Grete Hermann’s essay “Die naturphilosophischen Grundlagen der Quantenmechanik” (1935) has received much deserved scholarly attention in recent years. In this paper, I follow the lead of Elise Crull (2017) who sees in Hermann’s work the general outlines of a neo-Kantian interpretation of quantum theory. In full support of this view, I focus on Hermann’s central claim that limited spatio-temporal, and even analogically causal, representations of events exist within an overall relational structure of entangled quantum mechanical states that defy any unified spatio-temporal description. In my view, Hermann also advances an important transcendental argument that perspectival spatio-temporal representations of nature have their foundations in general relational networks that are not spatio-temporal. The key point is that the adoption of a perspectival system within the general network induces the representation but only for that context. These ideas are consistent with a perspectival subject–object principle in Kant and also with Weyl’s work on Lie groups and their representations.
Grete Hermann’s essay “Die naturphilosophischen Grundlagen der Quantenmechanik” (1935) has received much deserved scholarly attention in recent years. In this paper, I follow the lead of Elise Crull (2017) who sees in Hermann’s work the general outlines of a neo-Kantian interpretation of quantum theory. In full support of this view, I focus on Hermann’s central claim that limited spatio-temporal, and even analogically causal, representations of events exist within an overall relational structure of entangled quantum mechanical states that defy any unified spatio-temporal description. In my view, Hermann also advances an important transcendental argument that perspectival spatio-temporal representations of nature have their foundations in general relational networks that are not spatio-temporal. The key point is that the adoption of a perspectival system within the general network induces the representation but only for that context. These ideas are consistent with a perspectival subject–object principle in Kant and also with Weyl’s work on Lie groups and their representations.
Grete Hermann’s philosophical work on the foundations of quantum mechanics has recently received increased attention and appreciation. This includes her critique of John von Neumann’s “no hidden variables” proof and her neo-Kantian considerations on causality. I argue that Hermann, who was a German mathematician, physicist, and philosopher, took a critical view of Leonard Nelson’s interpretation of Kant. Her aim was to challenge Nelson’s dogmatism through her interpretation of quantum physics. Support for this thesis can be found in her interpretation of Bohr’s complementarity principle and her criticism of Heisenberg’s cut and von Neumann’s proof of the impossibility of hidden variables. Over the years, Hermann progressively distanced herself from Nelson, adopting a more liberal and democratic interpretation of Kant, and became a committed advocate of research ethics and responsibility in science and politics.
This is a translation of the excerpts published in Naturwissenschaften of Grete Hermann’s 1935 essay on philosophy of quantum mechanics, recently translated into English. Her main thesis, in line with her natural-philosophical training and neo-Kantian commitments, is to argue that quantum mechanics does not refute the principle of causality. Quantum mechanics cannot be completed by, hidden variables, because it is already causally complete (albeit retroductively). In establishing this provocative thesis, she makes important use of Bohr’s principles of correspondence and complementarity and of Weizsäcker's version of the gamma-ray microscope, arguing that the lesson of quantum mechanics is the impossibility of an absolute description of nature independent of the context of observation.
In this paper, I argue that Heisenberg's mature philosophy of quantum mechanics must be understood in the context of his epistemological project to reinterpret and redefine Kant's notion of the a priori. After discussions with Weizsäcker and Hermann in Leipzig in the 1930s, Heisenberg attempted to ground his interpretation of quantum mechanics on what might be termed a ‘practical’ transformation of Kantian philosophy. Taking as his starting point, Bohr's doctrine of the indispensability of classical concepts, Heisenberg argued that concepts such as space, time and causality can be regarded as ‘practically a priori’, in so far as they remain the conditions for the possibility of experience and even of ‘objective reality’, though they are not universal and necessary in a strictly Kantian sense. We cannot avoid using classical concepts in the description of experiments in quantum theory, despite the fact that there are limits to their applicability. Such concepts are, for Heisenberg, historically contingent, yet indispensable in our time, because we have no other language through which we can describe and conceive of the interaction between ‘object’ and ‘measuring device’.
Quantum theory, particularly with its concepts of indeterminacy and superposition, demands of philosophers of science a profound review and a complete redefinition of the foundation of the notion of representation. This review has significant implications for assessing the Kantian heritage, especially for those among us who recognize the advances of the transcendental approach over realist and empiricist perspectives in epistemology. Kant endeavored to establish a foundation for the notion of representation consistent with the physics of his time. Today, as inheritors of Kant’s legacy in the philosophy of science, we face the challenge of establishing a new foundation for the idea of representation that aligns with the principles of contemporary science. In his Progress of Metaphysics, as well as in Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, Kant distinguishes between analogical (symbolic) schematism and real (transcendental) schematism. My aim in this work is to explore the notion of analogical schematism for evaluating the content of extra-empirical concepts in contemporary physical theories, where intuition proves to be intrinsically indeterminate.
In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant argues that the empirical knowledge of the world depends on a priori conditions of human sensibility and understanding, i. e., our capacities of sense experience and concept formation. The objective knowledge presupposes, on one hand, space and time as a priori conditions of sensibility and, on another hand, a priori judgments, like the principle of causality, as constitutive conditions of understanding. The problem is that in the XX century the physical science completely changed how we conceive our knowledge of the world. Face to this new situation, what was changed in our classical reason? However, if the transcendental point of view is adopted, in the specific case of quantum mechanics, we have to wonder about the general conditions of this theory that make possible such knowledge, which predictive value is much more accurate than the classical physics. The aim of this work is firstly to show the Kantian implications on Bohr’s interpretation of quantum phenomena and secondly to provide an overview of the key elements for understanding the transcendental locus of ordinary language in the quantum mechanics context, in order to give support to a transcendental pragmatic position in the analysis of science.
Abstract: In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant argues that the empirical knowledge of the world depends on a priori conditions of human sensibility and understanding, i. e., our capacities of sense experience and concept formation. The objective knowledge presupposes, on one hand, space and time as a priori conditions of sensibility and, on another hand, a priori judgments, like the principle of causality, as constitutive conditions of understanding. The problem is that in the XX century the physical science completely changed how we conceive our knowledge of the world. Face to this new situation, what was changed in our classical reason? However, if the transcendental point of view is adopted, in the specific case of quantum mechanics, we have to wonder about the general conditions of this theory that make possible such knowledge, which predictive value is much more accurate than the classical physics. The aim of this work is firstly to show the Kantian implications on Bohr’s interpretation of quantum phenomena and secondly to provide an overview of the key elements for understanding the transcendental locus of ordinary language in the quantum mechanics context, in order to give support to a transcendental pragmatic position in the analysis of science.