical debates between Vienna and Berlin requires historical contextualization. To this end, I initially recapitulate the Forman thesis and the discussions ensuing from it. Most important among them are the recent books of Cushing and Beller that, rejecting Forman's strong claims, nevertheless deny any constructive influence of the scientific aspirations of German physicists on the philosophical debates about causality and indeterminism in the 1920s.\nAgainst this picture, I argue that the philosophical aspirations of physicist-philosophers were rather genuine and followed influential role models, among them Helmholtz and Mach. They represent a characteristic trait of the German-speaking scientific world and were expressed in academic addresses and in the publication of popular writings. After 1913, this philosophical discourse was conducted, to an increasing extent, on the pages of Die Naturwissenschaften. In a separate chapter, I study the role of philosophical and cultural matters in this journal, which can hardly be separated from the personality of its founding editor Arnold Berliner. At about 1930, this discourse among physicist-philosophers partly merged into scientific philosophy, as conducted by Logical Empiricists, and the newly founded Erkenntnis.\nOne of the characteristic features of the discourse among physicist-philosophers was that they were not strictly indebted to philosophical schools but rather willing to form strategic alliances. Such alliances emphasized one philosophical aspect that was considered pivotal at the time which other features, often expressing severe disagreements of content, were played down. This process can be witnessed at the end of the discussion between the Viennese and the Berliners in the 1930s, at a time when Schlick had already become the center of the Vienna Circle. Being confronted with a plethora of "metaphysical" misinterpretations and having taken the linguistic turn, Frank and Schlick formed a strategic alliance on the 1936 Copenhagen Congress for the Unity of Science. It brought them into opposition with Schrödinger's quest for a modification of quantum mechanics, although Schrödinger continued to be a staunch advocate of indeterminism. This year thus signifies the end of the coherence of Vienna Indeterminism, a tradition that reaches back to the publication of Boltzmann's Lectures of Gas Theory.