Quantum Entanglement, Internality and Dependence

Pasqualini, Matías Daniel

Published Jan 1, 2025• 0 citations

Abstract

The metaphysics of quantum entanglement has been a subject of interest among philosophers of physics in recent decades. Entanglement is commonly described as a relation that does not depend on the intrinsic properties of its relata. This feature has led some authors to propose that the quantum reality is fundamentally relational and/or holistic. Moreover, it has been employed to support various influential metaphysical perspectives within the metaphysics of science, including structuralism, monism, and, recently, coherentism. This paper advocates a non-reductionist approach to internal relations, drawing on Fine’s analysis of propositions involving essential properties. Assuming the pervasiveness of quantum entanglement, it is argued that treating it as an internal relation is the most compelling option. Under this interpretation, entanglement can be accommodated within different metaphysical frameworks: (1) as a fundamental internal relation, it aligns with structuralism; (2) as a derivative internal relation, it is compatible with monism; and (3) as a relation of dependence, it supports coherentism.

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