In this chapter it is argued that the decisive argument against the reducibility of causal relations comes from quantum physics. Bell’s theorem proves that no dynamics based on the local, intrinsic properties of quantum objects can yield the empirical predictions of quantum mechanics. Nonetheless, it is argued that quantum entanglement by no means implies that we have to abandon an ontology of objects in favour of an ontology of structures. All extant proposals for a quantum ontology of matter in spacetime are committed to objects, whose dynamics are determined not by their local, intrinsic properties, but by an holistic property instantiated by all the objects together—a structure that takes all the objects in the universe as its relata. The view set out in this chapter combines ontic structural realism with an ontology of objects that can be conceived as substances.
In this chapter it is argued that the decisive argument against the reducibility of causal relations comes from quantum physics. Bell’s theorem proves that no dynamics based on the local, intrinsic properties of quantum objects can yield the empirical predictions of quantum mechanics. Nonetheless, it is argued that quantum entanglement by no means implies that we have to abandon an ontology of objects in favour of an ontology of structures. All extant proposals for a quantum ontology of matter in spacetime are committed to objects, whose dynamics are determined not by their local, intrinsic properties, but by an holistic property instantiated by all the objects together—a structure that takes all the objects in the universe as its relata. The view set out in this chapter combines ontic structural realism with an ontology of objects that can be conceived as substances.
As far as classical physics is concerned, it is possible to trace causal relations between physical objects (i.e. particles in this case) back to intrinsic properties of these objects (such as their mass and charge). On this view, causal relations turn out to be internal instead of external relations, supervening on intrinsic properties of the relata (as proposed by Heil and Lowe). However, one can raise doubts about this view already in Newtonian mechanics. The decisive blow to this view comes from quantum physics, with Bell’s theorem proving that no dynamics based on local, intrinsic properties of quantum objects can yield the empirical predictions of quantum mechanics. Nonetheless, quantum entanglement by no means implies that we have to abandon an ontology of objects (i.e. substances such as particles) in favour of an ontology of structures (as claimed by French and Ladyman). Any of the known proposals for a quantum ontology of matter in space-time is committed to objects. However, on any of these proposals, what determines the dynamics of these objects are not local, intrinsic properties, but a global or holistic property instantiated by all the objects together – that is, a structure that takes all the objects in the universe as its relata. The view set out in this paper thus amounts to combining ontic structural realism with an ontology of objects that can be conceived as substances. This suggestion is illustrated by drawing on the ontology of quantum physics worked out by Bohm and Bell. 1.
The paper sides with the primitive ontology approach to quantum physics, as exemplified notably in Bohmian mechanics. It argues that the objects of the primitive ontology of quantum physics are structurally individuated by the spatial relations in which they stand. They neither have a primitive thisness (haecceity) nor intrinsic properties (such as mass or charge), but only stand in spatial relations. These relations make it that they are physical objects. Furthermore, in virtue of these relations, they are individuals, being absolutely discernible. Ontic structural realism thus plays a twofold role in the philosophy of quantum physics: it comes in not only at the level of the dynamics (structures of entanglement), but already at the level of the objects (primitive ontology) that instantiate the structures of entanglement, these objects being individuated by spatial relations.
Discussing the contemporary debate about the metaphysics of relations and structural realism, I analyse the philosophical significance of relational quantum mechanics (RQM). Relativising properties of objects (or systems) to other objects (or systems), RQM affirms that reality is inherently relational. My claim is that RQM can be seen as an instantiation of the ontology of ontic structural realism, for which relations are prior to objects, since it provides good reasons for the argument from the primacy of relation. In order to provide some evidence, RQM is interpreted focusing on its metametaphysics, in particular in relation to the very concept of relation, and to the meaning such concept assumes in the dispute between realism and antirealism.
We develop and extend a foundational program in which physical reality isreconceived as an architecture of constraints on correlations rather than a collectionof independently existing objects. Building on the limitations establishedby Bell inequalities, the Kochen–Specker theorem, and Leggett–Garg inequalities,we argue that these results collectively mandate a shift in the ontologicalfoundations of physics: from substance ontology to what we term correlationalontology. We introduce a formal framework for generalized correlation structures,examine their relationship to the non-signaling polytope and the Tsirelsonbound, and propose a hierarchy of physical theories indexed by their permissiblecorrelation geometries. We further argue that non-observable structures — thoseunderlying but not reducible to empirical correlations — must be understood asrelational and informational rather than as hidden substates in any classicalsense. Central to our proposal is the thesis that quantum entanglement, farfrom being a genuinely non-local phenomenon, is best understood as ordinarylocality within a distinct quantum environment whose intrinsic geometry differsfrom classical Minkowski space. This reframing resolves the apparent paradoxof action-at-a-distance and deepens the structuralist realist interpretation ofquantum mechanics. Finally, we explore the epistemological implications ofthis shift, arguing that it does not entail anti-realism but rather a structuralistrealism in which the observable is a projection of a richer relational order.
The aim of this work is to study the ontological thesis defended by Ontic Structural Realism, which, in general, states that the ontological commitments should be focused in the relations and not on objects. This would be a more coherent realist stance towards modern physical theories. In first place we will study the ontological conception defended by the Ontic Structural Realism, which, broadly speaking, postulates that the ontological focus should be placed on relations rather than on objects. This, in turn, would constitute a realistic interpretation of the current physical theories. Secondly, as a possible defense to the position stated by Ontic Structural Realism, the concept of non-supervenient relations will be studied and it will be argued that it is this type of relations that acquires a fundamental character in Quantum Mechanics, as, for example, in phenomena such as the so-called quantum entanglement.
This paper presents a conceptually simple account of the EPR argument and Bell’s theorem using entangled photon polarization experiments. It clarifies how quantum correlations arise from conditioning outcomes through fundamental properties of quantum entanglement that result in conditional probability structures rather than from superluminal influences or pre-existing particle properties. Building on this analysis, the paper explores the informational and philosophical consequences of Bell violations. Hidden-variable theories are shown to entail severe informational overhead by requiring microscopic labeling of otherwise indistinguishable particles, whereas quantum mechanics encodes structure economically through relational constraints on joint outcomes. A striking but rarely-emphasized feature of Bell-type experiments is that while traditionally the geometery of the apparatus used to carry out these experiments are aligned with each other, according to quantum mechanics the physical orientations of the apparatus have no physical meaning with respect to one another at the time of measurement. The geometry is defined only locally, relative to the laboratory in which the tests is set. The essay further argues that Bell’s theorem motivates a shift from object-centered classical realism toward a form of realism referred to as “Relational Realism” wherein correlations and informational structure are ontologically primary, while objects having individual properties are contextual and derivative. This perspective dissolves the traditional realism-versus-idealism dichotomy and situates quantum mechanics as a fundamentally relational theory of physical reality rather than an incomplete classical one.