Emerging network applications are based on collaborative environments that rely on the secure group-based communication paradigm. These protocols use traditional public-key cryptography (PKC) for authenticating the group members and exchange secret keys. However, the foreseeable breakthrough of quantum computers represents a risk for the secure systems based on PKC. In order to prepare for such an event, quantum-secure group-based communications must be established. Post-quantumcryptography (PQC) and quantum-key distribution (QKD) are two quantum-resistant technologies that can be used for enabling the long term security in such collaborative environments. This work proposes four quantum-secure group-based communication solutions, based on contributory and decentralized protocols. PQC and hybrid technologies (PQC/QKD) are explored. The solutions use PQC Key-exchange algorithms or QKD protocols (decoy-BB84 and T12) for key generation and PQC signature algorithms for authentication. For the first time hybrid schemes for group-based technologies are designed and explored. Results show that the group-based decentralized protocol (PQC SLIMCAST) outperforms the contributory protocol PQC GAKE. The PQC-based approaches have a better performance than the QKD versions.
Emerging network applications are based on collaborative environments that rely on the secure group-based communication paradigm. These protocols use traditional public-key cryptography (PKC) for authenticating the group members and exchange secret keys. However, the foreseeable breakthrough of quantum computers represents a risk for the secure systems based on PKC. In order to prepare for such an event, quantum-secure group-based communications must be established. Post-quantumcryptography (PQC) and quantum-key distribution (QKD) are two quantum-resistant technologies that can be used for enabling the long term security in such collaborative environments. This work proposes four quantum-secure group-based communication solutions, based on contributory and decentralized protocols. PQC and hybrid technologies (PQC/QKD) are explored. The solutions use PQC Key-exchange algorithms or QKD protocols (decoy-BB84 and T12) for key generation and PQC signature algorithms for authentication. For the first time hybrid schemes for group-based technologies are designed and explored. Results show that the group-based decentralized protocol (PQC SLIMCAST) outperforms the contributory protocol PQC GAKE. The PQC-based approaches have a better performance than the QKD versions.
Large quantum computers will be able to break the cryptographic algorithms on which current secure communications rely on. Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) and Quantum key distribution (QKD) are two security technologies that show protection capabilities against the latent quantum threat. While PQC relies on different hard mathematical problems to develop a wide variety of cryptographic operations, QKD is based on quantum physics laws to generate and distribute symmetric cryptographic keys through different QKD protocols. These keys can be used by different applications to perform security transformations. QKD still requires authentication to prevent man-in-the-middle attacks. The hybridization of PQC and QKD is an important step for future secure infrastructures, being able to provide long-term security. In this work we propose authenticated QKD approaches that rely on pre-shared keys and hybrid PQC/QKD alternatives and which are able to securely exchange secret QKD keys through authenticated channels. We identify the different configuration alternatives and their parameters, as well as we develop a wide performance evaluation. Results show that pre-shared keys and PQC-based authentication through Dilithium algorithm are the fastest alternatives. Also, we show the potential of the T12 QKD protocol.
The Hybrid approach in Quantum Cryptography creates adaptable security model which provides the safest Communication in the emerging quantum era. The development of quantum computing raise questions about the long-term security. Traditional algorithms, such as RSA, ECC, and Diffie-Hellman, which is seemed computationally secure but it can be effectively solved by quantum algorithms such as Shor's and Grover's. This problem leads to the origination of two key trends in current studies, namely Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC), designing mathematical approaches to encryption resistant to quantum attacks; Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) using the principles of quantum mechanics to assure security in communications. Accordingly, this research proposes a hybrid security framework including reliable data encryption and authentication using PQC, combined with the safe key- exchange method of QKD. The model is implemented in Python, Qiskit, and PQClean's Kyber and Dilithium algorithms to show how these two paradigms can cooperate toward quantum- resilient communication. To present the system performance, key exchange efficiency, computational overhead, and security strength have been considered. According to the results, this hybrid approach gives superior defense against quantum threats while maintaining practical effectiveness for real-world applications such as cloud security, 6G networks, and the Internet of Things.
