Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

HOPOS The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science

Grete Hermann’s Transformation of Neo-Kantianism: From Quantum Physics to Ethics

Andrea Reichenberger

Published Oct 24, 2025• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Grete Hermann’s philosophical work on the foundations of quantum mechanics has recently received increased attention and appreciation. This includes her critique of John von Neumann’s “no hidden variables” proof and her neo-Kantian considerations on causality. I argue that Hermann, who was a German mathematician, physicist, and philosopher, took a critical view of Leonard Nelson’s interpretation of Kant. Her aim was to challenge Nelson’s dogmatism through her interpretation of quantum physics. Support for this thesis can be found in her interpretation of Bohr’s complementarity principle and her criticism of Heisenberg’s cut and von Neumann’s proof of the impossibility of hidden variables. Over the years, Hermann progressively distanced herself from Nelson, adopting a more liberal and democratic interpretation of Kant, and became a committed advocate of research ethics and responsibility in science and politics.

DOI
10.1086/739307

Related papers

From Quantum Physics to Ethics: Grete Hermann on Heisenberg’s Cut

Andrea Reichenberger

In recent years, Grete Hermann (1901–1984) has been rediscovered as a principal figure in the history and philosophy of quantum physics. In particular, her criticism of Johann von Neumann’s so-called “no hidden variables” proof is a focal point of interest. Did she really find a mistake in this proof? We argue that the whole debate is misleading. It fits too well with the image of a forgotten woman who disproved a result of a mathematical genius, but it is neither historically nor systematically justified. Despite Hermann’s challenging thoughts on quantum physics, her impressive and important achievements were in ethics and politics. We offer a new and broader reading of Hermann’s interpretation of quantum physics and try to build a bridge between her works on quantum physics and ethics. In doing so, we focus on her interpretation of Heisenberg’s cut as a methaphorical device to argue against Leonard Nelson’s theory of free will and for freedom and responsibility as cornerstones of any democratic society.

Cambridge University Press eBooks•Jun 19, 2025•0 citations

The Natural-Philosophical Foundations of Quantum Mechanics (Excerpt)

Guido Bacciagaluppi, Elise Crull

This is a translation of the excerpts published in Naturwissenschaften of Grete Hermann’s 1935 essay on philosophy of quantum mechanics, recently translated into English. Her main thesis, in line with her natural-philosophical training and neo-Kantian commitments, is to argue that quantum mechanics does not refute the principle of causality. Quantum mechanics cannot be completed by, hidden variables, because it is already causally complete (albeit retroductively). In establishing this provocative thesis, she makes important use of Bohr’s principles of correspondence and complementarity and of Weizsäcker's version of the gamma-ray microscope, arguing that the lesson of quantum mechanics is the impossibility of an absolute description of nature independent of the context of observation.

Cambridge University Press eBooks•Nov 14, 2024•0 citations

Grete Hermann as Neo-Kantian Philosopher of Space and Time Representation

Erik C. Banks

Grete Hermann’s essay “Die naturphilosophischen Grundlagen der Quantenmechanik” (1935) has received much deserved scholarly attention in recent years. In this paper, I follow the lead of Elise Crull (2017) who sees in Hermann’s work the general outlines of a neo-Kantian interpretation of quantum theory. In full support of this view, I focus on Hermann’s central claim that limited spatio-temporal, and even analogically causal, representations of events exist within an overall relational structure of entangled quantum mechanical states that defy any unified spatio-temporal description. In my view, Hermann also advances an important transcendental argument that perspectival spatio-temporal representations of nature have their foundations in general relational networks that are not spatio-temporal. The key point is that the adoption of a perspectival system within the general network induces the representation but only for that context. These ideas are consistent with a perspectival subject–object principle in Kant and also with Weyl’s work on Lie groups and their representations.

Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy•Feb 5, 2018•4 citations

Grete Hermann: the quantum physicist who was overlooked

Sidney Perkowitz

Sidney Perkowitz uncovers the pioneering work of the German physicist and philosopher Grete Hermann, who sparred with the likes of Werner Heisenberg and John von Neumann — but whose contributions to quantum science have only recently come to light.

Physics World•Jun 1, 2025•0 citations

Translation of three short papers by Grete Hermann (with introduction)

Guido Bacciagaluppi

Grete Hermann (1901-1984) was one of the most interesting neo-Kantian philosophers and one of the central figures in philosophy of physics during the first half of the last century. Here I introduce and translate three short but representative papers by Hermann.