Quantum computing is posing a serious risk to classical cryptographic tools such as RSA and ECC as sophisticated quantum algorithms are able to crack their mathematical foundation in a time bound that is a a polynomial in the number of repetitions. In this paper, we will describe the process of integrating Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) and Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) into a hybrid approach to secure communications in the post-quantum world. The suggested methodology is a combination of the computational efficiency and scalability of PQC and the information-theoretic security and eavesdropping detection abilities of QKD. Simulation observations indicate that PQC-only systems are both faster in generating keys and scalable, but do not have a strong eavesdropping detection. On the other hand, non-conditional security is only a feature of systems based on QKD, but it is also highly overhead and slows down key rate. The hybrid PQC-Q KD model provides a balanced performance, high resilience, high authentication, high confidentiality, and realistic deployability. On balance, this discussion demonstrates that the hybrid approach is better than standalone methods and can provide a strong solution to protect against new quantum threats. The large-scale network protocol can be optimized, resources and further integration with other emerging technologies, such as 5G/6G, IoT or cloud computing, can be directed in future research.
The reliance on asymmetric public key cryptography (PKC) and symmetric encryption for cyber-security in current telecommunication networks is threatened by the emergence of powerful quantum computing technology. This is due to the ability of quantum computers to efficiently solve problems such as factorization or discrete logarithms, which are the basis for classical PKC schemes. Thus, the assumption that communications networks are secure no longer holds true. Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) and post-quantum cryptography (PQC) are the first cyber-security technologies that allow communications to resist the attacks of a quantum computer. To achieve quantum-resistant communications, the aforementioned technologies need to be incorporated into a network security protocol such as Transport Layer Security (TLS). In this paper, we describe and implement two novel, hybrid solutions in which QKD and PQC are combined inside TLS for achieving quantum-resistant authenticated key exchange: Concatenation and Exclusively-OR (XOR). We present the results, in terms of complexity and security enhancement, of integrating state-of-the-art QKD and PQC technologies into a practical, industry-ready TLS implementation. Our findings demonstrate that the adoption of a PQC-only approach enhances the TLS handshake performance by approximately 9 % compared to classical methods. Furthermore, our hybrid PQC-QKD quantum-resistant TLS comes at a performance cost of approximately 117 % during the key establishment process. In return, we substantially augment the security of the handshake, paving the road for the development of future-proof quantum-resistant communication systems based on QKD and PQC.
Quantum resistance is vital for emerging cryptographic systems as quantum technologies continue to advance towards large-scale, fault-tolerant quantum computers. Resistance may be offered by quantum key distribution (QKD), which provides information-theoretic security using quantum states of photons, but may be limited by transmission loss at long distances. An alternative approach uses classical means and is conjectured to be resistant to quantum attacks, so-called post-quantum cryptography (PQC), but it is yet to be rigorously proven, and its current implementations are computationally expensive. To overcome the security and performance challenges present in each, here we develop hybrid protocols by which QKD and PQC inter-operate within a joint quantum-classical network. In particular, we consider different hybrid designs that may offer enhanced speed and/or security over the individual performance of either approach. Furthermore, we present a method for analyzing the security of hybrid protocols in key distribution networks. Our hybrid approach paves the way for joint quantum-classical communication networks, which leverage the advantages of both QKD and PQC and can be tailored to the requirements of various practical networks.
Quantum computing threatens traditional cryptographic systems based on integer factorization and discrete logarithm problems. This paper proposes a hybrid secure communication framework integrating Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) with Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) for authentication. The BB84 protocol is used for quantum key generation, while CRYSTALS-Dilithium signatures secure the classical communication channel. A Python-based simulator models photon transmission, Quantum Bit Error Rate (QBER), intercept-resend attacks, and authentication verification. Results show that QBER increases proportionally with eavesdropping probability, enabling reliable attack detection. The integration of QKD secrecy with PQC authentication ensures both confidentiality and integrity. Performance evaluation demonstrates that the additional latency introduced by PQC authentication remains within acceptable limits. The proposed hybrid framework provides a scalable and quantum-resistant solution suitable for next-generation secure communication systems.