•Nov 22, 2020•0 citations

Heisenberg and the Transformation of Kantian Philosophy

Kristian Camilleri

In this paper, I argue that Heisenberg's mature philosophy of quantum mechanics must be understood in the context of his epistemological project to reinterpret and redefine Kant's notion of the a priori. After discussions with Weizsäcker and Hermann in Leipzig in the 1930s, Heisenberg attempted to ground his interpretation of quantum mechanics on what might be termed a ‘practical’ transformation of Kantian philosophy. Taking as his starting point, Bohr's doctrine of the indispensability of classical concepts, Heisenberg argued that concepts such as space, time and causality can be regarded as ‘practically a priori’, in so far as they remain the conditions for the possibility of experience and even of ‘objective reality’, though they are not universal and necessary in a strictly Kantian sense. We cannot avoid using classical concepts in the description of experiments in quantum theory, despite the fact that there are limits to their applicability. Such concepts are, for Heisenberg, historically contingent, yet indispensable in our time, because we have no other language through which we can describe and conceive of the interaction between ‘object’ and ‘measuring device’.

International Studies in the Philosophy of Science•Oct 1, 2005•13 citations
Grete Hermann’s philosophical work on the foundations of quantum mechanics has recently received increased attention and appreciation. This includes her critique of John von Neumann’s “no hidden variables” proof and her neo-Kantian considerations on causality. I argue that Hermann, who was a German mathematician, physicist, and philosopher, took a critical view of Leonard Nelson’s interpretation of Kant. Her aim was to challenge Nelson’s dogmatism through her interpretation of quantum physics. Support for this thesis can be found in her interpretation of Bohr’s complementarity principle and her criticism of Heisenberg’s cut and von Neumann’s proof of the impossibility of hidden variables. Over the years, Hermann progressively distanced herself from Nelson, adopting a more liberal and democratic interpretation of Kant, and became a committed advocate of research ethics and responsibility in science and politics.
In recent years, Grete Hermann (1901–1984) has been rediscovered as a principal figure in the history and philosophy of quantum physics. In particular, her criticism of Johann von Neumann’s so-called “no hidden variables” proof is a focal point of interest. Did she really find a mistake in this proof? We argue that the whole debate is misleading. It fits too well with the image of a forgotten woman who disproved a result of a mathematical genius, but it is neither historically nor systematically justified. Despite Hermann’s challenging thoughts on quantum physics, her impressive and important achievements were in ethics and politics. We offer a new and broader reading of Hermann’s interpretation of quantum physics and try to build a bridge between her works on quantum physics and ethics. In doing so, we focus on her interpretation of Heisenberg’s cut as a methaphorical device to argue against Leonard Nelson’s theory of free will and for freedom and responsibility as cornerstones of any democratic society.
This is a translation of the excerpts published in Naturwissenschaften of Grete Hermann’s 1935 essay on philosophy of quantum mechanics, recently translated into English. Her main thesis, in line with her natural-philosophical training and neo-Kantian commitments, is to argue that quantum mechanics does not refute the principle of causality. Quantum mechanics cannot be completed by, hidden variables, because it is already causally complete (albeit retroductively). In establishing this provocative thesis, she makes important use of Bohr’s principles of correspondence and complementarity and of Weizsäcker's version of the gamma-ray microscope, arguing that the lesson of quantum mechanics is the impossibility of an absolute description of nature independent of the context of observation.
Grete Hermann’s essay “Die naturphilosophischen Grundlagen der Quantenmechanik” (1935) has received much deserved scholarly attention in recent years. In this paper, I follow the lead of Elise Crull (2017) who sees in Hermann’s work the general outlines of a neo-Kantian interpretation of quantum theory. In full support of this view, I focus on Hermann’s central claim that limited spatio-temporal, and even analogically causal, representations of events exist within an overall relational structure of entangled quantum mechanical states that defy any unified spatio-temporal description. In my view, Hermann also advances an important transcendental argument that perspectival spatio-temporal representations of nature have their foundations in general relational networks that are not spatio-temporal. The key point is that the adoption of a perspectival system within the general network induces the representation but only for that context. These ideas are consistent with a perspectival subject–object principle in Kant and also with Weyl’s work on Lie groups and their representations.
In this paper, I argue that Heisenberg's mature philosophy of quantum mechanics must be understood in the context of his epistemological project to reinterpret and redefine Kant's notion of the a priori. After discussions with Weizsäcker and Hermann in Leipzig in the 1930s, Heisenberg attempted to ground his interpretation of quantum mechanics on what might be termed a ‘practical’ transformation of Kantian philosophy. Taking as his starting point, Bohr's doctrine of the indispensability of classical concepts, Heisenberg argued that concepts such as space, time and causality can be regarded as ‘practically a priori’, in so far as they remain the conditions for the possibility of experience and even of ‘objective reality’, though they are not universal and necessary in a strictly Kantian sense. We cannot avoid using classical concepts in the description of experiments in quantum theory, despite the fact that there are limits to their applicability. Such concepts are, for Heisenberg, historically contingent, yet indispensable in our time, because we have no other language through which we can describe and conceive of the interaction between ‘object’ and ‘measuring device’.